INDIA

A Journal for the Discussion of Indian Affairs.

REGISTERED FOR] [TRANSMISSION ABROAD.

No. 22. Vol. II.] JULY 10, 1891. [PRICE, PER COPY, 2d., or 4 as. YEARLY, POST FREE, 2/6, or 3 rs.

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THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS.

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Bombay—Pherozshah Mehta.
Madras—Anandu Charlu, M.A.

NOTES.

The *Tribune*, a most courageously-conducted and valuable journal, published twice a week at Lahore, has taken notice of a violent, not to say intemperate, article in the *Pioneer*, the pro-civilian and generally official organ, which is published at Allahabad. The *Pioneer*, in a long article, called the Secretary of the British Committee of the Congress all kinds of bad names, on the strength of the supposition that he had written the Introduction to the Report of the last Congress. This explanation will make the points in the following paragraph generally intelligible to our readers:—"Mr. Digby has a sufficiently broad back to bear much that is laid upon his shoulders, but the broadest-shouldered of us should not be made to bear the burden of others. The *Pioneer* does not love Mr. Digby over much—and, with some reason. But even the *Pioneer* should hold Mr. Digby responsible for only what he has done and not for what others may be doing. A very slight inquiry, for instance, would have satisfied the Allahabad paper that Mr. Digby is not the author of the Report of the Sixth Indian National Congress to which it devotes a column of indignation and sarcasm. After this the sneering allusion to Mr. Digby as 'a worthy successor of Mr. Barnum' falls somewhat flat. Mr. Digby has no more to do with the Report of the Sixth National Congress, or the vivid introduction which summarises the proceedings, than the editor of the *Pioneer*, or the Grand Lama of Thibet. Everyone knows who the author of the introduction is. If the generally well-informed Allahabad paper happens to be ignorant of the authorship we may inform him that it is the General Secretary of the Congress, Mr. A. O. Hume. We are aware that in the eyes of the *Pioneer* there is not much to choose between Mr. Digby and Mr. Hume, and the vicarious pillorying of the one for the other is scarcely an offence against truth. But both are pretty tough, and fair targets for bad shots." In the main the *Tribune* is correct in its statements. But, it may be added that Mr. Hume is not to be held accountable for the Introduction to the Report. He may, for aught we know, have drafted it. To those fully acquainted with the circumstances, however, it is well known that the Introduction to each Congress Report passes through many hands; when published it may be taken as representing the general opinions held by the leading Congress supporters in the place where the session of that body has been held. Consequently, Mr. Hume even may not be pilloried in the conscienceless columns of the *Pioneer* for what may appear in the Introduction in question, or in any Introduction.

The *Northampton Daily Reporter*, of June 17th, from whose columns we take the report of a meeting held in Northampton which appears elsewhere in this issue, says: "The Liberal and Radical Union unanimously decided last night to ask the National Liberal Federation to place the claims of the Indian National Congress on its programme. It is but fitting that Northampton, whose junior member took the initiative in the advocacy of Indian reform, should be to the front in wishing that work to be carried on. When that work has reached a successful issue the names of Bradlaugh and Northampton will not be forgotten, but will be coupled together in grateful remembrance."

An Indian gentleman, of middle age, now in England, studying for the Bar, Mr. Prakash Chund, who has done good service under the Government of India, has produced a Sanitary Primer in Hindustani. It may be hoped that the work will find early publication. The Indian Government is very anxious to improve Indian sanitation: it should find Mr. Chund's book the very instrument it specially requires. Mr. Chund, too, would, probably, be well-advised to take some pains to bring his book before the forthcoming Congress of Hygiene and Demography. A competent critic, Mr. F. Pincott, F.R.A.S., in a letter to the author, thus speaks of the work: "I have read through your Sanitary Primer in Hindustani with much attention, and have found it admirably suited to the present needs of India. It seems to me to be exactly the kind of book which Lord Lytton, when he was Viceroy, desired to have written. It not only deals with questions of health, as ordinarily understood, but embraces topics connected with the mental and moral states which, in so many different ways, influence the health of human beings.

This treatment of the subject is novel, and shows that you have a grand philosophical conception of the subject. I hope your book will be published speedily, for it will do much good, and ought to command a ready sale in India, and meet with official support there."

IN our review of Mr. J. H. Bell's book on Indian Reformers of fifty years ago, will be found a reference to Sir Charles Forbes, Bart. Seven years before Sir Charles joined the British India Committee, he thus expressed himself respecting the people of India:—"I have been seventeen years in this city [London], after having been twenty-two years in India: the more I see of the old country the better I like the people of India."

SIR WILLIAM HARCOURT's very mild speech in opening the Manipur debate has been variously commented upon and divers reasons assigned for the dove-like cooing of "Historicus." Mr. Maclean gives a reason for the Harcourtian mildness which is, at least, interesting. He says:—"Sir William Harcourt opened the debate in a singularly dignified and even magnanimous speech, and he spoke with especial tenderness of Lord Lansdowne, the Viceroy of India, probably from a grateful recollection of kindness shown him by the old Marquis of Lansdowne, who was the tutelary diety of aspiring Whig politicians thirty years ago, when Sir William was an ambitious young barrister."

WHO shall decide as to the merits of Sir William Harcourt's opening speech in the Manipur debate, when leading papers in the almost adjoining city of Bristol and port of Cardiff, speak in such contradictory tones as these, and one of those papers talks in two tones:—

Bristol Mercury.

Altogether Sir William made a dignified, brilliant, and effective speech, which was listened to with much interest. Mr. Gladstone refusing to be kept a prisoner in Park Lane came in smiling in the midst of his lieutenant's oration.

Mr. J. M. Maclean, M.P., in the Western Mail.

Sir W. Harcourt opened the debate in a singularly dignified and even magnanimous speech.

Western Mail.

Unfortunately, Sir William was dull—he always is dull when he has to be decorous. The dry monotony of it reminded us of the memorable occasion when Sir William made his first Budget speech—when, within half an hour of his rising, half the House was asleep. Mr. Gladstone—who had come down in honour of the occasion, looking whiter and feebler than ever—quietly dozed off while his first lieutenant droned away. In other parts of the House members were dozing in various attitudes of ungracefulness. Sir John Gorst, who, as Under Secretary for India had to reply, was straining his attention to catch the meaning of Sir William's uninteresting phrases, but the majority of members gave up the attempt to understand.

THE President of an important Literary Society, writing to the Secretary of the British Committee of the Congress, acknowledging the receipt of a batch of Congress and other Indian Reform literature, says: "For my part I shall do all I can to circulate them among our members, and trust by so doing to add my little mite towards those who are trying to make the English people think about our vast Dependencies. Judging from the past, I think your Committee have every reason to congratulate themselves upon the interest taken as a whole in Indian questions, yet we are far from doing justice to that great country. I wish you every success in your crusade."

SIR JOHN GORST has been well whipped by the press of his Party for his Manipur speech. If (says the London correspondent specially known to be a friend of Sir John's) the Conservative press in any way represents the feelings of the Conservative party, the best hated man of the day is Sir J. Gorst. Fault was found with his speech on Manipur; but his attitude in the debate on the Factories Bill has driven his critics frantic. They remember Lord Randolph Churchill as an unpleasant experience; but Sir John is far worse. "Indeed, he is accused of treachery by seizing the opportunity to ape Lord Randolph Churchill while that irrepressible politician is safe away in Mashonaland. One of the weekly reviews contains about the most savage article, directed against Sir John Gorst, that I have ever read. That unfortunate phrase, 'that Governments had always hated and discouraged independent, original talent, and promoted mediocrity,' is recalled. In prose and verse the torrent flows. Here is an example of the kind of thing:

'Thou may'st aspire (should fortune lend
To thine attempts her favouring aid)
To swagger as a People's Friend
With Burns and Dillon, Wilkes and Cade.

* * * *

'Go in and win, then, Honest John
(Or hear'st thou rather Genial Jack?),
There's praise from Labby to be won,
And from thy former friends the sack.'

No, this is not cut from one of those advanced Radical Republican papers: Not at all—it is from the *Globe.*" Another Conservative paper thus expresses itself:

"The fact is, Sir John is a very much disappointed man; he has had twenty-five years of Parliamentary life; a political life quite long enough to entitle Cabinet rank to a man of ability. Where does our extremely tall poppy find himself after a quarter of a century's splenetic service to the Conservative party? Vegetating in a third-rate £1,500 a year office. His colleague, Mr. Balfour, with eleven years' service, obtained the headship of the Local Government Board, and still vaults higher; and another colleague, Lord Randolph Churchill, was Secretary for India with the same short Parliamentary experience.

"On brooding over these things he finds he is like the Senaputty: his talents are in the way, and solely because of them he is being suppressed. Why, in seventeen years, Lord Cross, his 'mediocre' chief, was Home Secretary! The very thought of such a thing is enough to make him foreswear politics, return to Waikato, and become a Maori; or go out to Mashonaland and get up a filibustering expedition with Lord Randolph Churchill and the quartz mill; or join his brother in the solitude of Castle Combe down in Wiltshire. In case he chooses the latter, he might find time to give the public a few screeds on 'the advantages of being a fool,' and on 'political vanity.'"

Some reparation has been made to Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji by a member of Lord Salisbury's Government for the silly and malicious sneer about a "black man." Mr. Dadabhai has been invited to become a member (for India) of the governing board of the Imperial Institute. From among the many newspaper notices of the incident which have appeared we quote the following, which will serve to indicate the popularity of the appointment in this country:—

(*Daily News.*)

Mr. Naoroji has been invited by the Secretary of State for India to become one of the representatives of India on the governing body of the Imperial Institute, an invitation which he has accepted. Mr. Naoroji is well qualified for the post. The natural resources of India have been his life long study.

(*Daily Chronicle.*)

We congratulate Lord Salisbury on having at last made the discovery that his "black man" is a fit and proper person to hold an office of distinction. Mr. Naoroji, we learn, has been invited by the Secretary of State for India to become one of the representatives of India on the governing body of the Imperial Institute, an invitation which he has accepted.

(*Newcastle Daily Leader.*)

Lord Salisbury's "black man" has been receiving honour from the Government. It is announced that Mr. Naoroji has been invited by the Secretary of State for India to become one of the representatives of India on the governing body of the Imperial Institute, an invitation which he has accepted. Perhaps Lord Salisbury has discovered that a Parsee is not so black as he may be painted.

MR. HARI SING GOUR, of Downing College, Cambridge, is preparing a small book on the "Ethics of War." Mr. Gour hopes in his book to show that two nations entering upon war are quite as criminal as two bravadoes fighting a duel, and that as conquest by the one over the other shows nothing more, except perhaps the fact that the vanquisher was the greater scoundrel, so the victorious party in a war stands on no better eminence. Our "civilization and Christianity" treats a duel with a cry of horror and abhorrence, but the self-same civilization and Christianity listens with an ecstacy of triumph to the *Te Deum* rung over the corpses of many unsuspecting and innocent enemies.

IS AGITATION IN ENGLAND ON BEHALF OF INDIA JUSTIFIED BY RESULTS?

WORK HALF-A-CENTURY AGO AND TO-DAY.

"Mr. Pease, if you were in India your sympathy would not be for those that die, but for the millions still walking above ground, pining away a miserable existence, who cannot get dead."—*William Adam, of Calcutta, to Joseph Pease.*

THERE is, probably, among all thinking persons in India, no question more frequently asked just now than that which constitutes the title of this article. In view of the contemptuous manner in which Her Majesty's Government has treated Indian Councils' Reform during the past two sessions, while full attention has been given to the smaller grievances of two minor Colonies, a negative answer alone might seem possible. And, to those who take short views of events, the negative answer would seem complete and satisfactory, leaving no alternative. The uselessness of appealing to England for redress would, so far as Indian subjects of the Crown are concerned, appear clear. Short views are seldom justifiable in any respect, least of all in politics. A sufficiently long view demonstrates that, under our present system of government, agitation in England on behalf of India is fully justified by the results which are achieved. We know no better tonic for the politically depressed and temporarily despairing Indian reformer than a perusal of the most excellent work* which Mr. J. Hyslop Bell has just published. Mr. Bell, whose long and honoured connection with British journalism as proprietor and director of the *Northern Echo*, of Darlington, are well known, has written a book which tells of worthy and successful efforts connected with India put forth half-a-century ago—efforts known only to a very few, events wholly deserving of the permanent record which they have now obtained.

This book owes its origin to the visit of the Congress delegates to Britain in 1890. A seeming failure on their part is the occasion of this great success. On the day the delegates were due, in accordance with the programme arranged, at Edinburgh, so many and so great were the counter-attractions—Stanley was lecturing, a Carnegie Free Library was being opened—that it was determined no public meeting should be held. The public meeting being inadvisable, a venerable lady, Mrs. Pease-Nichol, widow of one of the greatest astronomers of the century, convened a drawing-room meeting at Huntly Lodge, her residence, at which the delegates were met by a number of the most patriotic of Scotsmen. Mrs. Nichol, fifty years earlier, was actively engaged in precisely the same work as that which the delegates wished to advance. As Miss Pease she was her father's right-hand in his efforts on behalf of India: so thoroughly did she master the facts of the day that Daniel O'Connell, speaking from a brief which had been placed in his hands, declared that it was one of the most masterly documents of the kind he had ever been favoured with. He did not know, when he said this, that he was paying a compliment to a lady, and that lady, Miss Pease, but he was soon able to place his acknowledgment in the right quarter. The meeting in Edinburgh led to Mrs. Nichol recalling the incidents connected with the British India Committee of 1837-46, hunting up correspondence, memoranda, pamphlets, published at the time. These memorabilia were handed to Mrs. Nichol's friend, Mr. J. H. Bell, who, to a perusal of the papers given him, added a study of contemporary official and other publications concerning India. This most interesting book is the result of his industry and research.

So closely packed are Mr. Bell's pages with facts and incidents that it is impossible to summarise within reasonable space the story he tells. The story can only be appreciated as it deserves by those who go to the book itself and read its every page. It will be found by those who take this course that a quiet, unassuming Quaker man of business, living in South Durham, practically gave up the nine last years of his life to the endeavour to procure justice for his fellow-subjects, people of an alien race whom he had never seen, who never saw him, whose successors to-day, probably, do not know his name. Unlike other movements of a cognate character, the British India Society's work in the earlier years of the Queen's reign was a provincial rather than a metropolitan one. It is true there was a London Committee, but, for reasons which are made clear, it did little work. The brunt of the conflict was borne by the provincial committees, especially by the South Durham Committee, whose headquarters were at Darlington. Mr. Bell does not, in so many words, say so, but he evidently thinks that the duties now performed by the British Committee of the Indian National Congress would lose nothing if to the metropolitan organisation were added provincial committees. In this he is, no doubt, correct. But the men to do what Joseph Pease and others accomplished in "the Thirties" have not yet revealed themselves. Probably, Mr. Bell is destined to be the pioneer of this branch of the movement. There is work to be done for India to-day as great as was done in Joseph Pease's day—if anything, far greater: it will not be done without the help of the constituencies; the help of the constituencies can only be secured by the instruction of the electors: the need for effort in the provinces, where six-sevenths of the electors live, is, therefore, supreme. As this book is the outcome of a meeting held far from London, it may be hoped that, as the result of Mr. Bell's publication, the provinces may be organised, and the British public, everywhere in the United Kingdom, made acquainted with Indian facts and the terribly imperative need for Indian reform.

The distrust felt in London as a centre of active propaganda agency or of direct influence for good is strongly expressed here and there. For example, Mr. Pease, writing in 1839 to Mr. F. Carnac Brown, of Tellicherry, Madras, Secretary of the London Committee, says: "London has always resembled (in my eyes) a great stagnant pool. Philanthropic and good men have not the power to stir its depths. The smiles of the great, aided sometimes by the influence of interested men, have paralysed therein many a noble cause." At the same time Mr. Pease is compelled to add: "Yet to a Society formed in London the Ministers of State in our country always look as speaking the voice of the nation." Then, is added a remark which should be taken to heart by Indian reformers as justifying, and promising success to, the proposed session of the National Congress in London in 1892. "In the great cause of emancipation, for instance," remarks Mr. Pease, "our London Society agreed with Ministers; and it was only when the provinces, throughout Britain, appealed to by large public meetings, sent from three hundred to four hundred delegates to London, we carried, in August last, immediate emancipation." Slightly altered, the historian of the Reform movement of the present time will have to pen this sentence in recording the manner in which justice for India was obtained in the British Parliament. Mr. W. H. Smith has obligingly made such a conclusion certain by the postponement this Session of the Indian Councils' Amendment Bill. There can be no doubt that events fully justified Mr. Pease's strictures. The London Committee showed great lack of back bone, proved itself amenable to influences which ought not to have had any weight with it, and lagged greatly behind the provincial committees, especially that in South Durham. How singularly incidents in public movements repeat themselves is proved by the part which Sir Charles Forbes, Bart., once of Bombay, played in the affairs of the Committee. Like Sir Richard Garth to-day, Sir Charles was a strong Tory in English politics and an advanced Liberal in respect to India. When, with a view of strengthening its position with the political parties in this country, the British India Committee determined to ally itself with the Free Traders and to get all the help it could from the Anti-Corn Law League, Sir Charles Forbes retired from association with the Indian reformers under circumstances almost identical with those which has led Sir Richard Garth—because the help of the Liberal Party has been promised to the present Committee—to ban a movement which is destined to obtain for India those reforms which he considers

* "British Folks and British India Fifty Years Ago: Joseph Pease and his Contemporaries." With Illustrations. Containing letters by Thomas Clarkson, Daniel O'Connell, Wendell Phillips, William Lloyd Garrison, Joseph Pease, Richard Cobden, Francis Carnac Brown, George Thompson, James Cosmo Melville, and others. By John Hyslop Bell. John Heywood, Manchester, and London.

essential. In many other ways, too, the history of the British Indian Committee of fifty years ago, is the history of the Congress British Committee of to-day, but time and space do not permit the working out of the parallel.

Mr. Pease's main object was the abolition of slavery in India. It was his delight, within three years of his death, and after six years' agitation, to be assured that he had succeeded in his chief effort, and that slavery in India was abolished. In handing Mr. Pease a copy of the Act of abolition Mr. Melville, the Secretary at the India House, generously and truthfully remarked: "You have had something to do with this", intending that his words should carry the full meaning of which they were capable. That same Mr. Melville, by the way, set an example which might be followed with advantage at the India Office to-day. Of course, the Committee were greatly abused when they began operations, motives were imputed to them: in a word, the gamut of abuse and distrust which nowadays provides the staple of the comments made by the *Pioneer* and the *Englishman* in India, and of *Allen's Indian Mail* in England—before that journal ended its existence, long after life had left its body—was freely made use of in England in 1837–1842. By a fortunate circumstance Mr. Pease and Mr. Melville, the Secretary of the East India Company, became acquainted with each other. The last-named gentleman recognised the sincerity of the motives, the purity of the action, of Mr. Pease and his friends, and at once established friendly relations with the Committee, welcoming its Chairman to the India House, and freely placing the knowledge of that establishment at the service of the reformers. This was wise in every sense, and contributed to smooth working where antagonism and irritation might have been looked for. It was not only in regard to slavery, however, that the Committee exerted itself: the amelioration of the condition of the suffering Indian people was ever to the fore. Great exertions were made to promote the growth of cotton and sugar in India for two reasons: first, the benefit of the cultivators, and next the discomfiture of the cotton-growers in the Southern States of America, and thus procure the overthrow of the slavery in that country, while West Indian slave-apprenticers would be brought to their senses. There is abundant evidence to prove that the Southern planters and West Indian growers feared that the object would be only too fully attained. The starving millions of India were always in the mind of Joseph Pease and his colleagues. Here, for example, is a passage from a letter written by Joseph Pease to the venerable Thomas Clarkson, one of the great leaders in slave emancipation, then, between eighty and ninety years, living in Ipswich, but notwithstanding his great age, an earnest member of the Committee. "I fear," says Mr. Pease, "even the able lectures of Thompson on cotton and sugar have too much diverted the public mind from the awful facts, that millions and tens of millions were famishing in India on a single meal a day, and, according to the clearest evidence given before the House of Commons, a considerable proportion of the mortality of human beings in India are deaths by starvation. When I remarked on this fearful holocaust to William Adam, of Calcutta, he stopped me, saying, "Mr. Pease, if you were in India your sympathy would not be for those that die, but for the millions still walking above ground, pining away a miserable experience, who cannot get dead!"

As we have said, we commend this work most heartily to all who are interested in Indian reform. An idea of the character of the contents may be judged by an incident or two which we cull from Mr. Bell's valuable pages.

The Melvilles and the East India Company.

"At the time of which we write it was almost impossible to take up any leading English or Indian newspaper without encountering the name of Melville. 'James Cosmo Melville' figured more frequently than the name of any other public official in the advertising columns of the London newspapers. In the military department of the India Government the signature of his brother, Phillip Melville, was deemed omnipotent. At Haileybury, 'the Company's College,' the Rev. Henry Melville's certificate was almost a passport to fortune. James Cosmo Melville, jun., held an important appointment in his father's bureau. The fourth and youngest of four brothers, Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Melville was in India, and held the office of military and naval secretary in the Presidency of Bombay; while a second son of James Cosmo Melville, the potent secretary to the East India Company, was under secretary in Bengal in both the Home and Finance departments.

"The head of this powerful family, James Cosmo Melville, was the gentleman whom Joseph Pease interviewed, and whom he came to regard as a personage not wholly deaf to the appeals of humanity, and eminently accessible through a highly cultivated intellect to every honest plea or plan for the commercial well-being of India. In the service of the Company since 1812, and now in the highest grade of that service, Mr. Melville had been appointed Secretary of the Military Department in the East India House in 1837; had become personally impressed with the benevolent purposes of the energetic Quaker; and had avowed himself anxious, so far as his official duties would permit, to give heed to the meek memorials and somewhat persistent expostulations he had from time to time addressed to the Directors."

The Formation of the London British India Society.

"On Saturday, July 6th, in Freemasons' Hall, the formal public inauguration of the London British India Society took place. There was a great public meeting. The room and galleries were completely crowded. Many ladies were present. The platform presented such an array of Indian notables as had seldom, if ever before, been seen in any London assembly. These included the Nawab Eckbaloo Dowlah, Prince of Oude; the Prince Jama-ood-Deen, son of the late Tippoo Sultan; Meer Afzul Ali, and Meer Kurreem Ali, agents in this country of the Rajah of Sattara; Ishanger Naoroojee and Hirjeebhoy Merwanjee, young gentlemen from Bombay, acquiring a knowledge of shipbuilding on the Thames; and Dorabjee Mancherjee, merchant, also from Bombay. Eminent Anglo-Indians a few, including Sir Charles Forbes, Bart., who lamented that they were so few, Sir Jeremiah Bryant, C.B., Sir Henry Strachey, Bart., Major-Generals Briggs, Goodfellow, White, and Robertson, Colonels Burney, Thompson, Nicholson, and Sykes, members of Parliament, including Daniel O'Connell, Francis Finch, recently returned by Walsall, his constituency thus recognising his useful exertions out of Parliament six years before in successfully opposing the renewal of commercial powers in the charter of the East India Company, William Ewart, elected the previous March, along with Lord Teignmouth, by Marylebone, Aaron Chapman, of an old Quaker family from Whitby, Archibald Hastie, who has been two years the representative of Paisley, and is an earnest supporter of reforms for British India, Charles P. Villiers, a convinced free-trader, who is as yet only at the beginning of the more than half century he will serve his country as the elect of Wolverhampton. Then Joseph Pease, Joseph Sturge, Thomas Frankland, of Liverpool, George Stacey, John Beaumont, and Dr. Hodgkin, represent on the platform the Friends, of whom several others of both sexes may be recognised by their garb in all parts of the hall. Leonard Raisbeck, of Stockton, and Joseph Sams, from Darlington, and nearly all their colleagues of the provisional committee, and a numerous sprinkling of barristers and ministers and clergymen, and eminent travellers who know enough of India to feel interested in all that affects her people, make up the rest. One lady who was present, one of whose most vivid memories of girlhood was having been in the same hall in 1824, when young Macaulay made his maiden speech in the presence of Zachary Macaulay and the venerable Wilberforce, it may well be believed looks and listens to-day with an interest intensified by her recollections. More than one of those present remembers that, since then, 'young Macaulay' has been in Parliament; has spent three years in India; and is now again, by favour of the electors of Edinburgh, called to the senate and to every prospect that can allure the gifted or satisfy ambition."

Remonstrances with a (mildly) patriotic Hindu, Dwarkanauth Tagore.

"With Dwarkanauth Tagore all intercourse would also have been avoided, but for the fact that his name was favourably known as that of one who had written heartily wishing God-speed to the British India Society at the outset. So Joseph Pease told him plainly by letter that, to meet himself and his colleagues would only be useful 'provided we may thereby learn of thy mature judgment and experience' more than they already knew of 'the best courses of procedure for improving the lamentable condition of the natives of thy country.' He took advantage of the opportunity to assure 'Respected Friend Dwarkanauth Tagore' that his then correspondent had no pecuniary or commercial interest to serve, that he and his friends could permit the obtrusion of no mercenary motive in connection with their labours; and, indeed, 'that they had no respect whatever for native Indians of rank and wealth, who forgot or concealed, whilst moving in commercial and courtly circles in this country, those miseries of their poor countrymen it was their duty to explain and, if possible, get amended.' 'I am informed (he added) there is another native of India, of rank and influence, arrived in London. If this gentleman should be one of thy friends, permit me to say it would be of great importance not to palliate, and not to cover the wretchedness under which his poor country groans either in his public or his private intercourse with those in power—not to sacrifice the cause of thy oppressed people whilst thou art moving amongst that circle of flatterers with which the great men of India are ever surrounded when they arrive in this land.' And then concluded—'That you two distinguished gentlemen may return to your native country amidst the gratitude and blessings of a great empire for the noble stand you shall then have made for her righteous cause, may be, I crave, your happy portion and consoling reward.'

"The warning may have been called forth by some intuitive

apprehension as to the weakness of resolution of the person addressed; or it may have been prompted by the writer's abiding sense of the corrupting influences of the metropolis. In either case, it appeared to have been needed. Dwarkanauth Tagore was invited to a Mansion House banquet to the Prime Minister; there his health was drunk amid loud acclamations from the city grandees; and when he rose to acknowledge the kindness, the attention, the flattery, with which he had been received ever since he set foot on English soil, he delivered himself of observations which, if they had been purposely concocted to exalt military exploits over humane statesmanship, could not have been better contrived. Dwarkanauth was reported as having regarded 'the tyranny and villainy of the Muhammadans and the no less frightful oppression of the Russians' as constituting the chief perils of his countrymen, and as having ascribed the safety and well-being of India mainly to Clive and Cornwallis and Wellington'; and all this in the presence of the Iron Duke, and on the eve of the recall of one Governor-General and the appointment of another! Many were the remonstrances addressed to Dwarkanauth on this subject. Sir Charles Forbes was one who expostulated. The 'liberty of remonstrance' was exercised by Joseph Pease with his usual plainness of speech, and elicited the polite assurance (August 31, 1842):—'I am glad of the opportunity of expressing to a well-known friend of my country my regret at what appeared to you inaccurate and injurious. My intention was—however imperfectly I was enabled to fulfil it—to state that, all things considered, my nation had been benefited by its deliverance from the yoke of the Muhammadans,' etc.; and he enclosed a reprint of a speech he had delivered at Calcutta on the 31st of October, 1838, to correct any misapprehension that might arise from his postprandial utterances in London in 1842! The Quaker was not convinced. . . .

"Dwarkanauth Tagore paid a second visit to England in 1845, and was lionised as before. It was mentioned in courtly circles, as a preternatural development of royal grace, that the infants in the royal nursery were not in the slightest degree afraid of the Hindu. He became a great favourite in Society, and saw all our lions. Thackeray and Dickens and Douglas Jerrold were added to the list of his friends. He mentioned in a letter to his son at Calcutta that he had discussed with Mr. Gladstone against the right to exclude from Parliament disbelievers in the doctrine of the Trinity, and had the best of the argument. He visited at Bristol the grave of Ram Mohun Roy, and, not long afterwards, like his great spiritual guide and predecessor, was seized with a kind of ague or malarial fever, and died, and was buried in the country of his voluntary exile. His mortal remains lie interred in Kensal Green Cemetery; no visitor can overlook the grave, for a splendid monument marks the spot. The third and fourth generations of his descendants now keep alive in Calcutta his pious memory, and worthily emulate his patriotism and public spirit."

The book has one drawback. It leaves off too soon. With the death of Joseph Pease Mr. Bell gathers the threads of his narrative together and clearly cuts into the middle of the pattern. If he had made the work thrice its present size, and had he brought down the story connected with efforts in England on behalf of Indian reform to the establishment in 1889 of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, he would have done wisely. In his concluding paragraph he admits the story of 1850-1890 needs to be told. Why should he not tell it?

It remains only that we should state that, in addition to an excellent Table of Contents an exhaustive Index has been provided. Here and there, perhaps, the narrative seems to halt, owing to the author assuming too much knowledge on the part of the reader, but Mr. Bell has turned out his book in a thoroughly workmanlike style, and deserves to be highly congratulated alike upon that and upon the undoubted service he has done to the memory of good men in the past by the story he has told. A few slight errors, such as "Indian *Annual* Congress" for "Indian *National* Congress", "Amrasti" for "Amraoti", will, no doubt, be corrected in future editions.

MR. DACOSTA ON THE NORTH-WESTERN FRONTIER POLICY IN INDIA.*

"THIS RUINOUS, THIS UNPRINCIPLED, TRANS-FRONTIER POLICY."—Motto of Introduction to Congress Report, 1890.

The trans-frontier policy of the Government of India has had, from time to time, to pass through the fire of severe criticism. It has never passed through the fire without suffering severe damage. Unfortunately, no power existing whereby the strictures of competent critics can be enforced and the force of public opinion be made to tell, little good has followed in India from all that has been said and done. In this respect India stands alone in the British dominions. Even in the Crown Colonies the expression of public opinion dominates and influences public policy. Ceylon, at this moment, in the response which the authorities are making to the efforts which have been put forth to abolish a food-tax and to relieve distressed agriculturists of an intolerable burden, furnishes proof of this. Had the Government of India been amenable to criticism, had their acts been brought to the bar of an enlightened public opinion, that Empire would have been saved many millions of money, many lives, much treasure, and the avoidance of more than one unjust and unprofitable war. Mr. John Dacosta has added to the many services he has rendered India the production of a small work dealing with the "scientific frontier" and the suffering and money it has cost us. In the hundred and forty octavo pages, of which his book consists, Mr. Dacosta has, out of the mouths of unimpugnable witnesses, described recent Afghan campaigns and the loss and suffering needlessly entailed. He takes authorities accepted at the India Office, and from their pages demonstrates the unwisdom which has characterised our proceedings in India since 1867. In that year, as Mr. Dacosta himself remarks, "certain opinions found expression in military circles to the effect that our means of successfully encountering a Russian advance would be greatly improved if we held advance posts in Afghanistan, whence we could meet our northern foe at a distance from the Indian frontier. These opinions, however, as soon as they were promulgated, were pronounced by high authorities to be fundamentally wrong; but the scheme had meanwhile found favour with members of the Cabinet, and has ever since been the subject of much discussion and of controversy between the political parties in Parliament." The fundamental wrongness of the course which the India Foreign Office has adopted is abundantly proved. But the most valuable portion of the work is that in which is shown the humiliating surrenders which accompanied our more recent campaigns.

The following passages (pp. 107 to 114) illustrate very forcibly the ruinous and discreditable results of our Afghan policy:—

"As stated in Mr. Hensman's letters and Dr. Duke's book, a force of 10,000 fighting men, under General Roberts, marched on Cabul, in September 1879, to avenge the murder of our Envoy. After defeating the Afghan army at Charasia on the 6th of October, General Roberts entered Cabul on the 11th. It was then well known that the leaders and chief actors in the massacre at the British Embassy were certain Herat regiments of the Amir, who had arrived in Cabul in August and, after fighting against us at Charasia, had dispersed and retired to their villages. Under these circumstances the obvious course for fulfilling the mission of the expedition would have been to pursue and punish the criminal fugitives; but sufficient troops could not be detached for that purpose without dangerously weakening our army. Besides, experience had taught us that to follow the enemy into the recesses of their mountains was to court disappointment and disaster. Thus the punishment of the actual murderers was found to lie beyond our power; whereupon we decided on bringing to justice such of the abettors as we could apprehend and convict, and on imposing a fine on the city of Cabul for its connivance at the crime. Accordingly a number of executions took place on the best evidence we could obtain, and the Amir Yakub Khan was sent a prisoner to India, on suspicion of his connivance at the outrage. Had our army then levied the fine imposed on the city of Cabul and left the country, it would have accomplished its mission so far as it lay in its power; and the nation would have been spared the disasters and humiliations which soon followed.

"Unfortunately, the success of the opening operations seemed to have unduly elated the British Cabinet and fatally blinded it to the actual condition of things prevailing in Afghanistan. Believing, apparently, from the temporary dispersion of the hostile army, that the country lay at our mercy,* the Government decided on extending the original scope of the expedition, and on preparing for a lengthened occupation by appointing district governors to supersede the officials of the Amir. Indeed, so sanguine were the views entertained of our power and influence that a telegram appeared in the *Times*, the second week in December, to the effect that Afghanistan was, to all intents and purposes, a conquered country which our troops could

* "A Scientific Frontier; or, the Danger of a Russian Invasion of India." London: W. H. Allen and Co., Limited, 13 Waterloo Place; and at Calcutta.

* The same tendency to blindly over-estimate our advantages appears in the Secretary of State's despatch of 7th August, 1879, in which it is stated at para. 3, with reference to the situation in Dec., 1878: "The passage of the Afghan frontier by British troops was followed by the defeat of the forces which guarded it and the rapid occupation of positions which placed the territories of the Amir at the mercy of the British Government." The sequel has shown how far that statement was justified; meanwhile the despatch was published as a Parliamentary paper (C. 2402, 1879), and probably served the political purpose for which it had been written.

traverse from north to south without hindrance. Neither this pompous announcement nor the imbecile attempt to control the internal administration of the country was in any way justified by existing circumstances.

"Our army was in a particularly precarious situation; it had no reserves at hand, and its communications with India were uncertain; its energies were being used chiefly in the collection of supplies, while its strength was very sensibly affected by the foraging and other detached parties which it had constantly to send out. As early as November 14th the scarcity of forage led to the determination of sending back the greater part of our cavalry to the valley of Jellalabad; and before the end of that month it became known that several powerful tribes were preparing to attack us. A few days later the force, which went out to break up the tribal gathering, were in full retreat before the enemy, abandoning their guns, evacuating the fortress of Cabul, and seeking safety in the entrenched camp at Sherpur. It was during these distressing events that the telegram in the *Times* announcing our supremacy in Afghanistan was being read by the public at home. Then, as regards our district governors, it has already been seen, from Mr. Hensman's letters, how they were defied, insulted, and threatened with death by the very people over whom they were sent to rule, and how that threat was, in one instance, actually carried into effect.

"Far greater humiliations still were, however, yet in store for us. On regaining our freedom after the investment of Sherpur, we were confronted with the evidence of the oppression and indignities suffered in Cabul by the Hindus and others whom we had pledged ourselves to protect.* The tribes in the surrounding country were meanwhile once more combining to expel us, and our military prestige had so greatly fallen in the estimation of the people that the Hindu merchants and bankers of Cabul, whose forefathers and themselves had lived and prospered in that city under the Durani dynasty, began to emigrate, because they did not believe that we could hold the place against the impending attack of the tribesmen.

"In these embarrassing circumstances the British Cabinet had once more recourse to *diplomacy*; and a message was sent to Abdarrhaman, grandson of Dost Muhammed, proposing to confer on him the Amirship and the amity of the British Government, provided he surrendered Candahar and Herat. No answer being received to that proposal an ultimatum was sent peremptorily claiming Candahar and the Kuram valley. Abdarrhaman, however, declined holding any negotiations whatever on the subject, and clearly let us know that he maintained his right to the sovereignty of the whole kingdom ruled by his grandsire. Our ultimatum was thus superciliously ignored, and we had to put up with the affront, simply because we had ventured to make demands which we had no power to enforce.

"In the midst of these untoward circumstances, news reached us that our southern army was completely defeated at Maiwand, and its remnant closely besieged at Candahar. It then became urgent that our best troops should at once march to their relief; but could we reach Candahar in good time, looking at the opposition we were certain to encounter on the road? Then, again, what would be the fate of those we left behind at Sherpur; some twenty thousand men, consisting largely of sick and wounded soldiers and camp-followers?

"In these circumstances, we had no choice but to submit to such terms as we could obtain; and we had accordingly to acknowledge Abdarrhaman as Amir of Afghanistan, without any limitation of territory; to pay him £100,000; to surrender some thirty of our guns; to leave intact the defensive works we had raised round Cabul; to pledge ourselves to refund the value of the treasure we had seized in that city, and to *renounce the fine we had imposed on its inhabitants for their connivance at the murder of our representative!*

"Such have been the results of the war which was carried on for two long years in vain attempts to execute the enigmatic policy of a 'scientific frontier' for India. The war cost twenty millions sterling, thousands of lives, and an appalling amount of human suffering, and it ended without the smallest advantage having been gained to compensate for all it had cost. Nay, the balance was quite the other way. Our failure in a contest with a semi-barbarous foe lowered our military prestige; while the humiliations we suffered at the hands of a people whom we unsuccessfully attacked for the purpose of robbing them of their territory have cast a stain on our national character, which it should be our most anxious desire to obliterate.

"Unfortunately, the incidents of the war and its results are but imperfectly known to the public; some of those incidents have been suppressed, others distorted, in official documents and the writings of interested or deluded persons; while military men who carefully watched the course of the operations have been precluded, by an implied rule of their service, from publicly discussing a subject which involved political issues and party questions of import.

"Had it been necessary to apply to Parliament for funds to prosecute the war, the House of Commons would certainly not have consented to tax their constituents without inquiring into the precise object, the necessity, and the justice of the venture. But the Indian Treasury was made to supply the money; and, as India has no representative in Parliament, explanations were avoided, and those who plunged the nation into the calamitous operations of 1878-80 have never been called to answer for their action. These circumstances will account for the facility with which the fatal policy of 1876 was revived in 1885, and for the countenance and support which it has since received from numerous irresponsible advocates. One of this class of writers suggests that 'all local hostility might be conjured by discreet diplomacy and the omnipotent rupee' (*Times*, 18th November, 1890). This, however, is simply ignoring the experience of our last expedition, when rupees were prodigally lavished without in any appreciable degree diminishing the hostility of the tribes; and diplomacy in every shape signally failed, resulting sometimes in discomfiture and humiliation. Nor can any surprise be felt at these results, seeing that the means suggested, and which virtually amount to astuteness and corruption, are not British characteristics; and it was probably the repugnance of Englishmen to the employment of such means that provoked the following remark recorded in Mr. Hensman's letter of August, 1880, written on the eve of our final departure from Cabul: 'How we have hated our sojourn in Afghanistan of late, only the record of our curses, and it be kept, can reveal.'"

The sorry story told above is no new one in our Afghan experiences. Indeed, humiliation seems to be our invariable lot when we put our hand into the Afghan hornet's nest. In 1842 it was so. "The carnival of havoc at Ghuznee and around Jellalabad and Kandahar was followed up by casting to the winds all that the invasion of Afghanistan was professedly undertaken to accomplish."* Mr. Dacosta's book ought to command the most careful attention of all who profess to care for the well-being of India and the good government of nearly three hundred millions of British subjects. The work is an excellent commentary on Mr. Dinshaw E. Wacha's denunciation at the last Indian National Congress, of "this ruinous, this unprincipled, trans-frontier policy." It ought to have many thousands of readers and we trust it may become as popular and as well-known as it deserves to be.

THE MANIPUR DEBATE.

THE Manipur debate on Tuesday was curious, but unproductive. Sir John Gorst's speech was the curiosity. Sir Harcourt opened the ball. He said he really knew very little about it, but perhaps it might interest the House if he set forth in detail what he ignored. He then did so. If the Government liked to make any statement which would incriminate itself, he (Sir Harcourt) would be delighted to listen. The India Office member of the Fourth Party rose on this demand. He had just left poor old Lord Cross, and his nerves were still itching from the tedious interview—and he showed it. The Government of India, he said, were wholly responsible for what had happened. He neither blamed them, nor the reverse; but anybody else might do as he liked. Lord Lansdowne and his predecessors were in the habit, when *désœuvrés*, of waging what little wars seemed to them entertaining; and when their issue was not unfavourable nobody was the wiser. The Senaputty had displayed exceptional ability and governing power. It was against the laws and ordinances of the Government of India for natives to display exceptional ability and governing power. Tarquinius Superbus cut off all the heads of the tall poppies in his garden with a stick. The Government of India would cut off the Senaputty's head with some other weapon. The moral was that Hindu and other native gentlemen who wanted to be happy, wealthy, and wise should cultivate docility, eschew originality, and display only a silvery mediocrity. Nothing quite so cynical has been heard since Disraeli, whom, by the bye, the late Sir John Macdonald physically so extraordinarily resembled, grew too old to amuse the peers. Sir L. Pelly, and a few other old Indians, assured the House that an Indian Government did not know how to do wrong even if it wanted to do so, and that in Manipur, as elsewhere, all was for the best in the best of possible worlds. Sir George Campbell was not quite so Panglossian; but he suggested that it was no use crying over spilt milk, forgetful of the fact that if he himself did not do so his *raison d'etre* would be gone. So much for Manipur.—*Land and Water* (Tory).

* This was the more galling that the Government had, not long before, published a despatch stating at para. 42: "We deem it absolutely requisite that, in countries like Afghanistan, the power of the British Government to punish its enemies and protect its friends should be so generally recognised as to render unnecessary the frequent assertion of it" (C. 2401, 1879, p. 36).

* "British Folks and British India Fifty Years Ago", by J. Hyslop Bell, p. 151. John Heywood, Manchester and London.

CORRESPONDENCE.

BRITISH RULE IN INDIA AS IT IS.

To the Editor of "India."

Sir,—"Under their old masters they (the Bengalis) had at least one resource. When the evil became insupportable, the people rose and pulled down the Government. But the English Government was not to be shaken off. That Government, *oppressive as the most oppressive form of barbarian despotism, resembled the government of evil genii, rather than the government of human tyrants.*" So wrote Lord Macaulay about half a century ago. His description gives a vivid picture of the early English rule in this country. Has the state of things changed since then? At the time of which Lord Macaulay wrote the English were not the only irresponsible rulers in India. They had their other rival European powers to contest with. The sun of Muhammadan glory, though eclipsed, was not completely shadowed. The Mahrattas were the virtual masters in India. The sturdy Afghans had not yet ceased their raids upon the Indian peninsula. There was no Suez Canal at that time, and it took six months, or more, for a European to come from or go to his mother country. The English possessed no considerable advantages, and were living in the midst of alarms. Under such circumstances it was natural to expect that a mere handful of English traders would be mild and conciliatory rulers. But far from it. They did not fail to aggrandise themselves at the cost of the poor inhabitants of the soil. "Enormous fortunes," writes Lord Macaulay, "were thus rapidly accumulated at Calcutta, while *thirty millions of human beings were reduced to the extremity of wretchedness.*" Every retired Anglo-Indian was hated as a "Nabob". This exact state of affairs, no doubt, no longer exists. But those who have compared the table of yearly exports with the imports of this country, will be staggered to find an annual drain of two crores and a half sterling, from the Indian shores. This enormous amount India has to pay to England as a subsidy for her safe holding. When one of those periodical famines which devastate this land, scourges us, the first and prime object of the Government is to allay the fears of the really philanthropic British public by State reports, contradicting all local ones. Thus, through some unfortunate bureaucratic negligence and error, happened those terrible famines of Orissa and Madras which carried off millions upon millions of our poverty-stricken population; and this at the end of the nineteenth century, and under the best of rulers India has been blessed with. The rest of the world was kept in the dark and knew nothing till it was too late to avert the disaster. The "Famine Fund" which was formed during those emergencies has, by strange magic, been converted into a military fund, and lavishly spent on the "Scientific Frontier" to keep back the Russian bugbears. We do not know if these scare-crows are being vigorously drilled, in the far regions of the dream land, to drive out our gods, who are perched, at this season, in the different points of Olympus. With the first swallow our rulers hurry off from the plains and go a-maying in the hills and dales, and there make holiday for eight mortal months in the year. Their time runs on merrily in picnics and carolings, and they congratulate themselves, once more, being safe from all popular clamours and whinings. Every part of India is now connected by a net-work of rail-roads. But for whose benefits are these? The people complain, with show of reason, that these are chiefly instrumental in raising the price of articles in the locality. Last year was the year of great inundation in the Lower Provinces of Bengal, and many thousands of people were rendered homeless and deprived of food and cattle. Simultaneously with Bengal another inundation took place in Europe. The sovereign in the latter continent opened a relief fund and himself put down a large amount. But India is not Europe. We were silenced with several State reports, but cannot tell how far these were of any practical good. The cruel policy of divide and rule, and the Arms Act, have emasculated the brave races of Hindustan. We are now entirely helpless, groaning like tamed elephants, at the feet of our almighty rulers. Is this humanity? Is this Christian charity? We may be killed as cats and dogs, but are forbidden, under heavy penalties, to raise an arm in self-defence. It is a stock reproach that the sons of Briton who fought so manly to abolish slavery from the world should treat the tea-coolies or the indigo-ryots as worse than slaves. How dear is justice in the land! It is too notorious a fact to be mentioned here. The Government is not satisfied with the Draconian measures they have passed. It is only a matter of a few months since the Government passed a resolution condemning the native magistrates as being too lenient. It is the object of the Government that when any person is taken before a tribunal he should be immediately sent to jail for a long term of imprisonment. This is, of course, in direct contravention of the spirit of the English law: "Let a hundred guilty escape, but not an innocent suffer." The Reg. 3 of 1818 has rendered insecure the person of every native of this country, as well as his property. But there is no further happiness and comfort left us even in our domestic circles. Since the passing of the Age of Consent Act, that measure hangs like a sword of Damocles over our heads, day and night, and God only knows what will become of us or our children. The police, which is looked upon as the guardian angel of public peace and property in every civilized country, is here looked down as an evil genius, and shunned as such by the people. However qualified we may be we are absolutely voiceless in the administration of our country. As this has been said times out of number we need not dilate on this point. We have without a murmur given all to our rulers. But the latter, instead of resting satisfied with what they have got, are, like Oliver Twist, ever asking for more; and this time they want us to give up our religion, which we hold dearer than life, and the independence of which we have hitherto maintained through every storm and trial. We may not be the best judges as to whether the English are trying to raise or lower our moral standard by equalizing it with the European one. After the Durbhanga Temple case and the more recent Benares Temple riot, if the English were to call the Muhammadans "iconoclasts," the latter could at once retort by saying: "Let not Satan rebuke sin." After all, who will say we were worse off under the Muhammadan *misrule*? Under them we lost our political supremacy alone, and that also we were regaining when the British sun appeared on the horizon and dispelled the last gloom of the Hindu and Muhammadan powers once for all. But under the present *régime* we have lost everything. The country is being rapidly impoverished and denationalized. Customs as old as the Himalayas are being thrust out at the point of the English bayonet. Indigenous arts and industries have altogether died out. Even for the necessaries of life we have to look to England. And a slight and slender call to revive them has been responded to by our benign rulers by a new machinery, in the form of the Factory Act. Justice, forsooth! We have been kept from every post of honour and responsibility. The Indian Princes have forgotten to govern. The nation which once produced a Todar Mall and a Mahu Sing is now a race of clerks. Where formerly idleness was a dream, inactivity is now the fashion. The country which possessed the Kohinoor, and of whose wealth were built mausoleums like the Taj Mehal or the celebrated Peacock Throne, is now a pauperized one. Who is to be blamed for this? And what can the people do? To a youth in England three channels are open—the Church, the army, and trade. The first does not exist here, the second we are forbidden to seek, and the third we cannot follow for want of money and encouragement. So involved are our interests with those of England that if she were to withdraw from us this moment, we should either die of starvation or fall an easy prey to a more powerful race. A negro of the West Indies or a bush-ranger of Australia breathes a freer air than a civilized Hindu. Is not our state too deep for tears?

Yours obediently,
CHARU CHANDRA MITRA, B.A.

84-1, Musjid Bari Street, Calcutta.
May 5th, 1891.

THE TERM "BABU."

To the Editor of "India."

Sir,—With reference to the discussion about the word "Babu," which has from time to time appeared in your paper, and which has of late assumed somewhat the character of a little controversy, I beg to say that I am one of those who love reforms for their own intrinsic value, rather than because they have been felt necessary merely from the insinuation of malicious opponents. The Anglo-Indian uses the word "Babu" in a contemptuous manner, not because he finds fault with the word itself, but because he regards the Bengalis, as a whole, with contempt. The reformation here consequently must be more radical than mere linguistic. Can I avoid the contempt of an Anglo-Indian because I have ceased to call myself Babu? I should like to be one of those conservatives who would make strenuous exertion to infuse new and better association to an old harmless thing when it is in the process of becoming contemptuous, instead of bringing about an innovation from cowardly prudence.

The controversy about "Babu" suggests to me other things. The advocates of this particular reform are inclined to propitiate, as it were, the Anglo-Indians by bringing themselves under their fold. But it has been experienced that the attempt often breaks down when it is merely mechanical. This happens more prominently in England before the homebred Britons. A smart young Indian gentleman, with his fluent and elegant English and well-cut English dress, often puzzles an Englishman uninitiated into the mystery of India. "How long have you been here, sir?" asks the latter. "Just about a month," replies the Indian. "Is that all? You have picked up our language and manners very quickly?" But upon learning that we, even in India, can often put an Englishman to shame in point of English, he begins to shake his head and says, "I see." "But you have a language of your own, haven't you?" "Oh! yes," the Indian replies, unable to bear the insinuation, "certainly we have language of our own; but very imperfect though." Upon learning from me that our instruction in the colleges are given in English, an intelligent Scotch friend of mine expressed his remark in a brief ejaculation; "That's very funny!" An Irishman remarked on the same subject: "That's a shame!" A distinguished professor of the Edinburgh university, one day expressed his regret in good earnest that he could not talk to me in Sanskrit. I need not comment on these sentiments. But, let me say that Indian costumes, and a few

syllables of Indian tongues, have often secured for us here more respect and admiration than a torrent of English words and English dress of the finest cut. A true born Englishman has the keenest perception of the distinction between slavish invitation and independent culture, because he himself carries in him a backbone of independent character. That the English language has worked almost miracles in India is impossible to deny, but the desire of introducing a common English epithet of address throughout India appears to me too premature, except for Congress purpose. I agree with your correspondent, "A Babu," that we can very well stick to our provincial epithets just now. The unification of India is what we all desire. But the desire to obtain this by abolishing all distinctiveness in a country like India, where each race has its peculiar civilisation and nationality, not of yesterday, but of centuries, appears to me like a dream, nay detrimental to the object desired. Each language in India is capable of infinite development through western ideas; and each nation of India is susceptible of its peculiar independent civilisation. Now, the unification of India, to my mind, will be effectually brought about by such recognition of independence, not by surrendering it. The universal introduction of "Mr." in India, though in itself very trifling, points towards such surrender. The Babu will never make himself one with the whole of India by ceasing to be a Babu.

A BENGALI BABU.

Edinburgh, June 13, 1891.

"BABU."

To the Editor of "India."

Sir,—While no one can properly object to the use of the word among the Bengalis themselves, every self-respecting Bengali, I think, ought to protest against its use by the Anglo-Indians. For in their mouth it is a term of reproach (!) and *contempt*. The confirmation of this view, seemingly based on imperfect generalization, comes from an unexceptionable quarter. Sir Steuart Bayley, when Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, like the high-minded English gentleman that he is, actually expressed himself, I believe officially, against the use of the word by officers of Government, on that account, and of course this is conclusive.

It is not difficult to find out the reason why "Babu" originally, and even now among the Bengalis themselves, a term of respectability, should have degenerated so much, as used by Anglo-Indians. To these, "Babu" is the designation of a race *differing* from themselves and *therefore necessarily inferior*. This is bad logic, but the human mind in many instances is not logical. We may see an instance of still worse logic in the street boy (I forget Lord Salisbury for once in the street boy) calling out "Blackie." And I might go further and say I do not draw upon imagination, but base my conclusion on proper cognisance of sober facts, though I speak under correction, that most English men and women, if they had sufficient self-introspection, when challenged in so many words, would have to admit, they regard with a feeling akin to contempt men of dark complexion when they *first* see them at any rate, a feeling for which there is no other warrant than a certain psychological necessity as variously instanced in the other cases. In the case of the street boy it is untutored instinct, in the case of the Englishman it is novelty acting upon a mind not naturally cosmopolitan, but in the Anglo-Indian it is neither of these. In him, whatever may have been its origin, it is now a deliberate assertion of haughty superiority, almost in retaliation for the emphatic spirit of independence for which the young Bengal is famous. It is this spirit of retaliation, indeed, which has led to the palpably absurd Anglo-Indian cant that the Congress is a "Babu" agitation. Is it not therefore time that the "Babu", giving as it does a handle to their revengeful insolence, should disappear from the Anglo-Indian dictionary? For it appears nowhere else. The English language knows it not. Unlike the words Monsieur or Signor, it has not been adopted by Englishmen as the proper designation of anybody. What justification is there then for its continuance?

In this connection, let me put on record a fact which will take your English readers I have no doubt by surprise. "Once upon a time" an English (!) Professor in Bengal, while reading Shakspere to a class of *Babus*, read, instead of "Baboon's blood," "Babu's blood!" It is this Anglo-Indianism (run mad in this instance, which is, however, by no means rare) that one protests against in objecting to the use of the word.

L. M. N.

DISTRESS IN MADRAS.

"R. S.," writing to us from Coimbatore, in May, says:

When famine prevailed in Ganjam, Lord Connemara was called to a sense of his duty, and to a due appreciation of the gravity of the situation, by questions in Parliament addressed to the Indian Secretary by the late member for India, Mr. C. Bradlaugh. It required all the distance from India to England, and back from England to India, for the Madras Government to obtain an idea of the severe distress which prevailed in one of the districts under their charge. Who is the man now, the friend of the poor and the distressed, to rouse up the Government of Lord Wenlock to a sense of their duty? Around Madras, acute distress prevails at present. Parts of Chingleput, North Arcot, Nellore, Cuddapah, Tinnevelly, Coimbatore, Malabar, and South Arcot comprise the area now affected. The estimated area in square miles is about 18,000, and the population of these tracts amounts to four millions. The distress, however, varies; the districts where the distress is most severe are Chingleput and North Arcot. A member of the Board of Revenue is in charge of the measures adopted for relieving the starving people. He is "single-handed, overworked, and loaded with a heavy additional burden of responsibility." Have Lord Wenlock and his councillors no duty to perform on this sad occasion, an occasion of great emergency, other than passing orders from the summit of the cloudland? No doubt, Lord Wenlock visited certain affected districts before his exodus to the pleasure-giving Nilgiris. But what I ask you to consider is, whether, when so much distress prevails around Madras, the Governor and his councillors are morally justified in running off to the hills, without even one of them remaining at the seat of government, and in close personal touch with the district officers, weighted with the conduct of the relief measures? I shall here quote an instance than which no greater blundering could have been committed on such emergencies as the present one. One of the relief measures that are usually adopted is to open public works, on which all those who are able to work are engaged and paid for. The public works are in charge of the Public Works Department, and this department is duly warned to select and keep in readiness works on which labour may be engaged, at all places where distress is apprehended. The Revenue Department which conducts the relief operations has to make the call on the Public Works Department, and the latter must at once comply with the call. In complying with such a call, the Public Works Department, which has earned the unenviable reputation of being styled the Public Waste Department, has failed. The *Madras Mail* of the 15th April called attention to the delay. The delay has been acknowledged by the authorities, and what do you think to be the cause of the delay? Not any urgent or unavoidable reason, but a want of overseers! A want of overseers, forsooth, in spite of the warning to be ready to open relief works at any time! Can this dereliction of the Public Works Department be attributed to anything other than callousness of a gross nature amounting to a want of due regard to the sacredness of human lives, though those human beings be the down-trodden pariahs? The Revenue Board remarks upon the delay:—"A failure to give work where work is wanted will inevitably lead to the necessity for granting gratuitous relief, a system of relief the control of which is difficult and costly, and which is subject to the gravest abuses." But even the Board has not sufficiently remarked upon another phase of the subject. Owing to the delay in opening the works, one of two things must have occurred. Either that the people in that area have not received gratuitous relief, or such gratuitous relief has been afforded. In the first case, people have been allowed to starve, have been left to the slow, torturing pangs of starvation, have been allowed to drift to a condition in which they would not be as fit as before to labour on the works, and have thus been brought to the verge of death by scores. They could exclaim with Johnson, "Had it been early, it had been kind; but it has been delayed till they have become indifferent, and reduced to a state when they could no more profit by it." So that, numbers of lives have been wantonly treated. In the second case, Government has adopted a measure which was unnecessary, and which in the opinion of the Board was open to abuse; and which could have been avoided with profit alike to the taxpayer as well as to the distressed. It is on an occasions like this the Madras Government have in their wisdom moved to the hills remote from the scenes of starvation and of woe. I cannot contain myself. Can you? Who can, if he but realizes the awful contempt for precious lives exhibited by those who live upon the toil and the sweat of the tax-payer, feeling acutely the lingering pain of starvation, while those who live by him abandon themselves to the pleasures of the lotus-eaters?

Really, the exodus of the Government to the hills has been abused, and has arrived at a stage at which some definite action for curtailing it ought to be energetically pursued. The *Madras Mail*, usually a very sober paper, only reluctantly inclined to raise its voice against the action of the Government, has some hard things to say about the exodus in its issue of April 30th. Even the greatest apologist of Government can therefore take it that a real abuse of the privilege has been committed, calling for the intervention of the home authorities. I cannot do better than quote here what the *Madras Mail* says on the subject:—

"A very good instance of the airy way which Government has of doing things during its prolonged stay in the rarified atmosphere of the Nilgiris is given in one of the papers before us. In one of his reports, Mr. Tremenheere, the Collector of Chingleput—with a courage which is all the more remarkable when we consider he was braving the severe uplifted brows which are generally assumed by high-placed officials when district officers go out of their way to report any unusually sad instances of poverty amongst ryots or labourers—referred to the deplorable condition of the pariahs in the following startling terms:—'We saw sixty or seventy at Senneri, whose condition, though none except habitual beggars were in present and actual want of food, would have moved a heart of stone. I have said above that their state is not appreciably lower than usual; a large proportion of them are always badly nourished, clad, if at all, in the vilest of rags, eaten up with leprosy or

other horrible diseases, hutted like pigs, untaught, uncared for, and unpitied. I must apologise to the Board and Government for picturing their position, which is indeed already known; but the days cannot be far distant when the public conscience of England, if not of India, will wake up to the condition of these unhappy wretches and to the easy means of ameliorating it.' "

Let me first ask you to picture to yourself to the very life these horrible details of the poverty prevailing here, and then compare it with the poverty of your great metropolis. The details given of the sufferings of the pariah apply to about forty millions of your fellow-subjects in India, among whom famine prevails, from one end of the year to the other. When shall any earnest attempt be made to make the lives of these unhappy wretches worth living, and worth living, too, under the imperial sway of Her Britannic Majesty? Our hope lies in the public conscience of England being awakened to a sense of the responsibility that rests upon the electors for the due protection of their Indian fellow-subjects, not merely from foreign foes, but from the more devastating poverty which prevails in the country to an extent almost beyond comprehension.

HOW FRONTIER WARS IN INDIA ARE GOT UP.

Papers relating to the Black Mountain Expedition on the North-West frontier of India have been asked for in the House of Commons and promised. The need for the publication will appear to be abundantly justified from what a correspondent of a pro-Government journal in India says. This gentleman writes:

"So far as is known to the public the Black Mountain tribes had been on their best behaviour since their punishment in 1888, the date of the last expedition. On the principle of letting sleeping curs lie it would, one would think, have been wise to have left them alone. But no: in October last it was decided 'to test the temper of the tribes,' in other words to stir them up. Accordingly a strong force was sent to the Black Mountain to perambulate within our nominal, but their actual tribal, border. As was anticipated, Hashim Ali's *loosewalahs* resented the invasion by firing a harmless fusilade from a safe distance as the troops marched up the hill. Whereupon, for the third time in Black Mountain history, they marched down again, instead of then and there exacting punishment for the insult. That insult was the ostensible cause of the big expedition which was launched nearly two months ago. Of course there could be no opposition to seven thousand troops; nor was there. A bridge of boats was dragged up the Indus; the river crossed; the two brigades united, the trans-Indus hills partly ascended, the objective being Baio, a few miles further up the mountain. This Baio, it seems, is a village common to Akazais, Chigarzais and Bonerwals. Hence the Baiowals, as expected, in honour bound began a game of brag, collected to the number of ten or fifteen hundred, waved flags, danced war dances and shouted defiantly: 'Come on; but by jingo if you do we'll—run away.' Upon this demonstration our army halted for three weeks, grumbling sorely at the inaction. But behind that army all was action and decision of purpose. The reserve brigade was mobilised and pushed to the front. A fourth brigade was formed at Hoti Mardan to demonstrate on the Boner frontier. Finally, when twelve thousand perfectly equipped troops were ready to eat up Akazais, Chigarzais, Bonerwals and all other zais and wals who might come in their way, the expectant army was faced rearwards and, for the fourth time in Black Mountain history, meekly marched down hill again, the zais and wals being, I presume, apologetically informed that it was all a mistake: there had never been any intention of occupying Baio: since which strategic movement to the rear that army reduced to its original strength of seven thousand men is sitting on a deserted hill-top cis-Indus, wondering what the whole show means and means. And what does it mean, I ask? Everything done and left undone by actual and possible enemies from the insulting fusilade in October last up to date was exactly foreseen. Government seems first to have deliberately sought a pretext for the expedition, by trailing its coat within our nominal border, and having provoked a show of opposition on the part of one small faction, leisurely prepared a large expedition, leisurely marched its army some miles up the Indus, leisurely bridged the river, crossed it, and then spasmodically met the Baiowal brag (waving flags, etc.) by British counter-brag (calling out two more brigades) and finally peacefully withdrew cis-Indus, having accomplished nothing beyond spending some fourteen or fifteen lakhs of rupees and destroying a few huts worth a hundred rupees or so. This Black Mountain mystery wants clearing up."

Mr. Labouchere, in *Truth*, is evidently of the same opinion as this correspondent; in his paper of June 25th he has a few paragraphs concerning it. May we hope that, in the House of Commons as well as in his paper, the senior member for Northampton will do his duty to the unrepresented hundreds of millions of his Indian fellow-subjects? There ought to be some means whereby he could raise a debate. This is what, with his pen, he records of the Black Mountain muddle:—

"The Manipur affair has thrown into the shade the latest expedition to the Black Mountain. Inquiry, however, will, I think, show that this episode thoroughly deserves the attention of the critics of Indian administration. So far as I can learn, whenever our Anglo-Indian warriors feel a little bored, or whenever the flow of decorations and honours is getting slack, an expedition to the Black Mountain is organised. In October last two brigades were despatched on this service. The Black Mountaineers did not allow themselves to be drawn. They fired a few shots at long range, but kept out of reach. The two brigades then marched to the top of the mountain, and, having looked about them—and having, I dare say, taken a few photographs—they marched home again.

"What rewards and honours followed upon this arduous operation I do not know. It served, however, one purpose. The British flag had been insulted. The prestige of the Indian Government was at stake—much as it was when the Senaputty kicked one of his brothers off the throne and put another in his place. The pretext was consequently furnished for another expedition at the first convenient opportunity in order to chastise the Black Mountaineers. As soon as the winter was over this expedition marched out, 7,000 strong. In due course the enemy appeared, it is said to the number of nearly 1,500. The expeditionary force then halted until a reserve brigade was mobilised and moved up, when the conjoint forces numbered 12,000 men. The commander then telegraphed to Simla for instructions as to whether he should attack the enemy or occupy a place called Baio, supposed to be the objective of the expedition. This desperate project was, however, vetoed, and without much more delay the whole army marched back again. Such was the last Black Mountain expedition—the fourth or fifth of the series.

"The spot where the last-mentioned episode took place—that is to say, where the British General lay entrenched looking at the enemy, before turning tail, has been christened by Tommy Atkins 'Fort Funk.' It is a very good name. I do not think so badly of our warriors as to suppose that the object of their 'funk' was the 1,500 hill-men in front. I think that what was 'funked' was the public opinion of England, and the probable exposure of the Black Mountain humbug, if anything occurred which would direct an inconvenient amount of attention to the place. For a humbug it evidently is. A correspondent, writing a few weeks ago, says that the leading heroes concerned 'are now awaiting their K.C.B.'s.' That is what the Black Mountain apparently exists for—a sort of Tom Tiddler's ground, where the Anglo-Indian warrior picks up, not only gold and silver, but a handle to his name. I take it, therefore, that for the present these gentry do not want to annex the Black Mountain or to smash the Black Mountaineers. That would be killing the goose which lays the golden eggs. Hence the right-about-face at 'Fort Funk.'

"Sooner or later, however, a collision is bound to occur. Sooner or later the hill-tribes will be provoked by the spectacle of British armies marching up the hill and marching down again, into making a desperate attack on the invader. The end of that will, of course, be that they will be swallowed up, and the frontier of the Indian Empire moved another notch forward, possibly after the preliminary annihilation of a British column, caught napping. In the meantime, though there was money available to send a couple of brigades to the Black Mountain last autumn, and 12,000 men this spring, merely for the purpose of marching them back again and getting the commanding officers gazetted, when an English Radical talks of interfering with the opium trade, he is informed that India is on the verge of bankruptcy, and is denounced as the worst enemy of the unfortunate Indian taxpayer."

Indian Crop and Weather Prospects.—*June* 21.—The prospects of the monsoon are beginning to cause serious anxiety, and there seems every reason to fear that the gloomy anticipations of the Meteorological Department are likely to be verified. The monsoon winds, which usually blow up the Arabian Sea, are being drawn down to the Bay of Bengal by a current which is directed with unusual strength to rejoin the low-pressure area in Assam and Burma. Rain has been abnormally deficient on the west coast from Bombay to Cochin, and the districts already somewhat famine-stricken are very insufficiently relieved by rain. The outlook there and throughout Bombay, Rajpootana, and North-Western India is far from satisfactory, and the rainy season crops threaten to fail. Prices have not yet shown any marked indications of rising except in Bombay. The Madras Government is doing its utmost to relieve distress in Arcot and Chingleput, and the Government of India has sanctioned large advances for irrigation works. There is no sign of the monsoon in Bengal, but owing to the heavy rain of last month its delay has not yet done harm.—*Times* Correspondent, Calcutta.

A Nagpore Newspaper.—The educated Hindoos of Nagpore are rather a large body and are disposed to be as go-ahead as their countrymen in Poona. They have a club of their own and a printing press, located in a fine commodious building called Lal Bagh, and on the 1st proximo they will issue the first number of a weekly Anglo-Vernacular paper, entitled the *Nagpore Independent*. The object of this paper, according to the prospectus, is "to advocate the interests of the dumb millions of India, and to seek a redress of their manifold grievances." The moving spirit of this class seems to be Mr. C. V. Nayudu, barrister-at-law, who has been educated in England, and is from all accounts a good English writer and speaker. The *Independent* will make the third weekly paper published in Nagpore.—*Bombay Gazette* Corres.

THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT AND INDIA.

[SPECIALLY REPORTED BY THE "HANSARD" STAFF FOR "INDIA".]

HOUSE OF COMMONS. JUNE 2.

WORK IN INDIAN FACTORIES.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH (Flintshire) asked the Under Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been drawn to the letter of Mr. Holt S. Hallett on night work in Indian factories, which appeared in the *Times* of 20th May;

Whether he is aware that Mrs. Pechey Phipson, who for the last seven years has medically attended native Indian females, declared in her recent lecture, delivered in Bombay, that "a Hindu girl of fifteen is about equal to an English girl of eleven, instead of the reverse, and that statements to the contrary by Englishmen who have no opportunity of becoming acquainted with Hindu family life were totally misleading;"

Whether his attention has been drawn to the grave evils which result from night work in factories in India;

Whether he is aware that girls in India from fourteen upward are classed as women, and do the same work as men;

Whether his attention has been drawn to the statement of Mr. Robert Baker, one of Her Majesty's senior inspectors of factories, given before the last Factory and Workshops Act Commission in this country, wherein he declared that "all night work for anybody is very injurious" and that this is a fair sample of the views held by each of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Factories and by every medical man who has been consulted on the subject;

Whether his attention has been drawn to the statement of the hon. Mr. Bliss that "the Indian idea of night is that it is a cool and pleasant time when all work which does not require a better light than can be easily and readily afforded can best be done;"

Whether as a fact the temperature in Indian factories is usually very high, even at night being frequently 95 degrees;

Whether the new Indian Factory Act affords any protection to hands employed in factories working less than four months in the year or where less than fifty hands are employed;

Whether his attention has been drawn to the evidence given before the Bombay Factory Commission of 1884 proving "that five-sevenths of the small ginning factories are in a dangerous condition," that "the same set of hands work both night and day with half an hour's rest in the evening, the same set continue working night and day for about eight days. The hands who work these long hours continually die;"

And whether Mr. Holt Hallett's statement that children under the new Act are allowed to work 168 hours a week in the minor factories and workshops is correct?

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): The answer to the first and second paragraphs of the hon. member's question is in the affirmative. The Secretary of State has had his attention drawn to the letter of Mr. Holt S. Hallett on night work in Indian factories, which appeared in the *Times* of the 25th of May, who is no doubt a high authority on matters of this kind. With regard to the third paragraph of the question the attention of the Secretary of State has been drawn to the evils which result from night work in factories in India. Night work for women is very much restricted by the Indian Factory Act, and is absolutely prohibited for children. In reply to the fourth paragraph of the question I have to say that girls of fourteen and upwards are classed as women, but the Secretary of State is not aware that they do the same work as men. The answer to the next question is in the affirmative. The answer to the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the question is also in the affirmative. The temperature in Indian factories is usually very high. The Indian Factory Act empowers the local government to apply its provisions to factories employing twenty hands and upwards, provided that they work more than four months in the year. I understand that most of the cotton and linen factories in Bombay will come under the Act. The answer to the question about the Bombay Factory Commission is that the statement of the hon. member is perfectly correct, and the reply to the last question is that in the factories and workshops employing less than twenty hands is that there is no restriction whatever on the length of children's labour.

Mr. S. SMITH: Will the right hon. gentleman call the attention of the Government of India to the very unsatisfactory condition under which children are employed?

Sir J. GORST: I cannot do so, but I know that my noble friend the Secretary for India has done so, and proper arrangements will be made for the protection of children.

THE PADDY TAX.

Mr. DIXON-HARTLAND (Middlesex, Uxbridge): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether it is in contemplation to abolish the paddy tax or rent of 10 per cent. in Ceylon;

And, whether the corresponding class of ryots cultivating paddy or rice in the Madras Presidency pays a tax or rent exceeding twenty, or even thirty, per cent?

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Baron H. de Worms, Liverpool, Toxteth): No decision has yet been come to with regard to the paddy tax in Ceylon. I am informed that the average incidence of the land tax in Madras on fields held by petty proprietors is Re. 1 per acre on unirrigated and Rs. $4\frac{3}{4}$ on irrigated land. The latter rate includes the cost of water supply. Much of the rice is grown upon unirrigated land. The land tax in Madras does not on the average amount to thirty or even twenty per cent. of the gross yield.

TREATMENT OF INDIAN COOLIES.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether his attention has been drawn to the telegram from Rangoon, which appeared in the *Times* of 1st June, regarding the treatment of Indian coolies returning from the Chin Hills;

Whether the Government have any information regarding the alleged harshness and neglect with which it is stated they have been treated;

And, whether inquiry will be made into the accuracy of these statements?

Sir J. GORST: No, sir, the Secretary of State has no information which corroborates the statement made by the *Times* correspondent.

INDIAN ORDER FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICES BY LADIES.

Mr. LABOUCHERE, (Northampton): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether there is an Indian Order which can be conferred upon ladies for distinguished services in India;

And, whether, if so, it is intended to confer it on Mrs. Grimwood?

Sir J. GORST: My noble friend the Secretary of State regrets extremely in view of the courage and devotion exhibited by Mrs. Grimwood during the attack on the Manipur Residency and the retreat, that there is no Indian Order which can by its statutes be conferred on ladies for distinguished services.

Mr. LABOUCHERE: For what service is the Star of India, as it is called, conferred upon ladies?

Sir J. GORST: I think the Star of India is not conferred upon ladies. It is confined to males.

Mr. LABOUCHERE: Then for what service is the Order which is conferred upon ladies, conferred?

Sir J. GORST: I am unable to say.

JUNE 4.

MANIPUR.

Mr. MACLEAN (Oldham): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether there is any record in the India Office of the acceptance by Rajah Chandra Kirti Sinh, of Manipur, in 1852, of the "very material alteration in the relations of the Government of India with Manipur," described in the despatch from the Court of Directors of the East India Company of 5th May, 1852, which has just been presented to Parliament;

And, whether there is any official correspondence to show what action was taken by the Government of India in 1885, on the death of Chandra Kirti Sinh, to secure the recognition by the new Rajah, deposed last year and now living in Calcutta, of the position assumed by the British Government of "pledged protectors of the Rajah?"

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): The answer to the first paragraph of the question is in the negative. The answer to the second is in the affirmative. There is a despatch of the 23rd of June, 1886, from the Chief Commissioner of Assam to the Government of India, and their reply of the 23rd of July.

Mr. MACLEAN: Will the right hon. gentleman produce these papers?

Sir J. GORST: Yes, sir; if the hon. member will move for them they will be given as an unopposed return.

MRS. GRIMWOOD.

Mr. LABOUCHERE (Northampton): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether he is aware that the only British ladies who are eligible for the Imperial Order of the Crown of India are the royal princesses and the wives and other female relations of former or actual Secretaries of State for India, Viceroys of India, and Governors of Madras and Bombay;

And, whether he will consider the advisability of rendering all other British ladies who may, like Mrs. Grimwood, have performed distinguished services in India eligible?

Sir J. GORST: The answer to the first question of the hon. member is in the affirmative. In reply to the second I have to say that my noble friend the Secretary of State does not propose to suggest any alteration in the statutes of the Indian Order of the Crown of India; but when the full official reports of the attack on the Manipur Residency are received he will gladly consider whether it is open to him to make any recommendation on Mrs. Grimwood's behalf.

Mr. MACLEAN: May I ask if the right hon. gentleman is in a position to give an assurance that Her Majesty's Government will be advised to confer a special mark of favour on this lady who, at a time of great personal and public peril, upheld the dignity and honour of the British name?

Sir J. GORST: I am sorry to say that there are two difficulties in the matter. One is that no official report has yet been received, and secondly what order or distinction can be conferred upon this lady. There is an order for conspicuous bravery, I do not know whether that order is restricted to males or not or whether the circumstances of the case are such as to bring Mrs. Grimwood within the purview of the conditions of that order. All I can say is that the Secretary of State, as soon as the official report is received, will consider whether there is any mark of distinction which can be conferred upon Mrs. Grimwood.

THE DISASTERS AT MANIPUR.

Sir W. HARCOURT (Derby) postponed his motion in reference to the disasters at Manipur until Monday.

HOUSE OF LORDS. JUNE 5.

MANIPUR.

The MARQUESS OF RIPON: My Lords, I beg to move that the papers relating to Manipur—I may state that I have the assent of the noble lord the Secretary of State for India—shall be laid before the House in the usual form of course of an address.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. JUNE 8.

EAST INDIA. (MANIPUR SUCCESSION.)

On the motion of Mr. MACLEAN (Oldham), a return was ordered for an address for return of correspondence relating to the succession

to the throne of Manipur after the death of Rajah Chandra Kirti Sinh in 1885.

ARMS FOR REGIMENTS IN INDIA.

Colonel EYRE (Lincoln, Gainsborough): I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War, whether regiments under orders for India, now armed with the magazine rifle, will, on proceeding to India, exchange the magazine rifle for the Martini.

The SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. E. Stanhope, Lincoln, Horncastle): The question referred to in the question of the hon. member is now under consideration between the War Office and the India Office. I shall be glad to explain to my hon. friend privately some of the difficulties in detail which have arisen.

JUNE 10.

THE INDIAN COUNCILS BILL.

On the order for the Indian Councils Bill being read,

Mr. CONYBEARE (Cornwall, Camborne) asked: Do the Government intend to press this Bill. Looking to the time of the Session would it not be more convenient to take it off the orders. It is very unfair to the inhabitants of India to keep them in a state of uncertainty.

Sir J. FERGUSSON: I must ask the hon. member to put the question when the Under Secretary for India is in his place.

THE MANIPUR DISASTERS.

Sir W. HARCOURT (Derby) deferred his motion to call attention to the Manipur disasters until to-morrow; but it was not likely that the motion will be reached, unless the report stage of the Irish Land Purchase Bill should have been disposed of.

JUNE 11.

THE ARMS OF INDIAN TROOPS.

Mr. WEBSTER (St. Pancras, E.): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, if he is in a position to state the number of native troops in the service of the Government of India who, on the 1st of last January, were armed with the Martini-Henry rifle, and the number who were armed with the Snider rifle;

If any other rifle requiring a different description or gauge of ammunition was then used in that service;

Whether it would be possible, in order to minimise the chance of difficulties arising in times of emergency, that in any future change of rifle in the Indian army the change be made division by division throughout the length and breadth of India;

If it would be possible to issue instructions that on any relief of Her Majesty's Indian Regiments being sent to a division armed with a new rifle that that relief be armed with the new rifle ere its departure from its old quarters;

And, if there are any general instructions fixing the minimum number of rounds of ammunition British or Native troops in India should have with them or accompanying them on the line of march, on their going on active service or proceeding on a mission on which hostilities may be reasonably anticipated.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): In reply to the first paragraph of the hon. member's question that the Secretary of State has not the exact figures, but, roughly speaking, rather more than one half of the native troops had Martini-Henry rifles and the rest Sniders. The answer to the second paragraph of the question is in the negative. There is no other rifle except these two in use among native troops. In answer to the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the question, I have to say that the plan suggested in the question would not in the opinion of the Secretary of State's advisers produce the result desired as troops could not be restricted to service in that division only to which they are allotted. The reply to the last paragraph of the question is that there are general instructions dealing with all the points mentioned except the last, namely, troops proceeding on a mission on which hostilities may be reasonably anticipated. In that case the number of rounds would depend on the particular circumstances of the case.

Mr. WEBSTER: In reference to the answer of the right hon. gentleman as to paragraph 2 of the question, may I ask if in Poonah the third Bombay cavalry are armed with the Snider, while other regiments in Poonah are armed with the Martini-Henry carbine? Is it also the fact that the Bombay 8th light infantry are armed with the Snider, while the) 26th Bombay artillery are armed with the Martini-Henry? Is it not the fact that there are four different kinds of ammunition in use and four different weapons; and does not the same thing constantly occur in reference to the troops serving in India?

Sir J. GORST: The House will see that what the hon. gentleman asks is whether there are not two kinds of carbines as well as two kinds of rifles on the Snider and Martini-Henry principle. I believe that is so, and I am not sufficiently acquainted with military matters to say whether the ammunition can be assimilated in every case.

Mr. WEBSTER: Is not the right hon. gentleman of opinion that it would be better to assimilate all the arms in use in India, so that they should be capable of using the same ammunition?

Sir J. GORST: As I have said, I am not a military man; and I do not know whether troops engaged in cavalry service could carry a rifle. That is the answer I have endeavoured to convey.

EAST INDIA CIVIL SERVANTS.

Mr. KING (Hull, Central): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the Secretary of State has had under consideration those recommendations of the Select Committee on the East India Civil Servants to which effect has not yet been given, particularly those relating to a uniform scheme explicitly describing the terms of pension and furlough, and the insufficiency of the present furlough pay:

And whether it may be expected that early steps will be taken to carry those recommendations into effect?

Sir J. GORST: The Secretary of State has been in correspondence with the Government of India on this matter, but it is still under consideration.

THE MANIPUR DEBATE.

Replying to questions in reference to the course of public business,

The FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. Smith, Strand) said: I have engaged with the right hon. member for Derby (Sir W. Harcourt) that the first day after the conclusion of the report stage of the Irish Land Purchase Bill shall be given to him for his motion on the affairs of Manipur. When the Purchase Bill is concluded I shall be in a position to make a statement to the House as to the course of public business that remains to be done, and to ask for such further facilities as may be necessary.

In reply to a question by Mr. S. BUXTON (Tower Hamlets, Poplar),

Mr. W. H. SMITH said: If the Land Purchase Bill is disposed of to-night the Manipur debate will be taken to-morrow.

JUNE 12.

THE EXECUTION OF THE TONGAL GENERAL.

Mr. PICTON (Leicester): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether the telegram in the *Times* of June 11th, stating that the execution of the Tongal General has been postponed, as he may be required to give evidence, is correct:

And, whether, if so, this involves a commutation of the capital sentence; and should that not be so, whether there is any English precedent in recent times for reprieving a condemned prisoner in order that he may give evidence, and then executing him afterwards.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. GORST, Chatham): The Secretary of State has received no information which corroborates the statement referred to in the question of the hon. member. The Tongal General has been sentenced to death and the sentence has been confirmed by General Collett, but the execution is not carried out pending the sending of the record to the Government of India for orders.

THE MANIPUR DEBATE.

Replying to various questions as to the course of public business,

The FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. SMITH, Strand) said: We hope to dispose of the report stage of the Irish Land Purchase Bill to-night, and to read the Bill a third time either to-night or on Monday. If it should be necessary to postpone the third reading until Monday and the debate does not last beyond eight or nine o'clock—(cries of "No")—it would then be possible to go on with the Maniqur Debate. I regret that the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby (Sir William Harcourt) is not in his place as the motion in reference to Manipur stands in his name and I should have been glad to enter into an arrangement with him.

Sir G. TREVELYAN (Glasgow, Bridgeton): In the absence of my right hon. friend the member for Derby, I can only say that he has always fully understood that a whole evening would be given by the Government for the debate upon Manipur.

Mr. W. H. SMITH: I think it would be best that there should be no misunderstanding as to the course of public business next week. I will therefore arrange with the permission of the House that the third reading of the Land Bill will be taken on Monday on the understanding that the report stage is concluded to-night. The Manipur debate, in that case, will be taken on Tuesday, and the Factory and Workshops Bill on Thursday.

JUNE 16.

INDIAN COUNCILS ACT (1861) AMENDMENT BILL.

Order for second reading read and motion made (Mr. Jackson), That the order be discharged and the Bill withdrawn.

Mr. BRYCE (Aberdeen, S.): I much regret that the Government purpose to withdraw this Bill. It is a Bill of considerable value though we do not regard it as completely satisfactory, and it certainly would require some little time for discussion—perhaps three or four hours. But after that I think there would be every disposition to further the progress of the Bill. The desire which I know the Secretary of State has to further this matter is fully reciprocated in this House, and I believe also the present Viceroy is anxious to have the opportunity of introducing those reforms which this Bill would enable him to introduce. Under the circumstances it is impossible, I suppose, to ask the Government to reconsider their determination, but what we can ask is that they will give the Bill a better chance next year by introducing it at the beginning of the Session, and giving us a reasonable time to discuss it. If that is done, I believe there is a general disposition on this side of the House to assist in passing this measure of reform.

Order discharged, and Bill withdrawn.

INDIAN COUNCILS ACT (1861) AMENDMENT BILL AND INDIAN BUDGET.

Mr. W. H. SMITH in debate replying to various hon. members said: An hon. gentleman desires that we should have a discussion upon the second reading of the Indian Councils Bill, but under the circumstances we cannot alter the determination we have come to. The hon. baronet opposite (Sir Joseph Pease) has mentioned the Indian Budget, and I can only say I hope it will be possible to deal with it somewhat earlier this Session.

THE INDIAN STAFF CORPS.

Mr. GOURLEY, (Sunderland): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether he is aware that grave discontent exists among the officers of the Indian Staff Corps on account of the slowness of their promotion to the ranks of Captain and Major:

And, whether he is prepared to bring the matter to the notice of the Indian Government, with a view to effecting a reduction in the existing fixed periods of service, viz., eleven

and twenty years, and thus assimilate the rate of promotion somewhat nearer to that governing for some years past the British Army, and which has averaged about eight and sixteen years.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Sir J. Fergusson, Manchester, N.E., for Sir J. GORST, Under Secretary of State for India): The Secretary of State is not aware that there is any grave discontent among the officers of the Indian Staff Corps on account of the slowness of their promotion to the ranks of Captain or Major, and as at present advised he has no intention of taking the initiative in the matter.

PASTOR HAEGERT OF THE BETHEL SANTHAL MISSION.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH (Flintshire): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether his attention has been drawn to the memorial from Pastor Haegert, of the Bethel Santhal Mission, to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, alleging that he was being dispossessed of the church, hospital, and school, in which he had laboured for nineteen years, on the complaint of the Headman of the village, who confessed in Court that he had been a chowkidar, and was dismissed from the service for some criminal offence, and sent to gaol:

Whether he is aware that Pastor Haegert offered to pay for the land five times as much as it might be valued at;

And, whether the Government have power to order the case to be tried again by another magistrate?

Sir J. FERGUSSON (for Sir J. Gorst): The attention of the Secretary of State has only been called to this matter by the question. The case appears to be one of title to land raised in the ordinary way in the courts of the country with which the executive government cannot interfere.

MILITARY CONTRIBUTION BY CEYLON.

Mr. OCTAVIUS V. MORGAN (Battersea): I beg to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether he will cause to be printed and circulated among Members of Parliament a copy of the Memorial from the Ceylon Association in London to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the subject of the Military Contribution to be paid by Ceylon to the Imperial Government?

The FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY (Mr. W. H. Smith, Strand) was understood to say that it would not be convenient at the present moment to print and circulate among members of Parliament a copy of the memorial from the Ceylon Association referred to in the question in reference to the military contribution to be paid by Ceylon to the Imperial Government, as Her Majesty's Government had not had a full opportunity of considering it.

THE MANIPUR DISASTER.

Sir W. HARCOURT (Derby) rose to call attention to the disasters at Manipur, and the causes which led to them, and to move: "That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty, that she will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House further correspondence relating to Manipur." The right hon. gentleman said: Among the frequent remarks which have been made in regard to the conduct of business in this House, it cannot be said that the House of Commons bestows too much attention on the condition of the affairs of our Indian Empire. When we consider that we are responsible for the condition and well-being of some 300,000,000 of people in India, it is, perhaps, not satisfactory that, generally speaking, the affairs of India occupy our attention for only a few hours, and those usually at the fag-end of the Session. I do not make this observation with the view of thinking that it would be desirable that the House of Commons should perpetually occupy itself in interfering with and endeavouring to supervise the conduct of the Indian Government. I think that the House of Commons exercises a wise and prudent reserve in that matter, being conscious of the great difficulty of the questions which may arise, and conscious also of the important consequences of the conditions under which that Government is conducted. Therefore, sir, I do not enter into this discussion from any point of view with the idea of laying down that the House of Commons should generally set itself up as a critic of the administration in its details, as it does in respect of our domestic affairs at home. And, therefore, whenever we are called upon to discuss these questions, I am sure the House of Commons will always address itself to them in a spirit of calmness, moderation, and impartiality in the treatment of them. I desire also in making this motion to disclaim any idea of bringing a general indictment against the Indian Administration. Whatever may have been the faults of the Indian Government in former times—and they were many—I think that in later days our Indian Administration has been one of which we may well be satisfied, and of which we have a right to be proud. Still less do I desire to make this motion in any spirit of attack upon or hostility to the present Viceroy of India. Every man who is acquainted with Lord Lansdowne will approach the consideration of any act of his Government with a disposition to place confidence in his high character, intelligence, capacity, and humanity. But, sir, subject to all these considerations, I think that when events have happened such as those which have occurred in Manipur; when we have had a British force cut to pieces; when high officials of the Indian Government have been slain; when, in point of fact, a Native Government under our protection has been practically overthrown—it would be a matter that would reflect greatly upon the indifference of the House of Commons if we were to treat such events as matters of no concern of ours. I think it is due to our responsibility—it is due to the people we are called upon to govern—that we should show we are not indifferent to matters which must greatly concern us and our Indian Empire. It is entirely in that spirit, sir, that I desire to introduce this matter to the attention of the House. I think it would be a grave dereliction of duty on the part of the House of Commons—upon its responsibility as the great inquest of the nation—if we did not, at all events, inquire of the responsible Government what the events have actually been, what were the causes which led to them, and how it is proposed to deal with them. There is another consideration which I think we ought to bear in view in this matter. It is a question which concerns the relations of the Indian Government with the native States of India. Everybody knows that it is a matter of the greatest importance that we should preserve those relations upon a footing of friendliness and confidence. Manipur is a small place, and may be regarded as insignificant; but its dealings with the English Government are regarded with serious and anxious attention by all other native States. The great feudatories look with anxiety and even jealousy upon anything we may do in regard to a native State, however small or insignificant. That fact naturally gives great importance to the policy we may pursue in this respect. And, sir, there is another consideration with which we have to count, and which did not exist in former times. Owing to the fact of our influence and civilisation, there has grown up in India an Indian public opinion, and it is not only to English but to Indian public opinion that we must commend the justice and the wisdom of our rule in India. That is a matter which we cannot leave out of sight at all. Therefore, I cannot think that even at this period of the Session the House of Commons will be wasting its time if, in the midst of our domestic controversies, we devote a few hours to the consideration of this question. I do not know that it is even necessary to make this apology for introducing the subject to the consideration of the House of Commons. I need not make the ordinary disclaimer that this motion has nothing about it of a party character. That fact must really appear on the face of it, and in the form in which it is couched. I have designedly and advisedly adopted the old Parliamentary form of calling attention to the subject, and asking the Government for papers. That is a method which has been adopted very frequently in reference to external affairs when it is not desired to move any vote of censure upon any particular policy, but to ensure that the House of Commons and the country shall be made acquainted with the policy which the Government are about to pursue. I should like to describe this motion as a matter of inquiry which will enable the Government to give further explanations in reference to this matter which do not appear on the face of the papers at present in our possession. I think that the Government have recognised this aspect of the case. They do not regard it as a hostile motion directed against them or against the Indian Government. It is in the interests of all governments, and especially of the Indian Government, that the views of the responsible ministers at home should be stated, and it is all the more necessary in this case because the papers already published contain no statement of the view of the Home Government in reference to the transaction. When I ask for the production of papers, I desire to refer to papers which display and declare the views of the Secretary of State for India and the Government of this country, and I have the satisfaction of knowing that the views of the Government will be stated to-night by a member of this House who always addresses it—I am speaking of the right hon. gentleman who represents the Indian Department in this House (Sir John Gorst)—with great knowledge of the subject upon which he speaks and with great ability. I am therefore certain, sir, that the views of the Indian Government will be well represented on this occasion. One part of the duty which I have to perform I shall endeavour to discharge as briefly as possible. I shall endeavour to state the facts as dispassionately as I can, and simply to raise those points which appear to me to require further explanation. [Mr. Gladstone here entered the House and took his seat upon the Front Opposition Bench, amid cheers.] I have alluded to the fact that we have here in these papers no statement of the views of the Indian Government at home—that is to say, of the Secretary of State with or without the advice of his Council in London. Of course the House of Commons looks to the Secretary of State for India as responsible for important transactions such as those which have occurred in India. But the remarkable feature of the Blue Book is that it begins with a despatch or a telegram from the Secretary of State for India on February 19th, asking for information of the circumstances attending the expulsion of the Maharaja of Manipur which took place five months before. That is the first point upon which I ask for an explanation. It is plain upon the face of this Blue Book that these events—that is, the deposition of the Maharaja of Manipur and the determination of the Indian Government to send an armed force to Manipur to maintain the Jubraj upon the throne—was taken without any communication from the Indian Government to the Secretary of State at home. I confess that that is a circumstance which causes me some surprise. I should have supposed that in the course of five months some communications in reference to a matter of this kind would have passed between the Government of India and the Secretary of State in London. It is a remarkable fact that these events took place at the end of September last, and that after communications backwards and forwards between the Commissioner of Assam and the Resident at Manipur and the Government at Calcutta the final determination of the policy of the Indian Government was to send an armed expedition to Manipur, and that the massacre took place before the Secretary of State in London heard of the affair at all, or that anything had occurred at Manipur. It will be seen from the Blue Book that the second despatch, which will be found in the first page and dated March 4th—it would arrive in London I suppose about three weeks afterwards—and must therefore have been received at or about the time that the disaster at Manipur occurred. That is a circumstance in regard to the relations between the Government of India and the Government in London, upon which we ought to have some explanation. I observe that curiously enough there are hardly any communications in this Blue Book between the Secretary of State in London and the Government of India, and none until after the disaster occurred. But at page 58 of the Blue Book there occurs a telegram dated April 9th, which is very curious. It is to the Viceroy at Simla, and it says: "Can you not keep me more fully informed as to Manipur affairs?" That is seven months after the revolution at Manipur had occurred in September, and it throws some light upon the situation and the relations which appear to have existed between the two Governments

in a matter of such grave importance—the Government at Calcutta and the Government in London. No opinion seems to have been given with regard to any steps which might have been taken in the matter, nor even after the disaster had occurred was any opinion asked or given as to the punishments to be awarded or the policy to be pursued. There is not one line in this Blue Book from the Secretary of State in London or from the Indian authorities in London, which shows that up to the present date they took any active steps in regard to these transactions. It seems to me impossible that that is a state of things which the House of Commons, looking to the Secretary of State as the responsible minister in this matter, can accept. Some time or other the Secretary of State would be bound to review the whole subject, and to express the views of the responsible Government. That is one of the principal features which I desire to present to the House of Commons. I will, however, go from that point to the transactions themselves, and the policy which has been pursued. I do not propose to enter into more details than is absolutely necessary. I assume that the House of Commons is acquainted with the general outline of the case, and knows what occurred; and, therefore, I will only call attention to such particular points as in my opinion seem to demand attention. It appears that on the 22nd of September an attack was made upon the reigning Maharaja of Manipur. Mr. Grimwood, the Political Agent, attributes it to the Doolairoi Hanjaba and the Zillah Sing, brothers of the Maharaja, although it would appear that the Senaputty was the prime mover in the matter. There can be no doubt that he was the principal agent in the removal of the reigning Maharaja. The political agent, Mr. Grimwood, reported by telegram to Mr. Quinton, the Commissioner of Assam, what had occurred, and he received instructions from Mr. Quinton which were confirmed by the Government in Calcutta, to mediate and not to assume the offensive—that is to say, that he was not to replace the Maharaja on his throne, but to mediate. This is important because it bears upon the view which was subsequently taken of the persons who were afterwards described as conspirators. Nobody would mediate with conspirators. Well, that was the primary instruction given to Mr. Grimwood as to what he was to do. And what did Mr. Grimwood do? because the action he took appears to bear greatly on what subsequently occurred. Mr. Grimwood went to the Senaputty. He says: "I then sent word to the palace that I would go and see the Senaputti the next morning." Mr. Grimwood had taken no part in the overthrowing of the Maharaja, but he did not find that it would be possible to re-establish him upon the throne, and it is quite clear from the papers in the Blue book that from the very first Mr. Grimwood was of opinion that the retirement of the Maharaja from the throne was a very good thing for Manipur. He says: "When I went to the palace the Senaputty and his brothers were evidently very pleased at the Maharaja's resolution"—that is that he would go away—"and the former promised to make all the arrangements for the journey of the Maharaja and his brothers to Cachar in a proper manner." Thus we have the political resident agreeing with the Senaputty to make arrangements for the retirement of the Maharaja, and that was the course taken in the first instance in this matter. You will find it referred to over and over again, and the view of Mr. Grimwood as stated at page 7 of the Blue Book, "The Maharaja unluckily, instead of exercising his authority over all his brothers without favouring one more than another, sided entirely with the Pucca Sena. On the other hand while the Pucca Sena seems to have been generally disliked by the people, the Senaputty is the most popular of all his brothers, not only with the Manipuris, but with the natives of India who reside here." That is the view taken by the political resident, and I think that in every other part of these papers it will be found that the same view is taken. Of course that view was reported at once to Mr. Quinton, and the date of the despatch is very important. The date of Mr. Grimwood's report to Mr. Quinton was the 25th of September so that the Commissioner of Assam was in full possession of what had happened and the views of the political resident at Manipur on September 25th. That view seems to have been completely accepted at that time by Mr. Quinton, the Commissioner of Assam, and it will be found in his despatch that he takes the same view of the subject and he entirely approves, as far as one can judge by the course taken by Mr. Grimwood. Mr. Quinton reported to the Government of India. It is difficult to follow the details clearly, because they are only to be found in enclosures, but it will be found Mr. Quinton reported to the Government of India on the 9th of October, and therefore it may be fairly said that the Government of India were fully acquainted with what had happened at Manipur up to that date. The point to which I wish to call the attention of the Under Secretary and the House is a most important one, namely that either the view taken by the political resident at Manipur in accepting the resolution to allow the Maharaja to be dismissed, and of accepting in point of fact, what had been done by the Senaputty was either right or wrong. If it was wrong it was surely the duty of the Government of India, without the smallest delay, to express their disapprobation and dissent from the course which had been pursued. But although the Government was in possession of everything that had occurred on the 9th of October there was no communication either to Mr. Grimwood or to Mr. Quinton that they took a different view of the transaction for at least four months. That, in my opinion, is what really lies at the root of the whole matter. I have said that in Mr. Grimwood's view the deposition of the Maharaja was accepted, and that the individual who was heir to the throne had declared himself Maharaja, and had been established in that position. Indeed, he had communicated to the Indian Government that the new Maharaja had taken his seat on the throne; and that fact was communicated to the Indian Government in the middle of October, although no notice seems to have been taken of it. Mr. Grimwood was allowed to act in accordance with his own view. In his opinion his view was accepted and approved by the Indian Government, and the new Maharaja was apparently installed with the assent of the Indian Government. There was not a word from the middle of October down to the end of December from the Indian Government. October passes, November passes, December passes, and the *status quo* is accepted by everybody. The next date in the matter is the 31st of December. At page 9 of the Blue Book there will be found a further letter from Mr. Quinton, Chief Commissioner of Assam, to the Secretary of the Government of India, dated December 31st. What is it that he says? "The Political Agent, as arranged, visited the Palace, when the Senaputty promised to make all arrangements for the journey of the Maharaja and his brothers to Cachar in a proper manner, and guaranteed that those who chose to stay at Manipur should not be molested. He undertook to send for the Jubraj, then eight miles away on the Cachar road, who arrived two or three hours afterwards and at once proclaimed himself Maharaja. The Maharaja, Sur Chandra Singh, accompanied by Pucca Sena and two other brothers and attendants—in all about sixty persons—left Manipur on the evening of the 23rd of September, under an escort of thirty-five rifles of the 14th Goorkha Light Infantry, who saw the party safely to Cachar, whence they proceeded to Calcutta. The Jubraj, whose nomination by the Maharaja as his successor on his demise had been sanctioned by the Government of India, has since carried on the government of the country, having been recognised as Regent by the Political Agent under the orders of the Chief Commissioner." The despatch further states: "The succession of the Jubraj, who has been recognised by the Government of India, merely anticipates the ordinary course of events, and is generally acquiesced in by the people of the State. Since he assumed office the administration has been successfully and tranquilly conducted, and the Political Agent expects no opposition to it, whereas the restoration and maintenance in the chiefship of Maharaja Sur Chandra Singh, unless effected by a strong British force, would most probably involve repeated insurrections, such as those which have characterised the history of the Manipur State." Thus after three months' experience on the part of Mr. Quinton and the Political Resident of the state of affairs at Manipur they give their approval and support to the existing condition of things. What was the Government of India doing all this time? They knew perfectly well what the situation was. They knew perfectly well what the Senaputty had done. The Senaputty, practically speaking, was Governor of Manipur, yet the very first words which the Government of India uttered was on the 24th of January. They allowed this state of things to go on all through the months of October, November, December, and January without expressing one word of disapproval of the course of things which had been taking place at Manipur. That despatch, which is of course one of the most important papers before us, is dated 24th of January, and in it for the first time we have a reference to the transactions which had taken place in September. Until then there had been no expression of any opinion whatever on the part of the Government of India. But in that despatch they demur to the course which Mr. Grimwood had adopted. They say to Mr. Quinton that "when Mr. Grimwood received your telegram directing him to mediate and assuring him of military assistance from Kohima, the proper course for him to pursue was to have gone to the Senaputty at the Palace, to have ascertained the reason of the disturbances, and to have communicated with you. It would then, in all probability, have become apparent, before the Political Agent had committed himself to assenting to the Maharaja's flight and thereby admitted the success of the Senaputty's revolt, that the Maharaja was entirely in our hands, and that the Senaputty, a declared traitor in open mutiny, could have been dealt with by us as circumstances demanded." But the Government of India had known for four months what the conduct of the Senaputty had been in regard to Manipur. That is one of the points on which an explanation is demanded. How is it possible that the Government of India, with full knowledge of everything that had occurred in Manipur since the middle of October, should at the end of January, for the first time, express an opinion and formulate a policy which reversed and disapproved the views taken by Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton? The Government of India is of course the superior authority, and had a right to judge and rejudge the acts of its subordinates, but what requires explanation is how it could have allowed its subordinates to go on from September until the end of January without a single word or hint that they dissented from the course which was being pursued? The Government of India in their despatch express their view that the best thing would be to restore the old Maharaja, to remove the Senaputty, and to employ a force with sufficient strength to show that we were the masters of the situation and to overawe the conspirators. Why did they allow the position to remain without overawing the conspirators for four months? It was only after that lapse of time that they expressed an opinion—an unfortunate opinion—which was not consistent with that of those who were on the spot, and who were acquainted with all the circumstances, that a small body of troops would be enough and that a sufficient number might be taken from Kohima. I do not lay much stress upon this point because the Government very properly placed upon Mr. Quinton the responsibility of taking such a force as might be necessary; but that was the view which was expressed by the Government of India for the first time at the end of January. At the time Mr. Quinton received this letter he appears to have been on board a yacht. He received it in the early part of February, and as was extremely natural he seems to have been filled with dismay that such a view should for the first time have been taken by the Government of India, and he addressed to the Indian Government a strong remonstrance against the policy of restoring the old Maharaja. Up to that time it had never been suggested for a moment that the Senaputty was to be removed. On the contrary, the Senaputty had been treated as the real man—the real governor—and it was considered a beneficial thing for Manipur that there should be a change in which the Senaputty should be the moving spirit. On the 9th of February Mr. Quinton addressed to the Government of India a strong remonstrance against the restoration of the old Maharaja. He says: "His restoration would simply mean that the authority of the State would be wielded by Pucca Sena, for whom no one has a good word to say." He goes on in the same despatch to say: "I was assured by Mr. Grimwood, who met me at Kohima last month, that there was no feeling whatever shown in favour of the return of the Maharaja, and that the present government was universally accepted." Then, apparently under the influence of the views of the Government of India, Mr. Quinton, for the first time, entertains the idea that there should be an inquiry into the conduct of the Senaputty. That will be found on page 23 of the Blue Book; but there was not a word of it until February. He says: "The punishment of the Senaputty is not in my mind in any way dependent on the Maharaja's restoration,

An inquiry into his conduct and his punishment to the satisfaction of the Government of India can be made a condition precedent to the recognition of the Jubraj, and, unless it is intended to exclude him permanently from the succession, his recognition as Jubraj, in the event of the present Jubraj becoming Maharaja, should be made to depend upon his obedience and good conduct." It is quite certain that at that time Mr. Quinton did not contemplate the immediate expulsion of the Jubraj, but simply an inquiry into his conduct, after allowing him to take his natural place as heir apparent to the throne. That was the state of things in February, and then Mr. Quinton goes to Calcutta. I should mention that up to that time the old Maharaja had been in Calcutta constantly soliciting aid from the Indian Government. Mr. Quinton goes up to Calcutta, and he has an opportunity of consulting with the Government of India. I presume that the Government of India called for his opinion in writing, and it is given in a despatch dated February 19th, at page 24 of the Blue Book. He there repeats his strong opinion that the old Maharaja should not be restored. There were two policies open to the Indian Government—one was not to recognise the revolution of the Senaputty, but to restore the old Maharaja, and the other was to acknowledge the revolution. But how? Was it possible to acknowledge the revolution by accepting the usurper to the throne, and then to treat as conspirators the men who brought about the revolution? It would be exactly the same as if we had accepted the restoration of Charles II., and ordered the execution of General Monk. In consequence, I suppose, of the remonstrance of Mr. Quinton, the Government of India abandoned their original policy, which was that of declining to accept the revolution. I should say when I call it a revolution that this is carefully pointed out as what, in Turkey, would be called a revolution of the seraglio. It was not a political revolution—not a revolution of the people nor a revolution against the English raj or British authority. It has no element of that kind, and therefore there was no political object in the matter, and no political reason for adopting one party rather than the other. Mr. Quinton, in his report of the 19th of February, speaks of a remonstrance against the restoration of the old Maharaja, and he says that "the restoration of the Maharaja and his adherents means the expulsion of the present *de facto* rulers, who have hitherto given no cause of complaint to us, or, so far as I can ascertain, to their subjects." He goes on to say: "The Jubraj is the heir apparent and will have on his side numerous partisans who look to his future accession, and the Senaputty, the most popular of the brothers, the present head of the army, a man of bold and turbulent character, may be expected, when driven to desperation, if he does not openly resist, to use his utmost efforts to stir up disaffection and rebellion." That was the reason for not putting up the old Maharaja, and the Government accepted that view, and abandoned their intention of restoring the old Maharaja. But then what was to be done with the new government, and were they to set up the Senaputty who would be a formidable opponent? He is the heir apparent, and one of the reasons given by Mr. Quinton against the restoration of the old Maharaja was that the Indian Government would always be obliged to maintain a large force in order to keep him on the throne. We come then to what is of course the practical part of the transaction—the final determination of the Government of India. That was arrived at on the 21st of February. No determination was come to by the Government as to what they were to do between the 24th of September and the 21st of February. For six months Mr. Grimwood, the Political Resident at Manipur, was, without the slightest intimation from the Government as to what course they intended to pursue, or whether they had any intention of disturbing the settlement of the Senaputty. It was certainly not until the middle of March that anything was heard. The Political Resident at Manipur was allowed to go on with his relations with the Indian Government as they existed at Manipur, without the slightest information as to the manner in which it was intended to deal with the Senaputty. I think I am right in that opinion. The views and final opinion of the Indian Government will be found on page 25 of the Blue Book, which contains the instructions to Mr. Quinton to go to Manipur and deal with the matter. Without detaining the House by reading the whole of the despatch, I may say it gives instructions for the recognition of the Jubraj and the removal of the Senaputty. There are, however, some words in the despatch which are important. Having ordered the Senaputty to be removed from Manipur, and punished for his conduct, Mr. Quinton is instructed to inform the Government of India in what way it would be best to carry out this object. The despatch says: "The Governor-General in Council considers that it will be desirable that the Senaputty should be removed from Manipur and punished for his lawless conduct. I am to inquire where you would recommend that he should be interned, and what steps you consider necessary for carrying out his removal without affording him the chance which his position as head of the Manipur forces might possibly give him, of making any forcible opposition." Mr. Quinton is then instructed to "take with you a sufficient force, even though opposition may not be expected, and you should report for the orders of the Government of India the condition which you propose to attach to the recognition as Maharaja of Manipur of the present Jubraj." Again, I call attention to the fact that when he was collecting this force and considering what it should be, Mr. Grimwood had no knowledge that the Senaputty was to be removed. That is a material point. Why was not Mr. Grimwood consulted as to the force that would be requisite to carry out the policy decided upon? As to the force which was taken and which was proved to be utterly inadequate, I propose to say nothing. I suppose that is a matter for military inquiry in India. That it was inadequate there is no doubt. Though it is not part of the civil question, it is part of the military question, and some explanation is required from the military authorities in India. In consequence of Mr. Grimwood not knowing what was to be done, Mr. Quinton started with his troops on the 7th of March. It seems to me very extraordinary that all this should have taken place without any communication with the Secretary of State in England. No despatch is sent till the 4th of March, just at the time when the whole expedition was organised and was about to start. That despatch could not, of course, reach England for three weeks afterwards. On the 7th of March Mr. Quinton and his force left for Manipur. The account of this will be found at page 64 in a paper written by Lieutenant Gurdon. After the whole expedition had started and was on the march, Mr. Gurdon was sent forward to see Mr. Grimwood at Manipur. He went by forced marches, and arrived at Manipur on the 15th of March. It is perfectly obvious from these papers that until Mr. Gurdon saw Mr. Grimwood on the 16th of March, Mr. Grimwood never had any idea that the policy he had been pursuing for six months was disapproved or was intended to be changed by the Government. Mr. Gurdon says he then told him what was going to occur. I think there is some controversy upon this matter. It is difficult to reconcile exactly the two accounts of what Mr. Gurdon said to Mr. Grimwood on that occasion. There is a telegram at page 81 in which Mr. Gurdon says:—"*First*, informed him of the intention to deport Senaputty; asked him best way to arrest him without affording him an opportunity of forcibly resisting. Grimwood's reply was Senaputty personally would resist to the utmost. Grimwood could suggest no means of resisting Senaputty as described." Why was not this all told before the expedition started? Why were not the military authorities in possession of this view before the force was organised? I am bound to say that this account of what was told Mr. Grimwood has not been universally accepted. In India certainly statements have been made—it is said on the authority of Mrs. Grimwood, and, I believe, accurately—that when Mr. Gurdon saw Mr. Grimwood he did not tell him there was a resolution to deport the Senaputty, but he asked a number of questions as to what would happen then. It is quite obvious I think that there was some mistake about that, but it is said that Mr. Quinton did not really know until a week after, when Mr. Quinton actually arrived at Manipur. There is a statement, supposed to be authorised by Mrs. Grimwood, which gives this account of the transaction:—On Sunday, the 15th of March, Mr. Gurdon arrived at the Residency at Manipur, having been sent forward to by the Chief Commissioner to make inquiries and to gather information. On Monday the 16th he closely questioned Mr. Grimwood with regard to Manipur affairs. Mr. Grimwood was well posted in the subject, and gave all the information sought for, but from first to last he was certainly kept in ignorance as to what was the object of the Chief Commissioner's mission. On Tuesday, the 17th, Mr. Gurdon left to join the Chief Commissioner, and on Friday, the 20th, Mr. Grimwood went to meet him. In the interval between Mr. Gurdon's departure and Mr. Quinton's arrival Mr. Grimwood and an English lieutenant went out on a shooting expedition which had been organised for them by the Jubraj. It is hardly conceivable that if Mr. Grimwood had received orders to deport the Senaputty he would in the interval have gone out with him on a shooting expedition. When Mr. Grimwood met Mr. Quinton he was, according to this account, told for the first time that the Senaputty was to be arrested and deported, and he was informed to his dismay that it was his hands which were to carry out this policy. Mrs. Grimwood begged the Chief Commissioner not to force on her husband the distressing task of arresting the Jubraj since he had always been on friendly terms with her husband and herself, and earnestly besought him to impose the disagreeable duty on someone else. If this account is correct the statement to Mr. Grimwood was not made until the 22nd. In any event, until the 15th Mr. Grimwood, the political agent at Manipur, was not informed of what was to be done. Well, Mr. Gurdon, having seen Mr. Grimwood at Manipur, returned on the 15th to Mr. Quinton, who was on his march. On the 18th Mr. Quinton telegraphs to the Government of India what he intends to do. He says: "I propose to require the Regent and the Durbar to meet me on arrival, announce the decision of Government, arrest Senaputty and inform him that the length of his exile and return depend on his conduct, and the tranquillity of the country, and order the Maharaja to place a gun with the escort during my stay to prevent any disturbance." That is approved by the Government of India, by telegraph. Mr. Quinton arrives at Manipur. Then the determination is taken to arrest the Senaputty in durbar. Mr. Quinton meets the Senaputty, and here I would observe that at that time so far as we can judge, the existing Government in Manipur was in the most friendly disposition towards the English Government. They treated them with all the solemnities of Eastern respect; they went forth to meet them, and all the ceremonial of a friendly reception was given. Mr. Quinton met the Senaputty; what passed between them we don't know, we have no record of that. It was settled to seize the Senaputty at the durbar. The arrangement was that the orders of India were to be announced at durbar, and the Senaputty was to be told to surrender. If he refused Colonel Skene was to arrest him at the durbar, troops were kept in readiness around the residency where the durbar was held, in case of resistance. It appears from these papers—I entirely, of course, omit to adopt the evidence given by the Jubraj and others of the natives which no doubt would be tainted with partiality. I do not rely upon them. At all events the Jubraj says he was very much alarmed at seeing the durbar surrounded by troops, and it was in consequence of that the Senaputty did not come. I speak in entire ignorance on these matters. There are gentlemen in this House of great Indian experience; they know what the character of this durbar was. They well know what would be the meaning attached to it by the natives of India. I profess to offer no opinion on the subject, I am quite incompetent to do so, whether or not it was a proper thing the durbar was summoned. It is a matter on which, in my opinion, the English Government is bound to pronounce an opinion. It is a thing which for good or for evil must deeply affect the natives of India and our relations with the princes of the native States. I know there has been a great deal of prejudice on this subject. I do not wish to inflame that prejudice or to express an opinion which I am incompetent to form. I know there are durbars and durbars. There are durbars such as was held by Lord Lytton to receive the Ameer of Afghanistan. That was a great reception of a foreign prince. I do not in the least intend to attach the same signification to a durbar of this character. I am struck with the fact that when the Marquis of Ripon addressed a question to the Secretary of State for India in another place as to the orders to arrest at the durbar, the answer given by the Secretary of State was: "My information does not lead me to believe that the Government of India ever contemplated the summoning of the Senaputty to the durbar for the purpose of arresting him. If that had been done I should have been very much surprised." That looked rather, I should say, as if the Secretary of State for India considered that that was a thing that

would not be approved of. I have read with great attention articles on this subject by a member of this House of great Indian experience, the hon. member for Evesham, whose opinion is always received with great deference on this subject. Although approving generally of the policy that was pursued, upon the subject of the durbar he has expressed a very strong opinion. He says: "To this durbar the family, including the Senaputty and Council of the Maharaja, was summoned. This summons was peaceful to them. They were not to be arrested. There was one exception. This summons was not peaceful for the Senaputty, as he was to be arrested, and yet he was not warned. Now this cannot be right; no argument as to the rights of the paramount power can make it so." It is quite plain the hon. member for Evesham would have disapproved of the transaction. I gather from the papers that that transaction was not originally ordered by the Government of India. The Viceroy did not know the arrest was to be made in the durbar until he learned it subsequently. He did not read the telegram of the 18th March, approving what Mr. Quinton was to do, in that sense. Therefore if it had been only an error of judgment on the part of Mr. Quinton, who is unfortunately dead, I would not lay stress upon the matter, but a very different importance was given to it by the fact that it was distinctly approved by the Viceroy. You will find that on pages 82 and 83 of the Blue Book. First of all, referring to the outcry in England and in India as to this transaction at the durbar, he says: "The imputation of treachery arises from a misconception of the Senaputty's position, and that of the Manipur State. The State is subordinate to the Government of India, and the Senaputty must have known that his conduct in conspiring against the Maharaja who had been recognised by us rendered him liable to punishment." How could he have known? Why, the English Resident negotiated with him the terms of the removal of the Maharaja. The English Resident at Manipur had been in communication with him in political life and in private life. The Commissioner of Assam recognised and approved these relations of the Political Resident at Manipur, and for six months he was recognised by the Government rather as the leader of a revolution, which they had accepted and approved. Well, then we come to the question of the durbar. "Until Gurdon's telegram of the 7th of May reached us we had not received specific information. If the Senaputty refused to submit quietly, Quinton intended to have him arrested at the durbar after the announcement of our order. We have no doubt Quinton considered open arrest in durbar, in case of such refusal, would be most straightforward and safest procedure. Knowing Senaputty's character, Quinton probably felt that the only chance of depriving him of opportunity of fomenting disturbance was to effect his deportation as promptly as possible. Had the arrest taken place at durbar, as intended, Quinton would not have lost his life." That is a ratification, and, according to the legal maxim, ratification after the event is retroactive in effect, and is equivalent to a mandate. We must deal with this exactly as if the original order had been given by the Government of India to arrest the Senaputty. I do not profess myself, and I do not desire myself, to express any opinion upon that matter, which must rest very much upon Indian opinion; but in my judgment it is a matter on which we ought to have the decision of the responsible Government in this House. It is a question which goes far beyond the merits of this particular affair, and affects the relations and dealings of the Indian Government with the native princes of India in the future. I am afraid I have wearied the House, but it is necessary in order that I should, in justice to all parties, give an accurate account of the matters and of the points to which I wished attention to be directed, and given them, in terms of the written papers. There are several points on which I think we ought to ask for some explanations of the Government. First of all, as I have said, How it was that the Secretary of State had no communication on this subject from first to last until the disaster had occurred; how it was that the change in the dynasty of Manipur could be effected; how it was that an armed force was sent to Manipur. Manipur is a State of importance, but it is now the connecting link between Assam and North Burma—how it is that all that could be done, without any information being communicated to the Secretary of State. Well, then upon the other point of view of the treatment of the Senaputty as a conspirator, because I do not know exactly what view is to be taken of orders sent to the general who wishes to inflict punishment upon the Senaputty. "You are to go to Manipur, take possession of the capital and punish as they deserve all who have acted as leaders or instigators of the revolt, or who have been concerned in the treacherous murder of British subjects." I do not quite understand what "the leaders and instigators of the revolt" means; whether it means the transaction of the 24th of March, or whether it refers also to the transactions of the 24th of September. That I think is a point which should be cleared up. If it refers to the transactions of the 24th of September all I have said as to the acceptance of that by Government will apply. If only to the transactions of the 24th March, 1891, that will be an entirely different thing. On the question of the separate treatment of the Senaputty and of the Jubraj, I wish to know the views of the Government as to the possibility of separating the cases of the Jubraj who was put upon the throne by the Senaputty and the Senaputty himself; how it is possible to treat one as a conspirator when you accept the other as the new ruler of Manipur. The second point of course is the question of the durbar to which I have already referred. The other point is the extraordinary delay on the part of the Government of India—that is to say from the middle of October, when they first knew all the particulars to the 21st February, when they came to a decision determining upon their policy; and the non-communication of these circumstances to Mr. Grimwood. Now, as to matters of future policy, I do not press the Government. I know the difficulties in which the Government of India is now placed by what has occurred. That the policy they adopted has totally failed nobody can deny. Here is this family of native princes. They acquiesce evidently in the removal of one and the setting up of another. One is deposed, the other is under the capital sentence, and consequently the whole fabric of the dynasty of Manipur, seems to have been destroyed. What is to be done in order to reconstruct the Government there of course will be an anxious question for the consideration of the Government of India. Well, then, as regards the punishment to be awarded to the persons here concerned in these terrible events, upon that I venture to offer no opinion. It is a grave responsibility for the Government of India and the Government at home, and they will determine upon these matters upon their responsibility, and upon their judgment. In the midst of these circumstances—which I think are to be deplored—whether there is any fault to be found with them or not—at all events there are some bright spots. There is the courage and fortitude of young Grant; there is the self-devotion of Mrs. Grimwood, which has been duly recognised by the Fountain of Honour. I hope I have discharged the duty I have undertaken in the spirit in which I have professed. I have endeavoured to state the case as impartially as I know how. I think the Government and the House will take the view that these matters are worthy of the attention of the English Parliament. Transactions of this kind cannot occur, disasters of this kind cannot be sustained, without this House—which after all is the final resort—and the Government of this immense Empire showing that they are cognisant of them, sympathises with them, and, if they desire, arrive at a fair and true judgment upon them.

Question put: "That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty that she will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House further correspondence relating to Manipur."

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. GORST): Of course to the motion submitted to the House, the Government offer no opposition whatever. The Government have endeavoured to lay before the House ample information respecting the unfortunate disaster at Manipur, and as further information is coming in by almost every mail, and as the inquiries which are now going on in Manipur are almost daily throwing fresh light on the transactions, Her Majesty's Government would of course think it their duty in obedience to the resolution which the right hon. gentleman has moved to give from time to time every information which may be useful and necessary to this House. The right hon. gentleman not only moved the investigation, he accompanied it by a speech in which he has asked for information upon certain points connected with the transactions on which he thinks the Government ought now to pronounce some opinion. I will do my best in the remarks I make to gratify the right hon. gentleman as far as I can go. The time for a full and complete expression of opinion has not yet arrived. Inquiries, as I mentioned just now, are still going on, especially into the military transactions; and not only are inquiries being made into these transactions, but the conduct of the civil officers, so far as it is possible now to arrive at it, is also being made the subject of inquiry. It would clearly be improper for the Secretary of State to have written any despatch in which the final conclusion of Her Majesty's Government in these matters was expressed until all reasonable means of obtaining any further information and any further elucidation of the facts have to be abandoned. Perhaps the right hon. gentleman after a perusal of the papers has been unable himself to find anybody whom he would take the responsibility of censuring, and rather asks me to assist him in the task, and invites me to find some person whom the right hon. gentleman would be justified in censuring. I am afraid that if that was his idea—I see the right hon. gentleman shakes his head—I could not have assisted him, because I am as unable as he is to fix anything like culpable blame upon any person connected with these transactions. Now the first two suggestions of the right hon. gentleman are suggestions which I feel myself very much in accord with. He asks, why were these transactions carried to the point of a military expedition against Manipur without any previous consultation with the Secretary of State in London? The only answer to that has been that that has been the universal practice with the Government of India in all except what they consider very important cases to take upon themselves the responsibility of dealing with the native States, and of not seeking the previous sanction or approval of the Secretary of State. And if the Secretary of State's sanction was not asked to this proceeding with Manipur, it was because the Government of India and everybody connected with this matter regarded it at the outset as a matter of very little importance; for if there had been no military disaster, if the Senaputty had been quietly arrested at Manipur and deported to some other part of India, very likely nothing would ever have been heard of the transaction in this House. It is because subsequent events have given an extraordinary significance to everything that previously took place that this matter is made the subject of discussion in the House of Commons; but I myself confess that it does seem to me that, certainly, looking upon it by the light of subsequent experience, the question whether a revolution in Manipur should be recognised or not, or whether an important person in the Manipur State should be deported or not was one of these important questions connected with the administration of native States about which the Secretary of State should have been informed, and, if time had permitted, might have been previously consulted. The second complaint of the right hon. gentleman is that there was a very unfortunate and regrettable delay in these transactions. I should like to point out that if the Secretary of State had been consulted that delay would have been considerably increased, because they could not have consulted the Secretary of State until all the information had been obtained and the Government of India itself was ripe for decision; and, therefore, the consultation with the Secretary of State would have added to the five months' delay in the Government of India making its decision by two or three months additional. But this delay, although regrettable, is not altogether inexplicable. The Government was at Simla when the transaction of November 25, 1890, took place, and it takes 14 days for papers to travel from Manipur to Simla. The Government of India was also then on the point of moving from Simla to Calcutta, and I am afraid that movement causes a good deal of delay in the transaction of public business on that account; and, finally, on the 14th November a fact took place to which the right hon. gentleman has not called the attention of the House. On the 14th November the ex-Maharaja

addressed a solemn protest to the Government of India in which he made some very grave accusations against Mr. Grimwood, and this protest had to be sent to Manipur for Mr. Grimwood's observations on it, before it could be taken into consideration by the Government of India. Mr. Grimwood wrote his answer to the Maharaja's protest on December 4th, and it was only on December 31st that Mr. Quinton forwarded to the Government of India Mr. Grimwood's explanation accompanied by his observations and recommendations on the subject. And as Mr. Quinton was on the point of coming to Calcutta, a further delay took place in order that he might personally confer the Viceroy on the matter. I admit that these delays were unfortunate and regrettable, but I think anybody would say that a delay of five months in coming to a conclusion on an important matter of this kind in a place which is not accessible by railroads and which is remote from the centre of political life in India, although regrettable is at least to be explained. The right hon. gentleman has rather suggested that the Government of India were to blame in the policy which gave rise to this disaster of removing the Senaputty from Manipur. That policy was of course the policy of the Government of India, and undoubtedly they are responsible for it. I do not think that either the right hon. gentleman himself or the people who have criticised this policy have quite appreciated that the removal of the Senaputty was entirely a political act. I am aware that the Government of India in their despatches make use of expressions like "treachery" and "rebellion", and accuse the Senaputty of moral offences for which they declare an intention of punishing him; but that is only the way in which the Anglo-Saxon race always is accustomed to ascribe criminal misconduct to political opponents. We are not unaccustomed to it in this country. The right hon. gentleman himself frequently speaks to large public bodies of the criminal practices and misconduct of the First Lord of the Treasury and others who sit on this Treasury bench; and he speaks of their expulsion from that bench which would be a purely political act as an act of punishment. Whether the Government of India is to be permitted to have the right to expel the Senaputty from Manipur or not, there was the question whether it was expedient that they should exercise that right: just let the House consider who the Senaputty was. He was a man of the greatest ability and the greatest force of character among the ruling family of Manipur. He was a man who was extremely popular among the people, who had a reputation of having impoverished himself by generosity which is one of the greatest virtues to which an Oriental can aspire. He was not a man of very nice moral character—I do not know that you can expect the same standard of morality from an Oriental that you can expect from an Englishman—but a man who beats two of his slaves to death for stealing a polo pony is rather worse than the average of Oriental despots. And there was this most important characteristic of the Senaputty: he was a man of independent character, who presumed to make revolutions without consulting the paramount power, and who set a Maharaja upon the throne of Manipur without first asking the leave of the British Resident. A man of that sort must be dealt with in one of two ways. First, he can be removed from the State altogether; or, secondly, he can be used as an instrument for governing the people of the State. It is quite evident that Mr. Grimwood desired to adopt the latter course and thought he could make use of the Senaputty as an instrument through which the Manipur people could be governed. Well, that is a very generous policy, and one which everybody is disposed to sympathise with, but it is a rather risky policy. It is a policy the success of which depends upon the Resident obtaining the ascendancy over the Senaputty and not the Senaputty over the Resident. And between the two powers there is the great difference that the one is temporary and the other permanent, and that although Mr. Grimwood might remain only a few years at Manipur, the Senaputty would remain there altogether, and might, when Mr. Grimwood had gone, possibly obtain an ascendancy over Mr. Grimwood's successor which he could not obtain over Mr. Grimwood himself. For that and other reasons Governments, Indian and other, have never encouraged a policy of this kind being adopted. Governments have always hated and discouraged independent and original talent, and they have always loved and promoted docile and unpretending mediocrity. This is not a new policy. It is as old as Tarquinius Superbus, and although in these modern times we do not lop or cut off the heads of the tall poppies, we take other and more merciful means of reducing any person of dangerous pre-eminence to a harmless condition. Why, in my own life I have known numbers of cases of this kind. I remember, thirty years ago, how the British Government spent their blood and treasure in the colony of New Zealand for the purpose of destroying the power of the Maori King instead of governing the natives of New Zealand through his instrumentality. I remember how, a few years ago, a British Government destroyed the power of Cetewayo in South Africa as soon as he became no longer necessary as a counterpoise to the Transvaal. But I can give you examples of the same policy nearer this country. Why did you expel Arabi from Egypt? Because he was thought to be dangerous, politically dangerous, to the peace of the country. I can give you even a closer parallel, taken from the conduct of that Government of which the right hon. gentleman was so distinguished a member. Why did you arrest Zebehr and intern him in Gibraltar? There you had a man in a country over which you had no power, and, acting from a political necessity, you would not permit him to exercise his influence in the Soudan, although General Gordon, your agent in the Soudan, asked to have him there. The Government of India, in refusing Mr. Grimwood the assistance of the Senaputty, acted in the same way as you did in refusing Zebehr to General Gordon to enable him to manage the Soudan. I am not saying this for the purpose of applying anything like a *tu quoque* argument to the right gentleman. I say it because it is according to our experience. It is a mortifying thing to confess, but I think governments are very likely to be right. It is better that great ability and independence such as is possessed by the Senaputty should be a disqualification from State service; it is perhaps better, and more for the peace and safety of the world, that you should depend on mediocrities. At any rate it would be unreasonable for the House to censure the Government of India, because in this matter they determined to remove the Senaputty from Manipur. They acted on the traditions and regular policy of governments almost from time immemorial. Now there is another branch of the subject which has to be considered, and that is, granting that the policy of removing the Senaputty was right, was it properly carried out? I hope the House will not believe that I would adopt a course so mean and cowardly as to try and shuffle off responsibility upon those who are dead in order that the living may escape blame, but it is necessary to call attention to the position of Mr. Quinton. He was not a subaltern or subordinate officer, he was the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and Manipur was a district in the province he administered. Now all who are acquainted with our policy in India know that these provinces have a considerable amount of independence, and even, in some cases, legislation of their own. It is true Assam is one of the least advanced of the Indian provinces, but even there, in the position of the Chief Commissioner, the Government of India would have been wrong in interfering with Mr. Quinton's discretion in carrying out this policy, and I have no doubt that if Mr. Quinton were alive he would be the first to assert that the responsibility belonged to him and was his. Now, it is very difficult in this House to discuss, even to the limited extent the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby has discussed it, the conduct of any of the actors in the Manipur affair, because all the chief actors have unhappily perished and cannot explain any point in their conduct that may seem to be unreasonable. Some things were done at Manipur which I suppose can never be explained, but which, if Mr. Quinton were alive, he possibly might explain to our entire satisfaction. But as I have said an inquiry on the spot is now proceeding, and it is, therefore, the more difficult for me to say a word on these transactions, which word might do less than justice to those unhappy men who cannot speak for themselves. But I cannot let the occasion pass without saying one or two things on behalf of the actors in the Manipur disaster to one of which I am assisted by the reference of the right hon. gentleman himself. Now, first of all, Mr. Quinton has been blamed for planning the arrest at the durbar, and I think that some indignation was evoked in this country about this arrest at durbar which was due in a great degree to misapprehension as to what a durbar is. People forgot it was not a meeting between equals such as the meetings between the Viceroy and the great rulers of native States, it was a kind of court held by the Chief Commissioner to which the Manipur authorities were summoned in order to hear the determination of the paramount power and they would be required to give their obedience to that determination, and if either the Regent or the Senaputty had refused to attend the durbar they were liable to be punished for contumacy as not obeying when summoned by the paramount Power. No doubt it is a question worth considering whether the attempt to effect the arrest at durbar was expedient or not. We have a high authority in the person of the hon. baronet the member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple) who no doubt will be listened to with the respect his opinion deserves should he give it to the House, but Indian authorities are not all agreed on this matter. A few days ago I had a visit from a gentleman, who, perhaps, more than any one else, is entitled to speak upon Indian frontier policy, Sir Robert Sandeman. He has surpassed all Indian officers in the success with which he has dealt with frontier tribes, tribes very different to the Manipur tribe, of a really warlike, independent race, formidable and dangerous. Sir Robert Sandeman told me the other day that he had repeatedly arrested recalcitrant chiefs at durbar; and the last illustration he gave me was from his experience only a few months ago, a short time before he left India. It was a chief in Beluchistan who made himself obnoxious to British authority. This chief was summoned to durbar, and therefrom he was given into custody, and carried away, a precisely parallel case to this at Manipur, or as it would have been had Mr. Quinton's intention been carried out. But while I am perfectly ready to admit that the question of arrests at durbar is one which deserves very attentive consideration, and upon which, after due and deliberate consideration, the Secretary of State will probably have to express an opinion, I wish to repudiate with the strongest indignation, of which I am capable, of the suggestion made in some quarters that Mr. Quinton attempted to carry out, or was capable of carrying out, anything like an act of treachery. Although the accusation was freely hinted about at one time, subsequent information has deprived the charge of all foundation, for it is almost certain that the fact that the Senaputty was going to be arrested was known for days before Mr. Quinton arrived. It is so stated in the evidence given at the trials at Manipur. It was known for days in advance that Mr. Quinton was coming, and that the Senaputty would be arrested. The Senaputty met Mr. Quinton four miles from Manipur with a very small escort and sat talking with him for some considerable time. Now does that not show that the Senaputty had no suspicion that Mr. Quinton contemplated any act of treachery.

Sir W. HARCOURT: Or perhaps of arrest.

Sir J. GORST: If the British Commissioner intended a treacherous arrest, there was his opportunity to effect the arrest four miles from Manipur. The Senaputty knew perfectly well that a durbar was called for the purpose of declaring his removal from Manipur and arresting him there. It is apparent therefore there was no treachery and that everything was above board and honourable between the parties. The Senaputty knowing that he would be arrested at the durbar would not go to the durbar at all. I do not believe that anybody acquainted with the facts can entertain the idea that Mr. Quinton contemplated any underhand and treacherous conduct, of which indeed he was incapable. Now the right hon. gentleman has called attention to the fact that Mr. Quinton's conduct in intending the arrest at the durbar was with the approbation of the Indian Government, and there is no doubt whatever that had they known of the intention they would have left Mr. Quinton to carry out their policy in the manner adopted by General R. Sandeman and other officers in frontier warfare. Then the right hon. gentleman said something of the insufficiency of the force, and rather hinted that the force was insufficient because Mr. Quinton was not fully informed of the resistance which might be anticipated. But I think the right hon. gentleman must have overlooked the despatch of February 19 from Mr. Quinton and the Government of India. In that despatch, speaking of the probability of resistance, Mr. Quinton said that the Senaputty was a man of ability and of turbulent character, who when driven to desperation might be expected, if not to openly resist, to use his utmost efforts to stir up disaffection.

Sir W. HARCOURT : I read that despatch.

Sir J. GORST : That shows that Mr. Quinton had all the information he could have before he determined on the number of his escort in reference to the resistance he expected. It is easy for us to be wise after the event, but I doubt whether anybody before these Manipur transactions could have doubted that 500 Sepoys—the force Mr. Quinton had at his disposal—would not have been sufficient to account for the whole of the Manipur force. I do not think that anyone, even Mr. Grimwood, had any idea of the tiger-like ferocity with which the Senaputti defended himself. Those who are acquainted with Indian affairs, and have followed Indian history know that the British powers there has not depended upon overwhelming force; boldness and audacity are qualities by which our empire in India has been acquired and preserved. There was no reason to suppose that the force which Mr. Quinton thought sufficient for carrying out his task was inadequate, for do we not find that the next event in sequence was that Lieutenant Grant set out with a force of eighty men to relieve the force at Manipur, that he penetrated to within twelve miles of the town that he attacked and captured a fort defended by a thousand men, that he drove back the entire Manipur army flushed with its victory over Mr. Quinton; and when relieved by the prudence of the superior officer, that relief was received by the little force with vexation rather than satisfaction. His relief was received by him and his force, not with satisfaction, but with vexation. More than I have said on the conduct of the military I would not venture to state to the House, as it might do some injustice to those who were men whose previous public service entitled them to consideration, but whose mouths are closed in death. If they committed any error of judgment they have paid for it. I believe this Manipur affair must always remain a dark page of Indian history. It is, as the right hon. gentleman pointed out, relieved by two bright examples of conspicuous bravery of a man and of a woman; the splendid audacity of Lieutenant Grant and the patient and heroic endurance of Mrs. Grimwood. I respectfully submit to this House that no proceedings in this House could either mend or mar the record, and to criticise the conduct of the men who have perished in the service of their country, and therefore can neither explain nor defend their conduct, may be unjust, must be ungenerous, and can serve no political end whatever.

The Hon. GEORGE CURZON : With the defence of the Indian Government by the Under Secretary, I find myself in total disagreement, and I therefore feel tempted to ask the indulgence of the House while I attempt to feebly defend the Government of India and the officers concerned. I purpose to limit myself chiefly to those parts of the case which touch the honour of the Indian Government and the officers concerned, a point about which we are more sensitive in this House than any other. Having done my best to master all the evidence at my disposal, and having considered and read the Blue Books most carefully, and also having made myself acquainted with what is the opinion of the Indian as well as the home newspapers, I have confidence in saying that a more painful line of defence than that adopted by the right hon. gentleman on behalf of the Indian Government and the officers who unhappily had paid the penalty with their lives, I never heard. Whatever the errors of judgment they had committed—and it not could be denied in some respects they were deplorable—neither the Government of India nor the officers concerned deserved the reprobation or censure of the House of Commons. The first point I take is the resolution of the Indian Government to send out Mr. Quinton to Manipur to restore the Jubraj and to arrest the Senaputty. I noticed the right hon. gentleman spoke in more moderate language than some of the newspapers, but the inference to be drawn was the same, viz, that the act of the British Government in proposing to forcibly arrest the Senaputty was an act of gratuitous interference on the part of the Government, I am quite ready to admit, whether it was politic to forcibly arrest the Senaputty at that particular moment, there is a question capable of argument whether it should have been done ofter such a lapse of time. It is quite true a good deal can be said and has been already said for the Senaputty by the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby; it is true he was admitted to have been popular with the bulk of his people; that he was on familiar terms with Mr. Grimwood; that since September, 1890, he has not been accused of any overt act of hostility against his Government, and therefore there was no pressing need for this violent and powerful step. But they do not even touch the fringe of the question. The point that can be advanced and sustained is this, that both on constitutional and political grounds the Indian Government were absolutely right in the step they took. First, sir, as regards the constitutional aspect of the question, Manipur, sir, is not an independent State, it is a protected State subordinate to the British Crown. Treaties and negotiations entered into between the two governments for the space of over sixty years have shown that, during that time the Government have not only saved the Manipur State from absorption by its neighbour on the south of Burma, but have saved the ruling dynasty of Manipur from being upset at times by popular outbreak, and at times by intrigue. I do not think, therefore, it will be doubted that Manipur was in no respect an independent State. I am amazed in that respect to have heard the language adopted by the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby and the Under Secretary of State for India. The right hon. gentleman the member for Derby represented the Senaputty as on the whole a respectable gentleman.

Sir W. HARCOURT : I expressed no opinion on that point at all; I have not undertaken the defence of the Senaputty, what I desired to point out was this, that the Indian Government accepted the Senaputty as the Commander-in-Chief, under the old Maharaja and practically as Prime Minister of the new Maharaja and accepted him for several years, and in spite of the allegations of the Indian Government, they made no objection since 1888, more than two years, to his remaining as Commander-in-Chief under the old Maharaja.

The Hon. GEO. CURZON : That may be true, but the right hon. gentleman was careful to eliminate from his speech anything derogatory to the Senaputty, and that is a most important point in the case. He was a well-known and notorious man, and I may say a man of even infamous character—("No, No")—of even infamous character. He had once been banished from the state of Manipur for acts of criminal violence, and on one occasion threatened with deportation. I am quite prepared to meet the point and argue that for his actions in the month of September of last year he stood in the position of a guilty man calling for punishment at the hands of the Indian Government. The Under Secretary for India said that the charges of treachery brought against the Senaputty were the mere inventions of political feeling against a political opponent.

Sir JOHN GORST : I did not say that, what I said was that the whole conduct was political, that it was a political act.

The Hon. GEO. CURZON : I beg pardon if I misunderstood him, I understood him to say the Senaputty was a political opponent, that the charges of treachery were similar to those we are familiar with in England, and which whether there is foundation for them or not are levelled against a political opponent. It appears to me that is a most unfair way of putting the case with regard to the Senaputty. In the act of last September it cannot be denied that he rebelled against the ruler of the State who had been restored, I look upon that act of rebellion as an act of rebellion against the paramount power which is that of the British Crown. That was the opinion of the Indian Government. They looked upon the Senaputty, from the result, as a man guilty of rebellion against the State, guilty of high treason and calling for punishment at the hands of the Indian Government.

Sir W. HARCOURT : Will the hon. member excuse me? If the Indian Government so regarded the Senaputty they must have looked upon the Jubraj in a similar light.

The Hon. GEORGE CURZON : I am most happy to meet that point also, because I conceive it is one absolutely valueless. The right hon. gentleman leads us to understand there ought to be similarity of intention on the part of the Indian Government with the Senaputty, and with the Jubraj. What is the similarity? It is admitted that the Jubraj was not responsible for the rebellion of 1890, but at the time was eight miles away, and he was not accused by either party of complicity in the proceedings, and the right hon. gentleman wishes to put on the same level with him, this notorious Senaputty, who was admitted to be at the head of the conspiracy, and who became the chief officer of the ruler of the State. The right hon. gentleman is fertile in resources, but I should like to know what he would have done had he been in the position of the Indian Government at the moment. They might have restored the Maharaja, but it was admitted he was too weak. The Indian Government had at first some disposition towards restoring that prince, but so strong was the dissenting voice of Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton that the idea had to be abandoned. How could they have ousted the Jubraj? He had taken the most becoming step; his elder brother having voluntarily abdicated and disappeared he stepped forward and prolaimed himself the ruler of Manipur. Having taken that step the English Government acknowledged him, and admitted him to the State. And yet this is the man, this blameless although meek individual, that the right hon. gentleman places on a level with this scoundrel, the Senaputty—(laughter)—and proposes that the Indian Government should treat him in a similar fashion. It appears to me that of the two courses of which I have spoken, that of restoring the original Maharaja and that of ousting the Jubraj—both of these being impossible, there remained nothing whatever for the Indian Government to do but to punish the Senaputty. This was the position when, on 21st February of the present year, Mr. Quinton left Calcutta and went to Manipur to carry out the instructions of the Government. And now I come to the second question, and perhaps the most important question, the arrest at the durbar. The responsibility must rest with one of three parties, either with the Indian Government, or with Mr. Quinton, or possibly with both. I think the right hon. gentleman in his speech acquitted the Indian Government of responsibility for the order, and indeed by following the evidence in the Blue Books it is perfectly capable of demonstration that the Indian Government knew nothing whatever of the proposed arrest at this durbar. I will prove what I say. In the first place, take the instructions of 21st February to Mr. Quinton, where will you find there any mention whatever of the durbar or of the arrest at the durbar? (Hear, hear.) Next I take Mr. Quinton's telegram of 18th March, in which he said—and this is the first intimation of arrest—that he proposed to arrest the Senaputty, but he does not say that he proposed to arrest him at the durbar, nor was that the legitimate inference. Then there was the evidence of Lieut. Gurdon, and the terms of the arrangement are actually given on page 8 by Lieut. Gurdon. The arrangement was that the orders of India were to be announced at the durbar, and the Senaputty was to be told to surrender. If he refused—I think a relevant and important condition—Colonel Skene was to arrest him at the Durbar. And, finally, we have the word of the Viceroy of India himself that it was not until the 7th May that the Indian Government knew anything of the intention to arrest him at the durbar. Therefore I think it is evident from this evidence that the Indian Government must be held absolutely quit of any responsibility for the proposed arrest at the durbar. The act, therefore, was the act of Mr. Quinton. It was not a rash or impulsive act. It was a decision arrived at by Mr. Quinton in conference with Colonel Skene and Mr. Grimwood, and although there is reason to believe that Mr. Grimwood dissented from the policy, and we do not know whether he was overruled or whether he yielded to the authority of his superior officers, that decision was the decision of the civil and military authorities combined. I happened to notice in the speech of the right hon. gentleman that he repeated this charge in a far more curtailed form than has been common in the organs of the press. If the right hon. gentleman observed a wise and studied moderation of language, that could not be said of some of the organs of the press that have spoken on the matter. I take these words which express the charge from the columns of the *Star* newspaper. (Laughter.) I admit that the *Star* is not an authority to which any great weight is to be given, but at the same time it expresses the character and the

rancour of the charge that is made. It was there stated in reference to this question of the durbar that it was deliberately intended to seize the Senaputty before he had time to resist. "This is the blackest spot in all this base and bloody business," a vocabulary which we at once recognise as the normal vocabulary of the *Star*. (Laughter.) I pass over the curious suggestion contained in this paragraph that before you arrest a criminal you are bound to give him notice in order that he may have time to resist—(laughter)—I ask the question was there any ruse in this matter? Was there any trap set? Was the Senaputty lured to this durbar under a sense of false security. The whole matter turns upon what is the character of a durbar? There is nothing precisely analogous to a durbar in this country. It is not a levee, it is not a public entertainment, it is not even a council or conference, but a durbar is an open court convened by the paramount power presided over by the officer representing the paramount power, that is on this occasion by Mr. Quinton representing the Viceroy and the Queen. It was on this occasion a court to which the Jubraj and his brothers were called as fugitives of the British Crown, and in that capacity they were bound to attend. Not only has the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary for India provided us with a precise anology in Hindostan, but an analogy will occur to us in European history. It is almost a precise analogue of the great feudal courts in the Middle Ages, and a friend has suggested to me hypothetically what seemed to be an absolute analogy. He suggested the case in which Louis XI. of France might, if he had had courage, have desired to arrest his turbulent vassal Charles the Bold of Burgundy. Had he been forced to carry that out, it might very well have been at a feudal court corresponding to this durbar, and had such a step been taken I venture to say that no one even in these days of flabby nineteenth century sentiment would have discovered for one moment that there was any deviation from the strictest code of honour. (Laughter.) Was the Senaputty taken by surprise? The whole evidence goes to prove that the Senaputty was a long-sighted individual and knew very well what he was up to all the time. He assumed illness and went or rather did not go to bed. This convenient illness lasted over two days during which time he was collecting his troops, issuing ammunition and arms and planting the guns. For two whole days this innocent dupe of Mr. Quinton was actually himself preparing the snare into which Mr. Quinton was to fall. It appears to me that Mr. Quinton took what was both the most open and the most merciful course in this matter—the most open because there was no doubt as to the meaning of his act, and the Senaputty understood it from the first, and the most merciful because, knowing this man to be a desperate character, popular with his army, the one thing that a man in his responsible position had to do was to escape resistance and avoid the risk of bloodshed. He took the one step by which there was no chance of bloodshed, and by which resistance, if attempted, would be of no avail. I admit that he was guilty of an error of judgment, and mistook the man he was dealing with; but it was untrue to say that he exceeded his instructions or belied his honour. I happen to have been a good deal in the East, perhaps as much as any member of this House who has not had official or business connection with those parts, and I think the House will believe me that I have framed as high and critical a standard of the rules which ought to regulate the conduct of British officials towards subject states as anyone. I do not shelter myself behind the plea that we are dealing with a half-civilised and barbarian people. That would be an unworthy and despicable thing. But we are dealing with an oriental people, who knew just as well the meaning of the word "durbar" as any peasant in this country knows the meaning of a magistrate's court or a judge and jury. (Hear, hear.) It appears to me that had this order for arrest in the durbar been transmitted by telegram from Simla, emanating from the Governor in Council, it would not have been anything that needed defence in the House of Commons; but the act was the act of Mr. Quinton, and, whatever you may think of the judgment he showed in the matter, I think you will see that it is an act the morality of which he would not have been called upon to defend if he had lived, and which now that he is dead ought not to be cast at his memory as a reproach. I will not presume to trespass longer upon the patience of the House. The point which I have tried to bring forward is this, that nothing whatever has been done, whatever the mistakes or whatever the blunders, that need make any Englishman feel ashamed. (Hear, hear.) There are many things upon which we can hardly form a judgment, and which the grave has closed from us. We shall never know why it was the Senaputty being admittedly a desperate man, and when it was known that ammunition was being dealt out to these men, that they possessed guns, that in face of this alarming array of events and circumstances, Colonel Skene actually thought fit, with a body of only 250 men, to attack this force. We shall never know why this unequal contest was not sooner abandoned, and why the Residency, instead of being evacuated in circumstances of disaster and horror at two o'clock on the morning of the 25th, was not evacuated under conditions of order at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th. We shall never know why it was that extraordinary colloquy was agreed upon, or, without having been agreed upon, all the superior officers were allowed to go out and fall into the trap. These are matters in which it was easy to be wise in the light of quiet knowledge. These are matters which rest with those who have paid the penalty of their lives; but, whatever be our opinion upon those points, let us not, in respect to their memory and out of regard to the honour which they did nothing whatever to sully—let us not accuse them of misdeeds of which they stood innocent, or suspect them of intentions of which the most delicate conscience need not be ashamed. (Loud cheers.)

Mr. CAMPBELL BANNERMAN (Stirling, etc.): Mr. Speaker, of the two speeches we have listened to on the other side of the House, although they differ, and differ widely, in so far as concerns the answer which they convey, and, above all, in the tone by which they are characterised, yet they agree in this one important fact, this one characteristic they possess in common—that they were neither of them addressed to the speech of my right hon. friend or to any of the inquiries that he had made; but were, I presume, prepared to answer other inquiries and other complaints that have been made through the public press. The hon. member opposite, who has just sat down, has, with *naïvete* for which I did not credit him before, quoted the charges made by the *Star* nawspaper, and his whole speech was prepared to shield the memories of Mr. Quinton and the other unfortunate participators in these events from certain calumnies which had appeared in that and other newspapers. My right hon. friend brought no complaint and no accusation against Mr. Quinton. Not a breath of dishonour will pass on any of their memories in consequence of anything my right hon. friend has said. My right hon. friend requested—as he was entitled and bound to do—that the views of Her Majesty's Government upon some of these points should be stated, and those views we have not yet obtained.

The Hon. G. CURZON (Lan., Southport): May I say in justification on this point that I did not say that the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby himself made those accusations, but that those reports were circulated, not only in the newspaper referred to, but in other newspapers both in this country and in India, and those newspapers contained attacks upon the Government of India, and it did seem to me that, whatever one particular organ might say, I was bound to get up and defend the honour of these men.

Mr. CAMPBELL BANNERMAN: I have not the least intention of taking part in the quarrel between the hon. gentleman and the *Star* newspaper. With the speech of my right hon. friend the Under Secretary of State I am bound to say I was greatly disappointed. If the right hon. gentleman will allow me to say so, I am a sincere admirer of his in public as well as in private life. I have been acquainted with him for many years, but I regret to see, as many have regretted to see, a certain cynical tone pervading everything he says in this House; and I suppose it must arise from some domestic circumstance, or other internal motive with which here we have no concern. At all events, I do not hesitate to say that the right hon. gentleman's speech on this occasion was nothing more than a prolonged satire on the defence of the Indian Government. A tone and spirit of irony pervaded it from beginning to end; and, if the right hon. gentleman had desired to see how ludicrous the defence of the Indian Government could be made to appear, I do not think he could have succeeded better than he did. The right hon. gentleman gives us, as I have said, no answer to the demand of my right hon. friend that we should know what the Secretary of State for India thinks of the policy pursued by the Indian Government in this matter. The right hon. gentleman said in reference to the charges that have been made against both the authorities in India and the authorities at home, there were a great number of reasons for delay in India owing to the moving of the seat of government from Calcutta to Simla, and so forth; but he omitted to observe this fact, that if the Government of India had kept the Government at home fully informed of what was going on, those delays would not have been tolerated for a moment. The Government at home was absolutely and entirely in ignorance that all these transactions were proceeding for five months after the main events occurred, during which time there were delays in India. Well, now, I do not believe for a moment that the Government at home, had it known what was going on, would not have been all that time pressing for some solution or other of the position of affairs—of the problem presented at Manipur. Now the great point in this is the determination of the Government of India to acknowledge a new Maharaja, and, at the same time to punish and deport from his country the principal author of the revolution, who placed the new Maharaja on his throne. And if hon. members will take the trouble, as we have done, to place the disputes in some sort of chronological order under the heads of the different persons concerned, they would be still more puzzled by the contemplation of what was disclosed. We have in India connected with this subject three authorities. We have Mr. Grimwood, Mr. Quinton, and the Under Secretary, I think, for the Government, representing, of course, his superiors. Well, each of these authorities has a mind of his own on the subject. I am not disposed to inquire or pronounce a strong opinion as to the degree of independence which would be accorded to officers in the position of Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton. My own tendency would have been towards treating the opinion of such a man as Mr. Grimwood, who was resident at the place, and who had resided on the spot and had more personal acquaintance with all the circumstances than any one else—my disposition would be towards treating him with the greatest confidence, and, unless a very strong case was made out to the contrary, of acting on his advice. He was on the spot, and was conversant with affairs. But in some degree Mr. Grimwood seemed to be in accord with Mr. Quinton. Nothing in Mr. Grimwood's suggestion implies that the Senaputty was subject to any punishment whatever. Mr. Quinton, in his first despatch on the 31st December, gives us an unbiassed opinion, and, after hearing all Mr. Grimwood had to say, he also recommended that the Jubraj should be acknowledged, and says nothing whatever about proceeding against the Senaputty. It is the Government of India, on the other hand, who apparently volunteer an opinion to the contrary. They say on January 29th that we should intervene in strength in order to punish the authors of this conspiracy. They say that Mr. Quinton, who visited Manipur to overawe the conspirators—this, as my right hon. friend pointed out, was many many months after the conspiracy had taken place—reported that the Maharaja should be reinstated, and that the Senaputty should be removed. So far we have these opinions; but afterwards Mr. Quinton goes to Calcutta, and then he repeats his opinion even in stronger terms. There is one remarkable passage which I think has not been quoted, in which he points out—in which he is arguing against the restoration of the old Maharaja, and he says that the restoration of the old Maharaja meant the expulsion of the present *de facto* rulers of Manipur, who had hitherto given no cause of complaint to us. And then he proceeds to say how strong, and how popular, and of how strong a will the Senaputty is. And what the Government of India apparently did was they abandoned their intention of restoring the old Maharaja, but they continued the policy of expelling the Senaputty which was a part of the original policy. What was the good of expelling the Senaputty? I regard many of the arguments now used in favour of removing the Senaputty as *ex post facto* arguments framed in order to account for this extraordinary policy. The removal of the Senaputty was part of the original policy of the Indian Government; which was to restore the old Maharaja and to expel the Senaputty; for, as it is somewhere

observed in these despatches, it was said by someone there should not be so many princes living there because there would be no peace in the country. After Mr. Quinton's visit to Calcutta, and when he had been talked over in regard to this point, it seems to me that the worst of all the conclusions was arrived at, namely, the compromise which carried out neither one policy nor the other. There was the policy of maintaining and reinstating the old Maharaja and expelling those who had rebelled against him; and there was the policy of acknowledging the new Maharaja and using him for the Government of the country, and those who placed him there. The Government of India in order to bring into apparent accord those rival opinions appeared to have formed a new policy, which they unfortunately attempted to carry out, and which was to acknowledge the new Maharaja, and at the same time expel the Senaputty. Well, sir, what my right hon. friend has asked is—and surely we are entitled to an answer?—does the Secretary of State for India approve of the new policy of the Indian Government? My right hon. friend distinctly repudiated the idea that he was called upon to express an opinion either as to the amount of force employed or as to this question of the particular circumstances of the arrest of Senaputty. The main point is, and which I think the House would do well not to lose sight of, and not to be diverted from by these subordinate issues. Was the whole policy of this expedition a good one; was it right to continue the new Maharaja and at the same time to remove the Senaputty? The hon. gentleman opposite, who found fault with the *Star* newspaper for using strong language, did not spare his own strong language in speaking of the Senaputty. All we know of the Senaputty from these papers—and that is all the information we can get upon it—is that he was a strong, powerful, and popular man, and also there is a story of his having beaten two slaves. It is not true that he beat two slaves to death as was stated. Well, I am bound to say, although I have not the personal experience such as the hon. baronet has of the East, that I do not imagine that a question like that, deplorable as it is, would for ever debar a potentate of that order from succeeding to the throne. But, if it did debar him, then it ought to have been acted upon before. He ought not to have been continued under the old Maharaja in that place, and not even during the months of the Regency. While we were waiting for the final settlement of this question the Senaputty ought not even then have been allowed to assume an even still more important position of Jubraj, not, at all events, without protest. There was no protest; he accepted the position and he occupied it. No evil occurred in the country. We hear of the arrival of Mr. Quinton. The people were contented; the Government was going on prosperously and peaceably; and we have, therefore, from the circumstances disclosed in these papers, no reason whatever to attribute to the Senaputty all those evil points of character which the hon. member opposite seemed so ready to attribute to him. What we expected was that the Government would have been able to complete this series of papers by producing a despatch from the Government at home giving its judgment on this question. The right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary for India says it is not yet time to come to a final conclusion on the matter. It may be that he is right in saying that we could not form a final conclusion on the recent advices, but surely a decision might be arrived at and some opinion expressed by this House in regard to the main policy which Mr. Quinton was directed to carry out; and here I would call the attention of the House to one of the despatches of Mr. Quinton in which he himself protests against his own mission, because in that despatch he says, "I am making arrangements for a visit to Manipur next month in view of the Government of India determining that the question of the return of the Maharaja should be reopened; but if I am right in supposing that the point is one on which I am asked to form an opinion, I would strongly advise against it. The question is one, as I said before, in which the people of the State have little interest, and is after all a mere family dispute, and a visit from the Chief Commissioner and inquiries such as those suggested must have the effect of unsettling men's minds and disturbing the tranquillity which now prevails without affording any better grounds than we now have for coming to a conclusion in the matter to be inquired into." Therefore, I think we must assume that Mr. Grimwood at Manipur and Mr. Quinton at Assam were after all the best judges of what was best to be done under all the circumstances; but upon every point they seem to have been overruled except upon the one point of the recognition of the new Maharaja. Well, sir, I regret that the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary for India, speaking on behalf of the Government, has not given us any opinion on these matters on behalf of the Secretary of State. The hon. member for Southport (Mr. G. Curzon) has given his opinion very strongly and with great force and knowledge upon the subject, but after all it is only his individual opinion. He has defended the Indian Government as if he were entitled to speak on their behalf, and he has spoken with much energy and in such a manner that we were very glad to hear what he had to advance. He has defended the Indian Government with much ability, but it was from the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary for India that we expected to hear a speech which would either defend or modify or mitigate the idea which has been formed in regard to the policy of the Indian Government on this important question.

Sir RICHARD TEMPLE: The right hon. gentleman who has just sat down has complained that the preceding speakers on this side of the House have not sufficiently followed up the able and argumentative speech delivered by the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby. I will with the permission of the House endeavour to some extent to supply that omission, but I must preface what I am about to say in regard to this important question by saying that I quite acknowledge and fully appreciate the very calm and temperate and statesmanlike, and also the comprehensive, manner in which the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby has treated this subject, although I am bound to add that in regard to certain particulars when the right hon. gentleman elaborately criticised the delay of certain months which took place in the autumn, and discussed the grave question as to why Mr. Grimwood did not know certain facts and did not do certain things by a certain date, and in regard to certain other minutes, the right hon. gentleman reminded me very much of an elephant picking up pins. I will with the permission of the House endeavour to select certain points in the undoubtedly excellent speech of the right hon. gentleman which in my opinion call for special notice on this side of the House. The right hon. gentleman spoke of the effect which these transactions were likely to have on the native States of India, and I do not know whether my hon. friend is right in saying that the effect will not be favourable. I think that those who like myself have had experience with regard to these native States will be of opinion that the effect will be good because the native States will have observed the manner in which for years we have conducted our government of those States, that we gave shelter to the Maharaja when he was deposed, that we endeavoured to establish his brother on the throne, and that we endeavoured to remove even by force all who were disposed to rebel against him. All this I contend will be recognised as our good evidence in respect of our Government, and that it will have a favourable influence on opinion in the native States of India. The right hon. gentleman, the member for Derby paid a very just and eloquent tribute to the gallantry and endurance of both the men and the women who were engaged in these transactions, but I should like to point out to him and to the House that in that eulogy there was one very notable omission. He omitted to mention the fidelity, the loyalty and the endurance of the native soldiers, particularly the Gorkhas, who are among the good soldiers not only of Asia, but of the world, and but for whom on the night of this sad occurrence at Manipur, not only the ladies and English officers but every one associated with them must have perished. I am sure the right hon. gentleman will excuse me endeavouring to correct what I am certain was only an accidental omission on his part. The right hon. gentleman did me the honour of quoting an opinion of mine with regard to the question of the justice of the intended arrest of the Senaputty, and notwithstanding all that has been said in the animated and generous attempt of my hon. friend the member for Southport (Mr. Curzon), I must adhere to what I have previously stated. It certainly does appear to me that under all the circumstances of the case in relation to this particular durbar, it was not justifiable on the part of the authorities to summon the Senaputty to that durbar without a previous warning that it was intended to arrest him when he got there, assuming that that was the intention with which he was summoned. I do not hesitate to say that if it was intended that he should be arrested, that arrest ought to have been carried out in the ordinary way. What I ask would have been easier at the moment of the arrival of the British escort at Manipur than to have sent a force of Gorkhas to arrest the Senaputty at his own house. That is a thing which might have been done and would have been done no doubt swiftly, suddenly and effectually, but instead of doing this the authorities give him time to prepare for resistance by summoning him to a peaceable durbar—a summons which he undoubtedly saw through, because it must have been perfectly transparent, and we now well know the result. I quite agree with the remark made by my hon. friend the member for Southport that it is very hard to criticise effectually the unfolded intentions of a dead man, but when such a question as this is being brought forward in the House of Commons I should not like it to be supposed that Indian authorities of the first rank would say that arrests of this kind were things which were to be allowed. On the contrary I should think that these authorities would be inclined to say that such a procedure as this constituted a very dangerous precedent. My right hon. friend the Under Secretary for India has in the course of his speech in reply to the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby, quoted authorities as to certain arrests that have been made on previous occasions, but I must point out to the right hon. gentleman and to this House, that there are durbars and durbars. There are certain durbars which are durbars only in name. They are simply courts of justice to which certain persons are summoned. They have to go there under direct orders and if they disobey they know that they will be arrested and compelled to appear and in that way forced to obey the summons. If a man thus summoned attends such a durbar knowing what is likely to happen he cannot complain of any sharp practice or unfair proceeding. But a durbar of this sort is not to be confused with such a durbar as that which has been referred to in connection with what took place at Manipur, that was a solemn affair—a state ceremonial. The Regent of Manipur was himself to be present with other princes of the blood, and the affair was to be conducted with a considerable amount of ceremony and with a certain amount of warlike display. What it was that Mr. Quinton intended when this durbar was summoned we shall never know, but of this I am quite sure, that he intended nothing to be done of a character that would at all be dishonourable. Indeed, as far as I can gather, the facts seem to be that there was no intention to do anything which was not properly justifiable and that therefore it will do no good either for the honour of England or to its influence in British India in this House to attempt a justification of anything to the contrary. I have thought it necessary out of deference to the great service to which I have had the honour to belong to make this frank and explicit statement. In my opinion arrests of this kind ought never to be made at durbars in India. The right hon. gentleman opposite has very properly asked whether the Government of India justifies such a procedure. I on my part am quite assured that the Government of India, upon a full review of the whole of the circumstances of the case as has now been laid before this House will say nothing different from that I have already asserted. With regard to the question whether the Viceroy and his council will ever sanction such a procedure, I am fully of opinion that when the Viceroy and his council come calmly to review the whole of the circumstances of this case they will not differ from the views which I have just had the honour to express. To my mind it is entirely owing to some misapprehension of the language which was used in the telegram addressed to them that they have answered without that amount of circumspection and consideration which the gravity of the case demands. Of course, I am unable further to explain their attempt at justification, but I cannot think that it will be seriously persevered in. I know that the hon. member for Southport has spoken of some mediæval examples which go the other way. And I must here thank him for the generosity with which he has come forward to defend Indian officers when attacked in their absence with

an amount of chivalry which I am thankful to bear testimony to in this age and generation. Is there not a famous case—that of the arrest of Count Egmont at Brussels? The Count, as the right hon. gentleman will recollect, was summoned by the Spanish general to a conference with regard to the fortifications of the city, and at that conference he was suddenly arrested. Has that not always been regarded in the history of the civilised world as an unjustifiable act on the part of the Spanish governor? What occurred at Manipur was undoubtedly a small act in comparison with that, but I hope that no evil example of this kind and that no precedent will ever be allowed to tarnish that British honour which in India has been hitherto untarnished. Now, sir, the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby has spoken of the smallness of the force employed. I must say in justice to the Government of India that according to their arrangements larger forces were to be employed, and it was only Mr. Grimwood's fault in not waiting for the extra relief forces which were close at hand that the expedition was restricted in numbers. But the disaster was not due to the mere fact of the force being insufficient in numbers. The Gorkhas are a fine infantry force, and five hundred of them would no doubt be well able to stand against five thousand Manipuris in an open field. But the unfortunate fact is that they were cooped up in the little British Residency which was close to an unfordable moat and right underneath the fortified walls of the palace upon which British guns had been mounted. And in addition to that the Residency had a thatched roof of inflammable material; it was this "unwonted location", as the American would call it, that caused the disaster. Then as to the forty rounds of ammunition. The right hon. gentleman the member for Derby very properly did not touch upon that beyond saying it was a point which required explanation. Possibly I may be able to afford him the explanation he wants. It appears that the force possessed two kinds of rifles, viz., Snider and Martini-Henry and for both kinds there was a large supply of ammunition in the Residency. The fault was that it was not served out. And now I come to deal briefly with the main point. The right hon. gentleman said while we condemn the mode of arrest is it possible to justify the policy of the Government of India. The right hon. gentleman the member for Stirling also adverted to that point and spoke of it as the most interesting question of all before the House. I agree that the question is "Was the Viceroy justified in acting in the manner he did?" I contend that he was. Might I ask the House just for a few moments to consider this question? It appears to be the inconvenient custom in the Royal House of Manipur that the succession goes not from father to son but from brother to brother, and as there are several brothers all near the throne quarrels are constantly arising. It is this unfortunate custom which has led to the present disaster. What was the case as it presented itself to the Government of India? Here we had the Maharaja whom we had supported on the throne by formal recognition for many years, and who had rendered us great service, especially in our wars with the hill tribes and more particularly in the last Burma war. I could show hon. members a long list of military expeditions in which his troops have taken part. He was suddenly driven from the throne by one of his brothers. This had to be recognised for the moment by Mr. Grimwood, the officer on the spot, who had of necessity to await the orders of the Government of India. The Maharaja, being exiled, comes to British India. When he gets there he petitions the Government of India to send him back again. This gave rise to a certain amount of complication which required the patient consideration of the Government. Had they hastily decided the matter, the right hon. gentleman would have been one of the first to complain that they had not taken sufficient time to consider whether the self-exiled Maharaja was a possible sovereign for Manipur or whether it would be better that his next brother should succeed him. In due course the Government of India ascertained that the author of the expulsion of the Maharaja was not his next brother, but his next brother but one. They came to the conclusion that the Maharaja proper was an impossible person, but that it was advisable to recognise the next brother as the sovereign of Manipur, who, in fact, had, in the meantime, been accepted *de facto* as the Regent. They also decided that they would not allow the Senaputty to remain any longer in Manipur, because they knew he was the one who had exiled his lawful sovereign if they had information that he was treating the Regent as badly. They believed him to be not only a dangerous, but a cruel man. It is all very well for the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby to throw a kind of veil over the misdeeds of this man. It is very kind of the right hon. gentleman to take so lenient a view of Oriental misconduct, but it was the opinion of the Government of India that the Senaputty was a dangerous person. Therefore when Government had determined to recognise the *de facto* Regent and to remove the Senaputty I hold they took a very proper course. Remember they did not propose to imprison or to transport the Senaputty. They only desired that he should leave the country, and his possible return to Manipur was to depend solely on his own conduct. Of course it is possible in all matters human that different persons should arrive at different conclusions. It may be that the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby would, if he had been Viceroy, have done something else, or that the right hon. gentleman the member for Stirling, if he had been senior member of the Council, would have given different advice. No two men would act precisely alike under such circumstances. I take it that it is a waste of time for us in this House to discuss whether or not under such circumstances the Viceroy acted rightly or wrongly or to urge that he might have done something different. The main question is had the Government of India a right to interfere. I think I can establish in a very few moments that they had such a right. What is the political history of Manipur? In the last century it was a little petty State and it is now so small that I hesitate to give statistics unless the House should burst into laughter at them.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I did not dispute the right to interfere.

Sir RICHARD TEMPLE: I beg the right hon. gentleman's pardon. He did not; but, unless I misunderstood him, the right hon. gentleman the member for Sterling did.

Mr. CAMPBELL BANNERMAN: Oh, no,

Sir RICHARD TEMPLE: Then what in the world was all his speech about?

Mr. CAMPBELL BANNERMAN: I said nothing about the right to interfere in Manipur; but I said something to the effect that I thought that in most cases such as this, a greater degree of consideration would have been given than appeared to have been given in this case to the advice and opinion of our officers on the spot.

Sir RICHARD TEMPLE: The Government of India is answerable. The Viceroy is responsible for the actions of his agents on the spot. Surely it is a new doctrine that the Viceroy is to be impugned before the House of Commons because he has not seen fit to adopt the advice of his political agent. What is the Viceroy there for but to form his own judgment? I think I have shown that the interference was of a right kind, and I am now endeavouring to prove that we had a right of interference. Early last century, this little State, so statistically insignificant, was about to be eaten up by a neighbouring and aggressive power. In her extremity the Maharaja of the day threw himself upon British protection. It was granted to him for the time, and the state was saved until the beginning of the present century. Then came another war in which the State again fell into danger, so much so that when we made our first treaty with Burma we stipulated specifically for the freedom and safety of Manipur. And if the House will look at the history of our political transactions with Manipur, it will find that we had negotiations with them about roadways, and we had to give them ammunition, as to the disposal of which the Maharaja actually consented to give a minute report. Then there came some territorial adjustment of the Eastern frontier of the kingdom of Upper Burma, and we actually had to arrange for a small transfer of territory in consideration of which the Maharaja was glad to receive a sum of £50 per annum. This brings the history of Manipur up to the year 1830 or thereabouts. Then again came more troubles about the succession. The Queen mother and her infant son had to take refuge in British territory. The son remained there until he became of age, and then he went back under British auspices to assert his rights, and they having been established he reigned under British protection for a lengthened period. Again arose the old story of a fight among the relatives with the result that we had to send an agent to explain that we could not allow this sort of family dissension, and that the sovereign whom we had recognised was to be obeyed. And so it went on until very recently when the Maharaja was again compelled to seek protection in British territory, and it was afforded him in consideration of his long services. We knew perfectly well that if we did not remove the Senaputty there would soon have been another revolution and another exiled Sovereign. I say that we were bound to interfere in a very effective manner, and that the Government of India from among the many possible modes of interference chose the best. Before I resume my seat I would like to point out that it is a great pity that we should be occupying the time of the Imperial Parliament in discussing details of this nature. If we desire to discuss Manipur at all surely we could find far worthier matters in connection with it to form the subject of our debates. Let me remind the House that Manipur holds a very important position, for it is the halfway house between Assam and Upper Burma. It is essentially a point, strategetically and politically, on our Eastern Indian frontier which must be traversed by all expeditions of a political and military character between Bengal and Burma, therefore its geography is of the highest importance. There are projected in connection with it railway schemes and other means of communication which if carried to a successful issue would do much to solve great political problems which may if they remain unsolved cause us trouble hereafter. These are important matters which greatly affect the future of our domination in Upper Burma and also in Bengal, and which would enable us with greater force to defend our Empire in the East in the event of attack from a foreign power. I hope that this question will receive much more attention from this House than it has had in the past.

Mr. J. M. MACLEAN (Oldham): I submit that no question relating to India could be more interesting or more worthy of discussion in this House than the conduct of the Indian Government itself. We have just heard two speeches in defence of the Indian Government—one the cool, unhesitating speech of the Under Secretary of State for India and the other the warm-hearted, generous, and thorough-going speech of the member for Southport (Mr. Curzon). I should think it a great calamity if the policy advocated by the hon. member for Southport were adopted by the Government, for I am sure if that line were taken it would have a deplorable effect in India. The speech of the hon. baronet who has last spoken (Sir Richard Temple) was of a different character. He has delicately apportioned praise and blame to the Indian Government. I think after what he has said about the arrest or attempt to arrest the Senaputty that there really remains uothing more to be said. I think that that statement made by one of his great authority—an authority highly respected in this House and in India—is perfectly conclusive on that point. The hon. baronet, however, defended the policy of the Government in the main. He said the Government were perfectly right in resolving to deal as they did with the Senaputty. He told us what the history was of the State of Manipur, and he pointed out what is obvious from the Blue Book, namely that this revolution which took place was simply a family affair—that it was so many brothers fighting for the succession to the throne. Now, does not that often occur not only in Manipur, but in Afghanistan and Nepal? And when it occurs in Nepal what is the policy of the Government towards that State? It allows brothers to fight out the quarrels among themselves so long as they do no harm to the British Empire, and it recognises the strongest man amongst them as the ruler of the country. Why should a different policy be pursued towards Manipur and towards the Senaputty? I am not going to say a word about the Senaputty's personal character. I think it is sufficient for us that Mr. Grimwood vouches for him that he was a popular man; that he governed the State well; and, Mr. Grimwood, I remember, in one passage expressly says that he was the only one of the princely brothers who had remained poor through his own generosity. I consider it a shabby proceeding indeed on the part of

the Government of India to rake up old charges and the discussion of criminal offences of years back, and to put them in at the end of the Blue Book for the purpose of creating prejudice in the minds of the British public. If he had faced us in fair fight; if he had attacked us openly and treated his prisoners as hostages I should for my part have had nothing but admiration for him, but not one word can I say after the events that have occurred. But we are simply discussing the policy of the Government of India towards this State of Manipur. My right hon. friend the Under Secretary of State for India says that the government of Lord Lansdowne simply took the course which all governments take in dealing with a bold and independent man of a strong character, and he gave us illustrations from his own personal experience, of the way in which men have been treated who have shown independence of character. But the obvious difference between the cases he mentioned such as Cetewayo and Arabi Pasha, and the case of the Senaputty is that in those cases the men who were removed, were opposed to the British Government, and had been acting against them, whereas in this case you have the Government of India accepting the very policy carried out by the Senaputty, and then determining to remove the man who carried it out. That is the gravamen of the charge brought against the Government of India, and it is very difficult for anyone who reads the despatches to understand how it was that the Government of India came to the conclusion to remove the man. It was proved that he was no enemy to the British Government. He was very well disposed towards us, and yet the Government of India summoned Mr. Quinton to Calcutta, and Lord Lansdowne and his Foreign Secretary then compelled him to adopt a policy entirely at variance with his own opinions and with those of his colleague (Mr. Grimwood). That is a matter upon which it is necessary for the Secretary of State for India, and in default of the Secretary of State for India, the British House of Commons, should express a very strong opinion as to whether it was a wise and just policy or not. I think for my part it was a very indiscreet and uncalled-for policy. Let me deal very shortly with the means by which it was proposed to carry out that policy. I do not suppose that any of us will stand up to accuse Mr. Quinton of deliberate treachery towards this man—of intentional treachery—and now that he is dead it is impossible to clear up what was really the meaning of his conduct. I think it may be said absolutely that the Government of India is responsible for everything Mr. Quinton did. They assumed that responsibility in their telegram of the 9th May to this country, and I am greatly surprised that there is no despatch produced this evening from the Government of India repeating more fully the language of that telegraphic despatch because evidently the Viceroy had considered the whole matter very fully and he completely took upon himself the responsibility for all that had been done by Mr. Quinton. The right hon. gentleman the member for Derby quoted some words of this despatch and perhaps the House will allow me to repeat them. "Until Gurdon's telegram of the 7th May reached us we had not received specific information that if Senaputty refused to submit quietly Quinton intended to have him arrested at durbar, after announcement of our orders, but we have no doubt Quinton considered open arrest in durbar in case of such refusal would be most straightforward and safest procedure. Knowing Senaputty's character Quinton probably felt that only chance of depriving him of opportunity of fomenting disturbance was to effect his deportation as promptly as possible. As a matter of fact, when Senaputty failed to comply with Quinton's orders, and letter of warning was sent to Regent, Senaputty evaded arrest and prepared resistance which led to massacre." I think it can hardly be contended that this is not an acceptance of the policy carried out by Mr. Quinton in attempting to arrest the Senaputty, and Mr. Quinton really thought his scheme received the direct sanction of the Government because in a telegram of the 18th March, he says, "I propose to require the Regent and the durbar to meet me on arrival, announce the decision of the Government, arrest Senaputty, and inform him that the length of his exile and return depend on his conduct and the tranquillity of the country." Then we have the telegram the next day from the Foreign Secretary stating that "Your proposals are approved." How can it be contended that the Government of India did not understand that Mr. Quinton proposed to get this man into a place where he could arrest him without fear of his being able to defend himself or call any forces in aid? It does not seem to me to be of much consequence what kind of a durbar it was to which he was summoned. Mr. Quinton met him. The Senaputty came to greet him and they talked together in a friendly manner for an hour in a tent, and Mr. Quinton gave him no warning of what he intended. Was it consistent with honour and good faith, when he had been treated in this way, that he should be summoned to a friendly meeting with the intention of arresting him? The right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India quoted what was done by Sir Robert Sandeman on the frontier. Everybody who knows him has the highest respect for Sir Robert Sandeman. We all know what excellent work he has done, that he is the Lord Warden of the most unruly district on the whole frontier: he is a dictator. The whole of his district is constantly in a state of siege, and the action of Sir Robert Sandeman is not a guide as to what ought to be the conduct of the representative of the Government of India in more settled and more regularly governed parts of the country. Having studied what opinions have been expressed in India on this question, I consider it is the duty of the Secretary of State, as representing the Imperial Parliament, to let the people of India know that in future conduct of that kind on the part of the representative of the Government of India will not be approved, because if it is sanctioned it will be a very difficult matter indeed to induce any native prince with whom we have the slightest difference of opinion ever again to enter a durbar held by the representative of the British Crown. Something has been said in this debate about the House of Commons not interesting itself in discussions of this kind, but I say the interposition of the House of Commons on this occasion is fully justified by the prolonged reticence of the Secretary of State for India. The Under Secretary said the time had not arrived when a complete opinion could be given by the Secretary of State on the whole of these transactions. Of course not. There are the reports to be received upon all the transactions that have taken place relating to the disaster, but the Secretary of State has long had before him what is the judgment of the Viceroy upon the two most important questions of the policy pursued towards Manipur—in the first instance as to the proceedings before the disaster occurred, and in the second case as to the proceedings of Mr. Quinton in trying to arrest the Senaputty. There are questions on which it has long been competent for the Secretary of State to pronounce an opinion. Is it improper that this House of Commons should be called upon to discuss so important and delicate questions? What was the object of the great change in the Government of India that was made during the time of the Indian Mutiny? The complaint then was that India was not sufficiently under the direct and immediate control of Parliament and popular opinion in this country, and the representative of the Secretary of State was made the chief Governor of India. No doubt as a rule we do not wish to interfere with details of the administration of India, but in great questions of policy it is always an advantage for the opinion of the House of Commons to be known. We deny to the people of India any right of representation; they have no power of expressing their own opinions upon any question that arises. Criticism is free enough in the press of India. I saw that the other day Lord Cross speaking at a dinner said he was very glad the press of India was free because it was a safety valve for the grievances of the people. That is a familiar image, but I don't think it is accurate enough. It is not very flattering to the Indian press, for it seems as if the Indian press may blow off any amount of steam without ruffling the complacency of the official mind. Any one who has tried to create public opinion in India must often have felt discouraged and disheartened at finding he is simply beating the air. In India the people have immense respect and veneration for the House of Commons. It is to this House they look for a redress of their grievances and to see that the country is governed well. A great French orator once said in the darkest days of the French Empire he crossed the Channel occasionally in order that he might have a breath of freedom. The members of the Indian Civil Service are not so brilliant as they used to be. They have not the same opportunities of coping with emergencies as they used to have, and it may be difficult to find amongst them a daring pilot in extremity. But they are upright, honourable, safe men who would do their duty to the best of their ability, but still they have all the defects of a close service—(hear, hear): they are apt to think too much of themselves and too little of outside opinion, and it must do them an immense good to have their minds brought into contact occasionally with the fresh and invigorating breezes of an enlightened public opinion in this country. Here public opinion is not merely a safety valve, it is the motive power which controls and sets in action all the administrative machinery of the state, and also is that opinion that we must look on all occasions to discern what the true policy is that we ought to pursue in difficult cases in India. I say public opinion has pronounced a judgment in this question which is perfectly consistent with fair play to the Government of India, and which at the same time will maintain unshaken and unstained that character for good faith which has always been the mainstay of our Government in India—(cheers).

Sir G. CAMPBELL: I think the House has to be congratulated on the tone of this debate, and that we are all indebted to the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby (Sir W. Harcourt) for bringing it forward in a very moderate and not in a party or polemical spirit. There has been a great disaster; but the Under Secretary for India was right in saying that after all in India we have to risk much to gain much. It is by daring and boldness we have achieved great things in India, and we must not judge people too hardly by results. Great things have often been done by rashness, and we applaud the result. On the other hand, when things are attempted with apparently adequate means, and failure results, I am afraid we are apt to be a little too hard upon those engaged in the operation. I am inclined to think that considerable blunders, both civil and military, took place at Manipur, but the principal actors sacrificed their lives, and it is very inexpedient that we should be too hard upon them. The failure to a great extent was a military one; but I am bound to accept the view taken by the Under Secretary that 500 native troops might reasonably have been expected to cope with any difficulties which might arise in this petty native State. As to the civil difficulty, the discussions must be of an academic character. The Senaputty was not arrested in the durbar, and therefore we need not discuss whether or not under the circumstances we should have been justified in arresting him. As to the general policy, I have considerable sympathy with the view that considerable weight was not given to the opinion of the local authorities. There is an institution in India called the Foreign Office, and there is too great a disposition on the part of that office to centralise control and not to pay sufficient attention to the opinions of the local authorities. I think that whatever was done in this matter should have been done quickly: delay was most unfortunate. I gather that the old Maharaja having been expelled was to go free. He wished to devote the remainder of his life to religious meditation. When he got to Calcutta, he fell into the hands of Calcutta lawyers and intriguers. At their instigation he made out a case: that the Government of India thought it necessary to press it on the attention of the Foreign Office without consulting the opinions of the local officers was unfortunate. With regard to the delay which took place I think the fact of the matter is that the Government of India were too much occupied in unfortunate little wars in the other extremities of India. They treated this petty Manipur business as of little importance: they let it drift and eventually there was a conflict of opinion between the Government of India and the local officers. As regards the question of the acknowledgment or non-acknowledgment of the revolutionary Government, I differ from the view suggested by the Under Secretary, namely, that it is better to refuse to acknowledge a strong man and put in a mediocre who may be a puppet of your Government. No doubt as the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby has said the interest of the native princes has to be considered, but the honour of India has to be considered also. While we must maintain the utmost faith and justice in our dealing.

with the native princes, we must let it be thoroughly understood that they have obligations and that we must see that those obligations are fulfilled. If we have a case of this kind in which there has been not so much a rebellion against the Queen, but an atrocious murder of British officers, I hope the Government will feel they have a duty both in the sight of the people of India and the native princes, and that is to let it be known that these things must not be done with impunity, while if they are done there will be a fair and just deliverance.

Sir LEWIS PELLY: This case is one that is very similar to many other cases which have happened. The facts broadly are these. A crisis happens in a native State; the local officer looks into it, he communicates to the authorities, he reports it to his superior—in this instance to the Chief Commissioner. The names are placed in order and some communications pass. In this case the Government told the Resident to hold his hand, not to become oppressive, to watch affairs, and if he saw an opportunity to mediate and try to arrange them. That opportunity apparently in the sequel did not arrive, but at all events things went on quietly and certain persons were summoned to Calcutta. The old Maharaja went to Calcutta where he made his complaints. The Chief Commissioner was called to Calcutta, and the Government took it into their heads to consider what they should do. The matter was considered temporarily and provisionally till the final decision could be arrived at. After long discussion, and after communicating officially with the Chief Commissioner and receiving his views and those of the local officers, the Government of India determined that they would not altogether accept the opinions of the local officers, but apparently, and largely in deference to the opinions of Mr. Quinton, they said they would receive his opinion so far that they would not force back on Manipur the old Maharaja, but that the old Maharaja should be removed. There was a rebellion, a rush was made on this old man's palace, and he fled for his life and came to Calcutta; but he was our man there, and we felt that the real operator in the whole affair was the Senaputty. The next brother of his, who has the next claim to be regarded, went away ten or twelve miles and kept quiet there. The Government said we must punish the instigator of this rebellion, and they determined that under conditions they would accept the second brother, the man who had not interfered with the revolution, and would not accept the man who had instigated it, that he must go. But that the Government of India came to consider the matter was more important than they at first supposed is evident from this that they instructed the Chief Commissioner not to instruct his subordinate, the Resident, but to go himself. In giving those instructions they probably, as they always do under similar circumstances, gave a general instruction to carry out a certain policy and did not give the details or manner in which it was to be done, and from that moment the carrying of the order out really rested with the local authority. In this case it was open to the Chief Commissioner either to have written to the Regent and informed him what the instructions were, or to have gone down and so settled with the Regent as to the means for carrying the order out. Seeing that the Senaputty was not the chief of a State, but subordinate to the Regent, the better course would have been to have summoned a durbar, and explained to the head of the State what his instructions were, and to request him to see them carried out. It appears that the Regent was really impotent, that he was in the hands of the Senaputty so that probably he would have said "I dare not do it and I cannot do it," in which case it would have been for the Chief Commissioner to write to the Government for fresh instructions or to have told the Regent that as he could not do it he was to do it by force. He had the force out; I think it was inexpedient to go into that enclosure at the palace especially without artillery. What they should have sent for was an increased force as without artillery they could not carry out the orders. That was not done, and the only difference between this and many other cases is this, that the course taken by the Chief Commissioner may perhaps have been open to comment as erroneous, disaster ensued, and consequently an appeal to this House. I think the next course is to leave the Government of India to act for themselves, believing they will do the best in the difficult circumstances as they arise, and as we cannot ascertain all the details of the difficulties that arose after the arrival of the Chief Commissioner at Manipur, the best thing is to let the past be past and say as little as possible about the matter.

Mr. BRYCE: I think that the House has no reason to regret the time that has been spent on the subject to-night because we have all felt that a good deal has been cleared up, and that the question had assumed a much sharper form in our minds than it had before. But at the same time I do not feel we have received from the Government all the light we had the right to expect, and some of the light we have received is rather of a vague and dangerous character. I have heard with regret the remarks of the Under Secretary of State as it does not appear to me that he met the necessity, for a despatch in which the judgment of the Government at home should be expressed and that there should be some full and deliberate review of the circumstances emanating from the home Government. My right hon. friend pointed out there were many things upon which inquiry was still pending, and which it would be unfair to expect the Secretary of State now to pass a definite opinion upon, but he said some things that seems to me liable to misapprehension. In the first place I think he will feel that he has not entirely disposed of the question regarding the durbar. I admit there is great force in the view it is to be treated as a court, and great force in the statement he gave from Sir Robt. Sandeman, but on the other hand we have, I think, the hon. member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple) and also the distinguished opinions from many eminent Indian governors, and I feel, therefore, it would be desirable that we should have this question of the durbar thoroughly reviewed, and the deliberate judgment of the Government of India expressed on it. I should say I cordially concur in acquitting Mr. Quinton from anything like blame. Though I did not know him intimately I knew him sufficiently to say there was no man in the North-Western Provinces more respected, and there are none amongst those who knew him who would believe he was guilty of any treacherous act. But the right hon. gentleman made use of an expression which I hope he will disavow. He spoke of the desirability of not having a strong man, such as the Senaputty, as ruler of a native State. I believe that to be a very bad doctrine, and I consider it would be to the interest of India, and the Indian Government, to have as rulers men of most vigorous character. The House will remember that the policy of having a strong ruler was adopted in Afghanistan after the last great Afghan War in the person of Abdul Rahman, the present Ameer. I could give many minor instances in which it has been found the best possible way of bringing about good administration in native States, and peaceful relations with the British Government, is to support a man of strong character and popular with the native people. In this particular case it should be noticed that the Senaputty had not been offensive to the native subjects of the State or to the British Government. It is not alleged—I do not find it in the despatches—that the Senaputty used his power to govern badly; he was popular; he had not shown himself in any way antagonistic to the British Government, and he remained on good terms, perhaps on too good terms with Mr. Grimwood himself. Therefore, we the paramount power had no motive in deposing him. I do not extenuate the actions of which he is said to have been guilty, but we have to consider them in connection with Oriental practices; but assuming him to have been dangerous—he had not shown himself dangerous to his native subjects or to the British Government. For this reason I cannot help feeling some regret that if the Indian Government did require these five or six months to make up its mind as to the course of policy it should pursue, it should not sooner have communicated its decision to Mr. Grimwood. This point was strongly put by my right hon. friend the member for Derby, and no answer has been made by the Under Secretary or any speakers since. It may have been true that the Government required time to consider the representations of the ex-Maharaja and to submit them to Mr. Grimwood for his criticism; but surely the Government ought to have taken pains to ascertain what was going on in Manipur meantime. Meantime, Mr. Grimwood remained on intimate terms with the Senaputty, and even up to the last month accompanied him with a hunting party. He appears not to have known the view of the Government of India, or if he did, he did not guide his own conduct by it, there was nothing to indicate to the Senaputty, or to the inhabitants of Manipur, that the Government of India was displeased at the revolution, and was going to take steps to punish those concerned in it. The term revolution is too strong to use, as Mr. Quinton says, in one of his despatches, it was a mere family dispute, a dispute not even between the reigning dynasty and another dynasty or family, but a dispute among the reigning family, of whom the nominal head was nothing more than the first among equals. It was too serious a view of the revolution to decide that it required the intervention of the paramount Power; but assuming that it was right to remove the Senaputty, it was surely a dangerous course to leave him practically enjoying the full confidence of Mr. Grimwood until the moment for his deposition came. On the question of delay there is one observation I desire to make, and I think it has not yet been made. We have often heard of the foreign policy of the Government of India, and we understand by foreign policy the relations of the Indian Government with such States as Manipur, and this is not in the hands of any responsible ministers or members of the Council. There is a military member of the Council, a member who is responsible for public works, and other departments have representatives, but there is no member representing foreign affairs. The explanation is that the Viceroy himself is his own Foreign Minister, and it is to this I wish to call attention. It seems to me that matters so important deserve the attention not only of the Viceroy himself, who, of course, as head of the Government, is the ultimate reference on all Indian questions of administration. Overwhelmed as the Viceroy is with an enormous mass of grave and responsible work of which we can scarcely form a conception, it is not fair to him that he should also have the sole control of foreign policy. He ought to have the advantage of a Minister with the position of Foreign Minister while being Member of the Council in the same sense as we have a Minister for Foreign Affairs in this country. It is true there is a Foreign Secretary, but his position in the government of India is not that of Foreign Secretary here. He is a Secretary and not able to deal with foreign affairs in the same way as the Commander-in-Chief can deal with military affairs, and more than once in the history of Indian government cases have arisen in which the want of such a minister has been greatly felt. It may be said to have resulted in serious evil to the State. I believe that at the moment when the Manipur affair was under discussion Sir H. Durand was absent, his place being filled by a junior official. I do not say that had any effect on the transactions, but it is well to consider whether in this respect the Government of India does not require some reform. There is another point upon which an answer has not been given to the criticisms of my right hon. friend, Why was the advice of authorities on the spot not taken by the Government of India? Hon. Members have said the Government of India must decide. Quite true, but where the Government of India decides against the advice of its local officers and where the disregard of that advice ends in disaster, surely the Government of India is bound to show that its action was right and the advice of its local officers wrong. That has not been done either by the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary or the hon. member for Southport. I think it will be admitted that it was a mistake to send Mr. Quinton. The suggestion that so important an official as the Chief Commissioner should go up to Manipur did not come from Mr. Quinton himself, it came from the Government of India, although Mr. Quinton very properly accepted the suggestion immediately that he should go. It was not a voluntary suggestion on his part, and the disaster assumed a more serious character from the death of Mr. Quinton, and his presence probably somewhat restricted the action of the military authority who would have acted more promptly and more energetically but for the presence of this high official. I will not attempt to discuss the military action. I am sure

we must all feel there was no want of courage but that there was some want of skill. It is a painful task, and I shall certainly not attempt to apportion the blame. If we are to ask what is the general moral to be drawn from the whole matter I think we shall feel that it is this: that the conduct of the Government in these foreign Indian affairs requires to be watched somewhat more carefully and closely than it seems to be watched by the home Government. No one would be less willing than I to suggest a policy of interference; but when we hear of so many frontier wars, and when we see from a perusal of these papers that the Government should interfere without communicating with home, I cannot help thinking that it would be better if there was some communication of intentions at least on the part of the Government of India. I was impressed by what the hon. member for Kirkcaldy said as to these frontier wars on the North-West of India. There is a good deal of activity, perhaps too much, on the North-West frontier, and I think we should be pleased to know what is going on there, that the forward movement we have reason to believe is in progress there is watched more closely and scrutinized more carefully than these occurrences at Manipur would lead us to believe. I hope after what has been said to-night that the Government will carefully consider the future fate of Manipur. It would be a pity that native princes who are sensitive in these matters should be left to the belief that there is a tendency on our part to interfere for the extinction of of their qualified independence. Without expressing an opinion as to the future government of Manipur, I hope the Government will carefully consider before, by a display of British force, they attempt a permanent alteration in the condition of that State. I quite agree with the hon. baronet (Sir R. Temple) as to the strategic importance of Manipur as the route to Assam and Burma, but I should regret a policy of annexation. In conclusion I would observe that I think that both the Under Secretary and the hon. member for Southport did not quite understand, in spite of the clearness with which he put it, the point of view of my right hon. friend. My right hon. friend did not make this motion in any sense one of censure on the Government of India. He brought it forward on the ground that a disaster has occurred which demands the most careful investigation, and he asked from the Government an expression of opinion upon certain points he submitted to them, points of importance with a regard to the disaster itself, and as illustrating the dangers we may expect, and I trust the Secretary of State will go into the whole case and deal with these matters.

Sir ROPER LETHBRIDGE (N. Kensington): There can be no doubt whatever, Mr. Speaker, as to the immense political and strategical importance of the geographical position of Manipur, as was pointed out both by the hon. member for Evesham and the hon. member for Aberdeen. That State is rightly the key of the communications between Assam and Burma, and not only so, but it is also the key to the communications between the continent of India itself and Burma and the communications with the South-West States of China. The House will at once, therefore, recognise the immense importance of any discussion that bears on the future conditions of that State and our future relations with it. But, at the same time, I must confess that, differing from the hon. member for Aberdeen, I do think there has been something like a waste of time on the part of this House in discussing the particular phases of the question that had been brought before the House this evening. I quite admit that the speech with which the right hon. member for Derby opened the discussion was a most temperate, moderate, and statesmanlike speech—a speech which it was a pleasure for any old Indian to listen to. The right hon. gentleman did full justice to the Indian services, and as an old member of these services, I am obliged to him for the expressions that he used; but when he states that he is bringing forward this motion as dealing with certain important questions of Indian policy I must venture to remark that the main body of the right hon. gentleman's speech, and the main body of the speeches of most hon. and right hon. gentlemen who had addressed the House this evening, has been concerned rather with minute criticisms into minor matters of detail. Even where the policy of the Government of India has been attacked or defended, it seems to me that it has been on comparatively small points of administrative detail which are better left to the discretion of the Government of India itself. The Government of India, as the right hon. member for Derby well told us, consists of men who have to a large extent spent the best parts of their lives in studying this question on the spot, and surely to them may be left questions affecting smaller matters of detail such as the occasion when the Senaputty should be arrested or when he should not be arrested. Things of that sort might surely be left to the discretion of the Government of India, and the points that are brought up here should be simply and solely large points of general policy. The first point that has been dealt with very largely to-night is the question of arresting the Senaputty at the durbar. The authority of the member for Evesham is very great on such a question as that, perhaps as great as any man living, yet I feel myself unable to agree with the conclusion he arrived at on the question of the durbar. I would venture to base my objection to his conclusion even upon his own speech and the words which he used to explain to this House most correctly the real meaning of the word durbar. I observed that the hon. member for Aberdeen complained that no full and clear explanation had been given of what was understood in India by a durbar, but I would venture to state to the hon. gentleman that my hon. friend the member for Evesham did point out that there are durbars and and durbars. There are many forms of durbars. There are durbars little more than a mere levee. There is a durbar which is more like a meeting on the field of the cloth of gold when there is a meeting of potentates, such as when the Viceroy of India met the Ameer of Afghanistan. But there is also, as the hon. member for Evesham pointed out to the House, a durbar which by universal admission is a tribunal of justice, a durbar to which durbarees are summoned. They are ordered to attend and at that Durbar a declaration of policy or of the intentions of the Government may be made; and undoubtedly arrests may be made at such a Durbar without any imputation of treachery. The Under Secretary of State quoted instances of such a durbar on the Beloochistan frontier in which Sir Robert Sandeman carried out some such proceeding as that of arresting prisoners. The reply was made by the hon. member for Oldham (Mr. Maclean) that the Beloochistan frontier was a particularly wild one; and he also said that such rules could not be applied to a more settled and more civilised part of the empire. I meet that in two ways. First of all I say that Manipur is as wild and as unsettled as any part of the Beloochistan frontier, even although the inhabitants of Manipur are not of such a warlike quality as the Belooches; and secondly what is an honourable act in Beloochistan cannot become a treacherous or a dishonourable act in Manipur. Then, I venture to point out that the very description given by my hon. friend the member for Evesham of this particular form of durbar, which is also a tribunal of justice, does prove most incontestably that Mr. Quinton and the Government of India, if they intended to order the attendance of the Senaputty at this durbar, and if they intended to arrest him there were justified by oriental usages. There is not only the instance of the arrests by Sir Robert Sandeman, but arrests at durbars have come from the remotest ages in the East. I do not wish to quote anything that would seem to be an attempt to raise a smile, but I would point out that even in the earliest times the arrest of Shadrach Meshach and Abednego took place at a durbar called by Nebuchadnezzar, when he called all the captains and nobles, and he arrested Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego on the testimony that was then given. Similar proceedings, we have learned to-night, had been adopted by Sir Robert Sandeman. The same kind of durbar must take place in oriental countries frequently, because that particular form of durbar is by no means an uncommon one. The right hon. member for Derby with great modesty disclaimed any right to speak authoritatively on the point, but said that this question with regard to the durbar would have to be settled by Indian opinion and not apparently by English opinion. Well, I am not quite sure that I agree entirely with the right hon. gentleman there. I am quite sure that the Government of India, in future at any rate, after observing the imputations that have been placed upon them somewhat unjustly, I would say, in this country, with regard to the proposed arrest of the Senaputty, will regard English sentiment on this point rather than Indian. I think that in India we cannot be too careful, and I agree with the right hon. member for Derby that we should study to have the highest possible standard on these points; and I should be glad to see the Government of India look in future to English rather than to oriental opinion upon such matters. But if regard be had to oriental opinion and to oriental custom—immemorial custom—then I will venture to say that no blame can rightly attach to the proposals that had been made either by the Government of India, or by Mr. Quinton; and at any rate it was a similar proposal that Mr. Quinton agreed to act upon. The hon. member for Aberdeen said that it was not advisable that the Viceroy should be in charge of the portfolio of the Foreign Department in India. The hon. member based that opinion on his view that the duties of the Foreign Office are of the highest and most difficult character. That is quite right, but it is really the very reason why the portfolio of the Foreign Department was, by the arrangement come to when the Council of the Governor-General was established, entrusted to the Viceroy himself. I had the honour of being attached to the Simla and Calcutta Foreign Office, and, therefore, I am aware of what took place then. The view taken was this, that the communications coming under the purview of the Members of the Council for the foreign department were of such an important and confidential character that they required to be dealt with with so much strength and ability to carry them through, and that it was best, if the Viceroy had any portfolio at all to hold, for him to hold that particular portfolio. We have seen recently in this country that a similar policy has been productive of the best results. I see the hon. member shakes his head. Perhaps he means that the Foreign Office in this country is not quite the same as the Foreign Office in India; but there is this ground of similarity between them, that both are concerned with matters of the highest importance. There is one other point in the speech of the hon. member for Aberdeen on which I should wish to say one or two words. He criticised somewhat severely the opinion expressed by the right hon. gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for India, confirmed also I may say by the hon. member of Kirkcaldy that there is some objection to the paramount power leaving in positions of the highest power and influence in native States, men of strong wills and violent tempers. That is not exactly what the member for Aberdeen (Mr. Bryce) said. As nearly as possible he said, I think, that the Government objected to the policy of employing strong men in high positions. But I would draw the hon. member's attention to the fact that there are differences, and that there are differences between Maharajas I could mention and others whom I could also mention. There are strong men, men of strong wills, but of honest integrity of purpose, who have done most admirable service to the Empire in many of the native States of India. We have such men in many of the native States at present, who are of that character, who do most valuable service in that character. The Secretary of State and my right hon. friend do not object to such strong men. What we object to is not the employment of strong men in those positions, but the employment of men with strong wills and violent tempers, aye and of violent actions, as it has been shown this very Senaputty has himself been guilty of. He has been guilty of the most shameless actions, of the most shameless cruelties—cruelties which are regarded with as much horror in India as in England. I hope the hon. member for Aberdeen will regard that as a fair criticism on his remarks about men of strong will. It is not the strong men of India—it is not at all merely because they are strong men, or because they are popular that we object to them; but it is on account of the subjects of those native States, who would have to suffer from their oppression if we allowed them to be under the charge of such rulers, that we who know the circumstances of India, object most strongly to the employment in such positions of men of strong wills combined with violent actions. I trust, sir, that that will be regarded as a justification of the policy of the Government of India in decreeing the deportation of the Senaputty. After most carefully reading the whole of the evidence presented to us, I do feel that it

(*Continued on page* 198.)

SIR J. GORST'S GOSPEL FOR CAPABLE INDIANS.

LORD SALISBURY'S CONTRIBUTION TO A CYNICAL TREATMENT OF INDIA.

For the sake of easy reference, and with a view to special emphasis, we record here, as well as in our Parliamentary report, Sir John Gorst's Gospel for Capable Indians. Elsewhere we give some reasons for stating that they represent the true and undeniable gospel of the Government of India, as practised to a recent date, towards hundreds of millions of the Queen's subjects. We also append, to show what good company the cynical Sir John keeps, some passages from a carefully-prepared document written by Lord Salisbury when he was Secretary of State for India. It will be seen that master and man are pretty much at one in what they say of India, and of the principles on which it is ruled.

Extract from Sir John Gorst's Manipur Speech.

The right hon. gentleman (Sir W. Harcourt) has rather suggested that the Government of India were to blame in the policy which gave rise to this disaster of removing the Senaputty from Manipur. That policy was of course the policy of the Government of India and undoubtedly they are responsible for it. I do not think that either the right hon. gentleman himself or the people who have criticised this policy have quite appreciated that the removal of the Senaputty was entirely a political act. I am aware that the Government of India in their despatches make use of expressions like 'treachery' and 'rebellion,' and accuse the Senaputty of moral offences for which they declare an intention of punishing him; but that is only the way in which the Anglo-Saxon race always is accustomed to ascribe criminal misconduct to political opponents. We are not unaccustomed to it in this country. The right hon. gentleman himself frequently speaks to large public bodies of the criminal practices and misconduct of the First Lord of the Treasury and others who sit on this Treasury bench; and he speaks of their compulsion from that bench which would be a purely political act as an act of punishment. Whether the Government of India is to be permitted to have the right to expel the Senaputty from Manipur or not, there was the question whether it was expedient that they should exercise that right: just let the House consider who the Senaputty was. He was a man of the greatest ability and the greatest force of character among the ruling family of Manipur. He was a man who was extremely popular among the people, who had a reputation of having impoverished himself by generosity, which is one of the greatest virtues to which an Oriental can aspire. He was not a man of very nice moral character—I do not know that you can expect the same standard of morality from an Oriental that you can expect from an Englishman—but a man who beats two of his slaves to death for stealing a polo pony is rather worse than the average of Oriental despots. And there was this most important characteristic of the Senaputty: he was a man of independent character, who presumed to make revolutions without consulting the paramount power, and who set a Maharaja upon the throne of Manipur without first asking the leave of the British Resident. A man of that sort must be dealt with in one of two ways. First, he can be removed from the State altogether; or, secondly, he can be used as an instrument for governing the people of the State. It is quite evident that Mr. Grimwood desired to adopt the latter course, and thought he could make use of the Senaputty as an instrument through which the Manipur people could be governed. Well, that is a very generous policy, and one which everybody is disposed to sympathise with, but it is a rather risky policy. It is a policy the success of which depends upon the Resident obtaining the ascendancy over the Senaputty and not the Senaputty over the Resident. And between the two powers there is the great difference that the one is temporary and the other permanent, and that although Mr. Grimwood might remain only a few years at Manipur, the Senaputty would remain there altogether, and might, when Mr. Grimwood had gone, possibly obtain an ascendancy over Mr. Grimwood's successor which he could not obtain over Mr. Grimwood himself.

For that and other reasons Governments, Indian, and other, have never encouraged a policy of this kind being adopted. Governments have always hated and discouraged independent and original talent, and they have always loved and promoted docile and unpretending mediocrity. This is not a new policy. It as as old as Tarquinius Superbus, and although in these modern times we do not lop or cut off the heads of the tall poppies, we take other and more merciful means of reducing any person of dangerous pre-eminence to a harmless condition.

Why, in my own life I have known numbers of cases of this kind. I remember, thirty years ago, how the British Government spent their blood and treasure in the colony of New Zealand for the purpose of destroying the power of the Maori king instead of governing the natives of New Zealand through his instrumentality.

I remember how, a few years ago, a British Government destroyed the power of Cetewayo in South Africa as soon as he became no longer necessary as a counterpoise to the Transvaal; but I can give you examples of the same policy nearer this country. Why did you expel Arabi from Egypt? Because he was thought to be dangerous, politically dangerous, to the peace of the country.

I can give you even a closer parallel, taken from the conduct of that Government of which the right hon. gentleman was so distinguished a member. Why did you arrest Zebehr and intern him in Gibraltar? There you had a man in a country over which you had no power, and, acting from a political necessity, you would not permit him to exercise his influence in the Soudan, although General Gordon, your agent in the Soudan, asked to have him there. The Government of India, in refusing Mr. Grimwood the assistance of the Senaputty, acted in the same way as you did in refusing Zebehr to General Gordon to enable him to manage the Soudan. I am not saying this for the purpose of applying anything like a *tu quoque* argument to the right hon. gentleman. I say it because it is according to our experience.

It is a mortifying thing to confess, but I think Governments are very likely to be right. It is better that great ability and independence such as is possessed by the Senaputty should be a disqualification from State service; IT IS PERHAPS BETTER, AND MORE FOR THE PEACE AND SAFETY OF THE WORLD, THAT YOU SHOULD DEPEND ON MEDIOCRITIES. At any rate, it would be unreasonable for the House to censure the Government of India, because in this matter they determined to remove the Senaputty from Manipur. THEY ACTED ON THE TRADITIONS AND REGULAR POLICY OF GOVERNMENTS ALMOST FROM TIME IMMEMORIAL.

In a few words at the end of the debate, Sir John Gorst, having been strongly censured by Sir William Harcourt, and rebuked by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, tried to minimise the effect of his words. He said:—"I should like expressly to deny that I ever asserted such a doctrine as that the Government of India in the Native States should be conducted on the principle of suppressing ability or independence. What I said was that the reason which justified the Government of India in removing the Senaputty, and which would justify the Government of India in removing any native prince, magnate or official from any of the protected native States was not only that the Senaputty was able and independent, but also that he was a man who was prepared to act and who did act in defiance of the paramount Power." An examination of the passages quoted above will show that Sir John Gorst did say what he was charged with saying, that he did assert a doctrine the assertion of which will, rightly, give great offence in India.

But, why should Sir John Gorst defend himself by trying to make out that words do not bear the meaning customarily associated with them? If he was cynical, so had been Lord Salisbury before him. But, being an Indian official, Sir John probably did not know this. Sir John Gorst's remarks are in no degree more cynical—bad as they are—than were those used by Lord Salisbury in 1875, when Secretary of State for India. In a Blue Book have been preserved, for the enlightenment and edification of our Indian fellow-subjects, these remarkable utterances by the present Prime Minister:—

"As *India* MUST *be bled*,"

"The lancet should be directed to the parts where the blood is congested, or at least sufficient, not to those which are already feeble for the want of it."

"*Much of the revenue* [of India] *is exported without a direct equivalent.*"

"I SEE NO TERROR *in the prospect of* 'DRIFTING.'"

"We have not the power to give permanent force to a new policy."

". . . . a long series of inconsistencies in the course of the Indian Government. . . . . They are a warning of the fashion after which our Government is made."

"By the law of its existence it [the Indian Government] must be a government of incessant change. It is the despotism of a line of kings whose reigns are limited by climatic causes to five years."

"Whatever power exists in England is divided between a council of which the elements are necessarily fluctuating, and a political officer whose average existence amounts to about thirty months. *It would be absurd to expect* from this arrangement *a persistent and systematic policy, if the policy is to depend upon the will of the government.*"

There is much more of the same sort in the State paper in which Lord Salisbury, after grave deliberation, and not in hasty speech, expressed his views. In the course of the same discussion, the late Sir Louis Mallet, then Under Secretary of State for India, uttered some pregnant sentences, not cynically, but condemnatory, as when he asked: "Even now, is it not nearer the truth to say that the Government of India takes, *not what it chooses, but what it dares?*"

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INDIA.

A Journal for the Discussion of Indian Affairs.

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Communications for the Editor should be addressed "To the Editor of *INDIA*", and, if intended for insertion, should be written *on one side of the paper only*, and must be authenticated by the real name and address of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith.

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Cheques and Post-office Orders to be made payable to *William Digby*, and crossed National Provincial Bank of England, Limited.

Receipts not forwarded for Subscriptions unless the remittance is accompanied by a stamped envelope.

The Annual Subscription is 2s. 6d. post free in the United Kingdom, and Rs. 3 for India. The amount may be remitted by Post-office Order, or Order on a Mercantile House.

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INDIA.

JULY 10, 1891.

THE INDIAN REFORM BILL ONCE MORE POSTPONED.

Once again has the Home Government shown its contempt and disregard for the best interests of five out of six of the subjects of the British Crown. With utter unconcern and carelessness, combined with a profound ignorance of what was involved, Mr. W. H. Smith recently announced in the House of Commons, the withdrawal, for the second time, of the Indian Councils' Amendmen Bill. Mr. Bryce protested: his protest was treated with scorn. One day—and perhaps not a distant day—the British Government will repent its ostentatious disregard of Indian interests. Not only Indian reformers but the Indian Government also were anxious a reform measure should be passed. When, however, it comes to a matter of considering those who have votes, and those who have not votes, the interests of two hundred and thirty millions of British subjects are postponed to an attempt to "dish" political opponents by bringing forward a bribing measure of educational reform. So far as India is concerned one lesson only is to be learned, and that is, the thing which has been refused on twice asking shall be sought a third time, or a fourth time, or a fifth time, if needs be. If there had been any doubt as to the desirability of carrying out, with thoroughness, the proposal made at the last Congress by Mr. Norendro Nath Sen, that a meeting of the great Indian organisation should be held in England next year, the withdrawal of the Government Bill should remove all doubt. Thanks to the indifference of the present Government it has been left to the Congress—if it knows how to make use of a magnificent opportunity—to ensure the passing, not of such an emasculated measure as that recently before Parliament, but, of a Bill which shall really provide for the needs of the Empire at the present time. Lord Cross's measure is one of those which Lord Brougham stigmatised half-a-century ago, when he said:—"I entirely concur in the observations of Mr. Burke, repeated and more happily expressed by Mr. Canning, that the masters of slaves [an autocratic Government] are not to be entrusted with the making of laws on slavery [constitutional liberties which will reduce the powers of autocracy]; that nothing they do is ever found effective; and that if, by some miracle, they ever chance to enact a wholesome regulation, it is always found to want what Mr. Burke calls the 'executory principle': it fails to get itself executed." The legislation and rule-making in behalf of the admission of Indians into the Covenanted Civil Service furnish a powerful illustration. The present time is not a fit time for the Home Government to choose in which to flout the legitimate, the loyal, and the constitutional, desires of the Queen's Indian subjects. Famine, gaunt and deadly, is already ravaging various parts of the Empire: it is threatening a vast area and an immense population. In all parts of India food-prices are at starvation rates. Everywhere the people are suffering sorely. If we may trust the writings in some of the Anglo-Indian papers there is grave discontent and disaffection among the people. Recent disturbances in India are declared to have found their real reason in the increasing sufferings of the people owing to the daily greater difficulty of maintaining life—not in comfort, but on a bare subsistence—consequent on the high prices and scarcity of food. At such a time, a disposition to take the educated and trusted leaders of people into confidence, with a view to the amelioration of admittedly very grave evils would have done more to prevent the milk of Indian loyalty turning sour than anything else which can be conceived. Unfortunately, to all these things the authorities, English and Indian, are blind. It is inevitable that the consequences of their blindness should follow. It almost seems as if they cultivated indifference to the desires of the people as a political fine art.

THE ENTHRONEMENT OF MEDIOCRITY IN INDIA.

"The mischief of these rash and cynical declarations is that they will be repeated in every native newspaper in India; they will be discussed in every bazaar; they will be commented upon with pain and anxiety by our friends, and with secret triumph by our enemies; they will alarm every native prince in India, and will fill with disgust, aye, and indignation, the minds of many able men, fired with a just and natural ambition, who reside now largely in that country. I am afraid, my lords, that it will be impossible altogether to get rid of the mischief effected in India of declarations of this kind made, if not with the authority, at least on behalf of Her Majesty's Government." The "rash and cynical declarations" thus referred to by Lord Cross are Sir John Gorst's remarks in the Manipur debate, which will be found on the opposite page. No doubt, those remarks will cause mischief, not, however, because they tell the people of India any new thing, but because they confirm what has already been burnt into the heart of every man of knowledge and discernment in India. Excepting within the last few years, when Indian public opinion has become a force to be reckoned with, the appointment of Additional Members to the various Legislative Councils of India, and the men selected for special honours, afford the most emphatic proof of that patronage of mediocrity which, Sir John Gorst says, is so dear to the heart of all governments—despotic governments especially, he might have added. As for the feudatory States, to those who know how Sir Salar Jung was treated during Lord Lytton's period of rule, Lord Ripon's reference to that great statesman will appear most unfortunate. Possibly, Sir John Gorst, because of his stay in Hyderabad shortly after Sir Salar's death, had the deplorable history of the Hyderabadi Dewan, during the Lyttonian *régime*, in his mind, when he alluded to Tarquinius Superbus and the tall poppies.

Attempts have been made to explain away Sir John Gorst's words, and to repudiate the only meaning which can fairly be drawn from them. Such attempts will wholly

fail. Under certain circumstances the attempts might have been of some value. For example, if the Prime Minister had called upon the Under Secretary for India to resign *because* of his observations, something would have been done to redress the balance, and some mischief might have been averted. While, however, Sir John remains unrebuked, unpunished, Lord Cross's weak sentence of repudiation and his feeble assurance that his subordinate's words were not compatible with common sense, will have no power or convincing force in India. Nor ought they. Actions speak louder than words. We began these remarks with a quotation from Lord Ripon's speech in the House of Lords: we end them with an extract from the most independent Conservative journal in Great Britain, which says:—"As Under Secretary of State for India, Sir John Gorst gave the chiefs and people of that country to understand that their English rulers are at all times a poor sort of rogues—alarmed at the appearance of intellectual power in any native gentleman like the Senaputty, systematic in cutting him down, and cantingly unscrupulous in finding 'moral' reasons for his suppression. Here Sir John Gorst did something much worse than 'round' on his colleagues. So clever a man has not to be taught the natural and only effect of the language he chose to employ. At such a time, on such a theme, and with the certainty that every word was being watched for in India, he might as well have been an acknowledged preacher of sedition as a Secretary for India when he delivered his Manipur speech; and no man in England or Hindostan, knowing what Sir John Gorst said, doubts that he has done great mischief."

SIR JOHN GORST "SPOKE HISTORICAL TRUTH AND SOUND PHILOSOPHY."

Upon the substance of what Sir John Gorst said about the "short way" of the Indian Governments, and of all Governments with able and powerful feudatories, there can be no question but that he spoke historical truth and sound philosophy. From the days of Surajah Dowlah to Cetewayo, the English Government is always the ally of the imbecile and the destroyer of the talented. It would never suit the interest of the major-generals and old "Politicals" to allow an able and popular ruler to be at rest, for then their occupation would be gone. An able and popular ruler can always get on without wars or missions; and wars and missions constitute those tides in the affairs of major-generals and old "Politicals" which, taken at the flood, lead to fortune, for it is our barbarous and unwise custom in apportioning promotions and decorations to overlook the patient merit which builds up the happiness of a people, and only to do honour to those who make themselves conspicuous at a crisis, albeit that, but for their own wickedness and duplicity, that crisis might never have arisen.—*Speaker*, June 27th.

THE NORTHAMPTON LIBERAL AND RADICAL UNION.

INDIA'S CLAIMS.

On Tuesday night a special meeting of the members of the Liberal and Radical Association was held at the Café, Abington Square, when it was decided that the National Liberal Federation should be asked to include the programme of the Indian National Congress in its programme. Councillor F. Covington (the President) occupied the chair, and there were also present Mr. J. Gurney, Mr. T. Purser, Mr. S. Clarke, Mr. C. E. Crick, Mr. W. Billingham, Mr. W. Lucas, Mr. F. O. Adams, Mr. T. P. Stroulger, Mr. W. Knibb, Mr. J. Ward, Mr. R. Hill, Mr. S. J. Ricketts, Mr. J. Dimbleby, Mr. E. Barnes (deputy secretary, in place of Mr. T. Ashdowne), etc.

Mr. Covington, after explaining the circumstances which led to the meeting, pointed out that there would be, perhaps, some difficulty in getting the Liberal Federation to take the matter up, as when the Liberals came into power at the next election there would be a lot of legislation in arrear that would have to be taken up, and which it might be argued ought to take precedence of the question of Indian reform. It was, however, their duty, seeing the special position Northampton had occupied in the matter, to rap at the door of the Federation with a view of taking up the matter of the claims of India as soon as possible. Mr. Bradlaugh had taken a prominent part in the matter, and he was recognised as the leader of the Indian question in the House of Commons and also right throughout the length and breadth of the country of India. Mr. Bradlaugh undertook to bring a measure in; but, modest as it was, it did not gain acceptance in the House of Commons.

Northampton

was better acquainted with the question than a great many other places, inasmuch as, besides Mr. Bradlaugh, there had been deputations here, and educative work had been done. If such men as those who came here were kept out of the governmental power, it was a loss to India and a wrong done to them. It was a cardinal principle with Liberals that no large party in the State overlooked and unrepresented. If that held good in England it also held good as regarded the country of which we were conquerors, where the population was about 250 millions, and which was, therefore, more then seven times the bulk of the British Isles. Many of the Indians were men of culture and lagislative ability, and yet, notwithstanding their great and solid grievances, they were not, as their Congresses proved, bitter or hostile, but there existed a vein of loyalty that was deep and thorough, and had they the small modicum of representative rule that they asked for, they would use it in the interest both of their own country and of us that gave them that power. It was not right that the Indians should be kept out of self-rule when we had given it to almost every other dependency except Ireland. England had educated India up to a high code of political morality, and we could but respect and admire the Indians if they acted up to it and wanted to have control in the government of their own country. The programme which they submitted with such earnestness was as follows:—

1.—Reform of the Supreme, Presidency, and Provincial Councils.
2.—Fair play in the Public Service; Indians to be put on an equal footing with Britons.
3.—Extension of Trial by Jury, and Criminal Procedure Reform on basis prevailing in Britain.
4.—Improved Police Administration.
5.—Establishment of Military Colleges to provide Education and Training for Indians as officers of the Indian Army.
6.—A system of volunteering for all Indians, and not for Indian Christians only.
7.—Improvements in the Arms Act to enable cultivators and others to protect themselves against wild beasts.
8.—Reform of the Drink Regulations.
9.—A more Equitable Imposition of the Income Tax.
10.—The fostering of Education by Government, especially Technical Education.
11.—Enquiry as to the advisability of extending a permanent settlement of the Land Revenue, and Land Law Reform generally.
12.—Reduction of the Salt Tax.
13.—Economy in Administration, and Reduction of Military Expenditure.
14.—Mending or Ending of the Secretary of State's Council.

The Indians wanted a representative Government instead of a nominative one, and in commenting upon the programme Mr. Covington specially referred to the clause having reference to the abridgement of the power of magistrates in certain cases. This had for its object the stopping of the forcing of grog shops on the community for the sake of revenue. The religion of the people forbade the use of intoxicants, so that the effect of the establishment of these drinking places was to debase the people. The people were closely in touch with our literature, and were intelligent, and without representative institutions all true Liberals must feel they were very slaves. He moved—

"That this association expresses cordial sympathy with the desire of the Indian National Congress to obtain its programme of administrative reform, and especially the substitution of the elective for the nominative principle in the choice of the supreme and provincial councils. That in order to secure the early adoption of Indian administrative reform as a plank in the Liberal programme, this resolution be communicated to the National Liberal Federation."

Mr. Joseph Gurney seconded.

Mr. Lucas said that in supporting this resolution they would be but impressing upon the Liberal Federation that they wished the work initiated by our junior member to be carried on. The Indians must be given some voice in the direction of their own affairs if we would retain their loyalty and affection of a federated Government of the Empire, which was the dream of many Liberal reformers.

Mr. S. Clarke said he had no objection to the matter being one for discussion at the annual meeting of the Federation, and he was impressed with one or two things on the programme, but he objected to the education of officers for military purposes. If there were officers there would of course be an army, and all reformers opposed as much as possible the establishment of an army which had to be kept by those who worked and paid taxes. The Indians should

Reform Themselves

as much as possible, and do away with an army, and this would lead to a reduction of taxation. Then they ought also to abolish early marriages and life-long widowhood. If they were earnest in their reformation, they should do these things as soon as possible.

Mr. W. BILLINGHAM supported the chairman. He thought that if the matter were placed upon the programme of the Liberal Federation it would lead to its being more discussed and better understood. The reforms the Indians wanted were identical to those required by ourselves. (Hear, hear.) He especially protested against the forcing of drink upon the Indians against their wishes, and thought that, were that as represented, the sooner they took the question up the better it would be. (Hear, hear.) He objected to the excessive military expenditure both in India and at home, and considered that no Liberal or Radical need have any hesitation in supporting the programmes adopted by the Liberal Federation.

Mr. C. E. CRICK, after an interesting sketch of the growth of English supremacy in India, pointed out that the state of affairs where the representative element now existed in the small provincial councils augured well in the event of its extension. The Congress also showed better than anything else the capacity of the Indians for self-government. Their programme was characterised by moderation, and the agitation by which it was furthered was a peaceable one, which reflected the greatest credit upon the Indians. (Cheers.) Liberals and Radicals worked for Home Rule in Ireland and in our own counties, and it was only an extension of this principle that was asked for by India. He hoped the programme would be adopted by the Federation, and that India would in the future become

HAPPY, CONTENTED, AND BETTER GOVERNED.

Mr. PURSER supported the resolution unhesitatingly. Taxation without representation was tyranny, and in India they had taxation without representation. He did not hold with the educating of officers for the army as it would increase expenditure, and so long as there was an army there was no reason why the Indians should not become officers as well as Englishmen. As Mr. Bradlaugh had said, if we were to hold India, we must have the confidence and affection of her people.

Mr. COVINGTON in reply to Mr. Clarke's objections, remarked that they ought not to require the Indians to be perfect before granting them any reforms. This was the old Tory argument on the question of giving the vote to the agricultural labourer. Then as to the marriages, the conscience of India was waking up in that respect, and they were reforming; while in regard to the army the change desired was that competitive examinations for the higher positions should be held, and that the examinations should take place in India, and not in London, the distance of which prevented some of the most competent from presenting themselves. The Indians had to pay for the army, and why should they not aspire to positions of command in it? He denounced the drink traffic abomination, and put the resolution to the meeting.

It was carried unanimously.

The chairman was thanked for his services.

—*Northampton Daily Reporter*, June 17th.

THE SHADOW OF DEATH OVER INDIA.

A REUTER'S telegram from Madras, dated June 30, says:

The aspect of affairs in the districts threatened with famine by the continued drought is daily growing more serious, and the hope of obtaining intermediate crops has been abandoned. The ryots have eagerly ploughed again and again, hoping that showers would justify sowing, but the rains have been almost a total failure, and on every side is to be seen a dreary expanse of scorched-up earth. No crops can be expected earlier than seven months hence; and in spite of the work of the kitchens and the admirable organisation of the relief works, the suffering among the poorer classes is rapidly increasing in severity. The distress is aggravated by the scarcity of drinking-water.

From the *Times* of July 3, we quote the following telegram:

CALCUTTA, July 3rd.

During the last week an improvement has taken place in the weather. The Meteorological Department reports that rain-bearing winds have penetrated to the Central and North-West Provinces, but the monsoon is a fortnight later than usual. The winds have been exceptionally light, and have a marked tendency to avoid the north-western regions, from which direction the abnormally high barometrical pressure continues. Steamers arriving at Bombay report the weather to be almost calm in the Arabian Sea, an unusual circumstance at this season.

More rain is wanted in all the provinces except Burmah and Assam, but prices generally are stationary and are nowhere rising to any great extent.

The distress existing on the east coast of Madras is due mainly to the failure of the winter rains, but it has been aggravated by the delay of the summer rains. The regions now causing the greatest anxiety are the South-West Punjab and Rajpootana, where cattle are already beginning to suffer.

It is still too early to predict any widespread failure of crops, but if the present conditions continue ten or fifteen days longer there will be grave cause for apprehension.

Extensive swarms of locusts continue to appear over the whole of Northern India, and have also appeared in Bengal, where they are seldom seen.

INDIA AND THE GENERAL ELECTION 1885.[1]

APPEAL FROM THE PEOPLE OF INDIA TO THE ELECTORS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND.

FELLOW SUBJECTS,—You, under Providence, are charged with the government and well-being of the people of India. We, your Indian fellow-subjects, number one-sixth of the population of the globe. The source of power, not only over your own destinies but over the destinies of the many races and peoples in India, is in your hands. In the great Council of the State which governs you and us alike you are all-powerful; we are utterly powerless. Every class and interest in your country is represented; no grievance lacks a champion; no class-injustice goes unredressed. We, on the contrary, have no representatives to safeguard our interests either in the Free Assembly of Britain—our Court of Final Appeal—or in the Supreme or Executive Councils of our own land. In the seat of power, whether in India or in England, we are voiceless—either in person or by deputy. We cry out to you, who are able to champion our cause, and implore you to determine that this condition of things shall no longer continue, but that a change which shall recognise us as loyal subjects of the great British Empire and give us the privileges of free citizens shall be no longer delayed.

We are not unmindful of, we cheerfully and gratefully recognise, the many advantages which our country enjoys from your government. You have done great things for us: you have

(*a*) Promoted peace through the Indian Continent;

(*b*) Have established equal laws and dealt justly in our courts;

(*c*) Have sown the seeds of Education broadcast over the land;

(*d*) Have permitted to us as individuals and in associated bodies freedom of thought and action;

(*e*) Have, with a Free Press, given us the noble influence of your language and literature;

(*f*) Have initiated us into the discipline of self-governing institutions;

(*g*) Have displayed solicitude in promoting our material advance; and

(*h*) Have, by recent acts, breathed a new spirit into our national life.

Through each and all of these things we have become reconciled to the sway of a nation rich with the inheritance of freedom, itself the parent of many free nations sprung from its loins. We desire that our future may continue to be linked with yours. We are more than content to be reckoned a part of the great and free British Empire; we are anxious that the existing connection between your country and ours should continue. But, we desire that this should be done on terms that shall be fairer and juster to us—while not unfair or unjust to you—than at present is the case.

In your name great promises have been made to us. We do not say that none of these promises have been kept. Some have been fulfilled; some, again, have been wholly ignored. Of others the statement of the greatest of your own poets has been verified: the promises have been "kept to the ear but broken to the hope." In Parliament, at regular intervals, in times past, you examined into the manner in which Britons had kept their trust and performed their duty. Until satisfied on these points you refused to renew the Charter of the East India Company. As a consequence of inquiry, you abolish trade monopolies, promoted education, opened the Civil Service to equal competition, protected our Princes and Chiefs from threatened destruction, selected our best men for high judicial office, and associated many of us with your own servants in the work of Municipal government.

Twenty five years have passed since you revised your work in India. Previously there was examination at intervals of twenty years. Each inquiry marked an advance in our liberties. The greatest of all changes in the Government of India—the assumption of direct control by the Crown and the people of Britain—was made in 1858. The time, we feel, has come, to use a phrase familiar in our mercantile experience as well as yours, when stock should be taken to see how far the experiment of 1858 has succeeded or failed; and if it has succeeded what new reforms shall be granted, what new liberties shall be placed in our hands: if it has failed, to provide the remedy.

The present moment is especially suited for close and searching inquiry. The foreign policy of Britain is almost comprised in a single word. That word is INDIA. Your responsibilities in Egypt, your statesmen allege, arise out of your control of India. The advantages derived by you from your insular position are now taken away. As an Asiatic Power you find your frontier almost coterminous with those of another great European and Asiatic Power. You have recognised this. You are taking steps to safeguard your possessions—entirely at our expense. We are in no way consulted respecting the means you propose

[1] This appeal was printed as a four page leaflet nearly six years ago, in anticipation of the general election of that year, and was very largely circulated. Every point made in that appeal is as strong now as ever. We, therefore, reprint it with the hope that the hard facts and the pathos which mark every paragraph may arouse British Electors to interest themselves in India.—ED., INDIA.

to adopt—and make us pay for. We think the proposals for increased military expenditure which have been made are unnecessary. We cannot prevent their being carried out. You can. A desire is prevalent in India and in this country to resist aggression by meeting the enemy far away from our frontiers. Such a policy may dazzle some by its magnificence. We beseech you not to be led away by such a prospect from the path of ascertained safety. That path of ascertained safety is that the Indian Empire be defended from within its own borders and remain independent of the fluctuations of a foreign policy in the shaping of which it has no share. The proposed addition to the British garrison in our country will involve an annual additional expenditure and increased burdens of taxation beyond the power of our people to bear. The drain of our resources to your country will be increased to our sore detriment.

There is a better way than that. If the rulers of India trust its people, give them higher military education, arm them properly, form national reserves out of the armies of Native States instead of distrusting the Princes of those States, and take Princes and people into their complete confidence, no danger whatever need be apprehended from any Asiatic or any European Power. This policy has been recommended by great Indian authorities as the only sound one to follow, and all departures from it have led to disastrous results. The increase of military charges will impoverish the country, and by crippling the Government in its necessary home (*i.e.*, Indian) expenditure, retard the development of internal resources. The late Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, with rare foresight, understood the needs of India both at home and abroad and the demonstrations which greeted his departure affixed the seal of popular consent to the wisdom of the course pursued by him. As one effect of his beneficent administration, when your relations with Russia assumed a critical turn last year, Princes and people volunteered to place at the disposal of Government all their resources with a devotion which no success, however brilliant, in military warfare, would have ensured.

What, then, do we ask at your hands? These, at least:—

1. We pray you to require a pledge from the candidate—whether Liberal or Conservative—who seeks your support, that he will press for

A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO INDIAN AFFAIRS

as soon as the new Parliament meets.

2. A generous consideration of such reforms—on the lines of Mr. Bright's proposals in 1858—as, while not weakening India as a whole, shall afford a career to each Presidency and Province for development according to the enterprise and intelligence of the respective peoples. What has been accomplished with respect to the nations constituting the German Empire may, *if you will*, be accomplished in respect to the many nations and States in India.

3. A changed military policy, whereby the extreme costliness of Indian military administration may be reduced.

4. The redemption of the many pledges given through a long series of years, nearly the whole of which remain unredeemed. For example:

(1) The settlement of the land question;

(2) The Civil and Military Services (though nominally open) closed to the people of India;

(3) The unequal distribution of the Home Charges and the disastrous balance of trade against India;

(4) The industrial development of India a close monopoly in foreign hands;

(5) Famines increase and are of frightful severity—official figures are as follows:

Sixty-Years.	No. of Famines.	Life-Loss.
1800 to 1860	13	5,000,000
Ten-Year-Period.		
1861 to 1870	8	4,585,000
1871 to 1880	5	6,736,420

(6) Arms are denied to the people, and all martial spirit allowed to decline;

(7) Taxation has largely trenched on the margin of subsistence;

(8) Our so-called Legislative Councils possess no power of inquiry into or control over Executive acts, cannot utter an opinion respecting finance, and contain no representatives of Native Indian interests, save here and there an Indian gentleman nominated by the Government of the day.

(9) We are denied, in our own country, any share in directing the affairs of the land; local experience, special knowledge, which our ablest and wisest men could bring to the Councils of the Empire, the Presidency, and the Province respectively, are not availed of, involving the double calamity of a country governed by alien and unsympathetic individuals and local administrative ability withering for want of exercise. No opening for honourable and loyal ambition is provided for able Indians; we are doomed to inferior tasks and denied that share in the administration of a part of the British Empire which we as loyal subjects of the Queen-Empress desire to take.

British Fellow Subjects, help us in the attainment of our objects by voting only for those candidates at the present Election who will support inquiry. We ask simply for reasonable reforms, and for those reforms only after you have satisfied yourselves through your representatives that our requests are just. But, we ask you to delay not. Hope has been so long deferred that many of us have well-nigh lost heart. Our confidence, however, in your desire to do us justice is unbounded. Acquaint yourselves with our needs that we may be at peace and in security. And, so doing, may the blessings of God attend upon you in this noble work, and enable you to rule over India as an instrument in His hands to carry out His purpose of elevating the people of this land by a just and beneficent discharge of the trust confided to your care, and to help them to attain to an equality with your own higher status among the civilized nations of the world.

Signed,

On behalf of the Indian Union of Associations, Calcutta,
MANOMOHUN GHOSE;
,, ,, Mahajana Sabha, Madras,
S. RAMASWAMY MUDALIYAR;
,, ,, Presidency Association, Bombay, Sarvajanik Sabha, Poona, and Sind Sabha,
N. G. CHANDAVARKAR.
Offices of the Indian Delegates Committee;
18, Cockspur Street, London, S.W.
WM. DIGBY, Hon. Sec.

THE BURDEN ON THE SOIL IN INDIA.

WHY THE RYOT'S PAUPERISM IS, NECESSARILY, AN INCREASING EVIL.

FROM a small pamphlet on "Revenue Enhancements" written by Sir W. Wedderburn, Bart., in 1882, when he was a member of the Bombay Civil Service, we quote a description of what the land revenue of India is, as well as the unsound principles on which it is levied. Sir William writes:—

"In 1856 and 1864 the Court of Directors and the Secretary of State gave distinct orders that the Government demand was not to exceed one-half the true rent of the land assessed. And the next question is, whether these orders have been obeyed by local officials in India? On studying the facts disclosed in the debate, it becomes at once apparent that this question must be answered in the negative, as no one who takes part in the discussion contends that the instructions of the India Office have been carried out in practice. Some members of the Council, indeed, show themselves unwilling to discuss the matter at all, but no one pretends to think that under existing arrangements one-half the net produce is really left with the ryot. It is, in fact, admitted that Sir C. Wood's rule has become 'a mere paper instruction.' As to what the Settlement Departments really have done and are doing in India, Sir Bartle Frere shows himself better informed than most of his colleagues, and his remarks on the subject are deserving of attention as being those of a witness naturally biassed in favour of the existing system. His opinion is that throughout India the State demand rarely, if ever, fulfils the requirements of the India Office instructions, or can be rightly described as limited to a fixed share of the true rent: 'The reader of much of the literature relating to Indian land revenue would suppose that it came for the most part, or at least very frequently, under (this) class as a true land-tax. But with the exception of a very few localities, almost infinitesimally small in proportion to the total area which pays land revenue in India, such a true land-tax is practically unknown.' As regards the Bombay Presidency, he considers that the assessment for the most part comes within the three following economic classes: (a) *a land-tax fixed more or less arbitrarily*, and absorbing a varying proportion of the true rent; (b) *a full rent*, leaving nothing to the cultivator but the wages of his labour and the interest on his capital; and (c) *a rent and something more*, trenching on the wages of labour or the profits of capital. He observes that often the demand is more moderate in name than in reality; 'but any one who will take the trouble of going carefully into the subject will be able to satisfy himself that the State often takes a full rent even when it professes and believes itself to be taking a mere land-tax or share of that rent. Indeed, I have known many instances of lands held at what was intended to be light quit rents, abandoned because, through change of prices and other circumstances, the owner found that the Government demand absorbed more than the full rent. It might seem almost impossible that the Government demand should ever amount to what is defined as class (c), rent and something more, but in my early years, when assessments were high and prices low, I often met with whole districts in the Dekkan where the cultivator could not pay the Government demand without trenching on his own wages as labourer, to the extent of his

having less for himself than a hired labourer would require.' To Sir Bartle Frere's three classes Sir Louis Mallet adds another, for he says, 'I am also informed that in many cases lands have been assessed which barely pay the cost of cultivation, and yield no rent at all.' This may be called class (d), *where the land yields no rent at all*, and the assessment is taken wholly from that portion of the crop which represents the wages of labour. And to these four classes we must regretfully add yet a fifth and still more grievous case, class (e) *where the total crop is insufficient to pay the cost of cultivation*, and where the assessment must be paid either out of wages earned elsewhere or from cash obtained from the money-lender. That this class (e) not only exists, but that it embraces the vast majority of holdings in the Dekkan, will be clear to 'any one who will take the trouble' to study the bulky and doleful literature which has accumulated round the case of the distressed ryot: the report with appendices of the Dekkan Riots Commission; the report of the Famine Commissioners, with the evidence taken before them; and the inquiries and debates in connection with the Dekkan Agriculturists Relief Act. Here facts and statistics will be found in abundance, showing that the pauperism of the ordinary ryot is an increasing evil; that it is a necessary consequence of his present economic position; and that it primarily arises from the absolute insufficiency of the total produce of the land, as compared with the population which it is called on to support. The Dekkan Riots Commissioners have exploded the old stock explanations—the ryot's improvidence, his extravagance on marriages, and the inordinate gains of the money-lender—and we must now look a good deal deeper into figures and facts for the true causes of the general insolvency. Take for example the village of Nepti—a village containing a fair amount of garden land, and favourably situated on a road near the town of Ahmednagar. We have now before us the detailed figures showing for each holding the amount of the assessment, the cash expenses of cultivation, and the cost of family maintenance, together with the value of the produce, and the amount of income derived by the occupant from other sources. And from the totals it appears that the gross produce of the whole village is worth Rs. 12,001, and the income from other sources Rs. 3,731, giving a grand total income of Rs. 15,732. On the other hand, bare family maintenance amounts to Rs. 11,345, the cash expenses of cultivation to Rs. 3,007, and the assessment to Rs. 2,392, giving a grand total of Rs. 16,744 as the outgoings of the village. In ordinary years, therefore, the income is insufficient to meet the expenditure. And there is besides a total debt on the village of Rs. 33,132, which represents a further annual charge for interest of Rs. 7,000 or Rs. 8,000, and indicates a steady progress towards absolute ruin. In villages where the land is chiefly dry-crop, the balance-sheet is still worse. Thus in the village of Chas the total crop is worth only Rs. 7,939; whereas the cost of cultivation, including maintenance, amounts to Rs. 12,136. Here the assessment could not be paid at all if it were not for the considerable sum of Rs. 4,619 earned by labour apart from agriculture; by carrying grass and firewood, by working on the roads, by cart-hire, and by other miscellaneous employments rendered possible by the vicinity of a large town. Such supplementary means of livelihood are, of course, wanting in secluded villages far away from any large market or centre of industry. According to these figures, few landholders in the ordinary Dekkan village can aspire to a higher position than class (e) in the fiscal scale. And it may here be noted that in his book, 'The Garden of India,' Mr. Irwin makes similar calculations for one or two typical villages in Oudh, with similar results; and gives it as his opinion that the only way the peasant makes both ends meet is by stinting himself in food and eating less than is necessary for health. To sum up, therefore, our gleanings as to the practical incidence of the land revenue, we may say that, by reason of exhausted soil, increasing population, high assessment, and low prices, there has in these latter days been produced a state of things in the Dekkan a full degree lower than that described by Sir Bartle Frere as existing in his early years. And in answer to the question propounded above, we must reply that the Settlement Departments have not limited their enhancements according to any principle recognised by the Secretary of State; that, instead of obeying the orders of 1856 and 1864, they have guided themselves by 'certain artificial and arbitrary rules, often at variance with actual facts;' and that the assessment, instead of being a tax upon rent, is for the most part paid out of the wages of labour, operating thus as a poll-tax upon the poorest classes of the agricultural community."

As to the mode of assessment and "crop experiments" Sir William says, most trenchantly and with convincing force:—

"If, however, we analyse these 'crop experiments,' however slightly, it becomes at once apparent that they are entirely wanting in the accuracy indispensable in any test operation. The method prescribed is somewhat as follows: the revenue officer entrusted with the duty goes to a field of ripe jowari, say 15 acres in extent, and is expected to select a specimen plot, say of 5 guntas ($\frac{1}{8}$th of an acre), which shall correctly represent the average of the whole field. He has this plot reaped, threshed, and measured; and by multiplying the result by 120 he estimates the crop of the whole 15 acres. The experiment is then completed by comparing the money value of this total estimated crop with the cash assessment on the field. Now, could any method professing to secure accuracy be better calculated to produce error and confusion? In the first place, it starts with a supremely difficult mental operation, requiring great knowledge and great impartiality. To select a specimen 5-gunta plot of standing corn which will correctly represent a crop of average quantity and quality, it is a duty which would task severely the skill of the most trained and experienced agriculturist. Even the rural speculator who makes it his business to buy the standing crop or 'khoti,' is continually mistaken in his estimates. Yet the whole value of these 'crop experiments' depends upon the success with which this delicate operation is performed. Of course, as a matter of fact, the selection by the experimenting officer is the roughest guess-work. And the unavoidable error which attends his initial estimate is multiplied just 120-fold when he comes to sum up for the whole field. It is as though we wished to take a careful test census of a village containing 120 houses, and directed the enumerator to be very particular in selecting an average house and counting its inmates; the total population being afterwards determined by multiplying this number by 120. Indeed, the veriest tyro must see that the method followed is exactly the converse of that by which statistical facts are ordinarily ascertained. If I reap, thresh, and measure the whole 15 acre field, and divide the total by 120, I determine directly the outturn of an average plot of 5 guntas; and similarly if I count the heads of corn contained in 5 guntas, I may estimate fairly enough the amount of grain contained in an average head of jowari. This is a simple operation requiring no judicial impartiality or technical skill. But if I go the other way about, and argue from the particular to the general, I become at once involved in difficulty. And the absurdity becomes apparent if I try to select an average head of jowari as the basis for calculating the total crop; though such a method would differ only in degree, and not in kind, from that adopted by the Settlement Department. Such a method allows the greatest possible latitude to individual carelessness and personal bias, and consequently we find that the printed reports show results of a very contradictory kind. By far the best experiments are those made by Mr. Stormont, of the Government Farm in Khandesh. They are the most trustworthy, because Mr. Stormont is himself a practical farmer, because he has no departmental interest or bias in the matter, and because when making his experiments he knew that his estimates would afterwards be tested by the actual results when the crops on the farm came in the due course of business to be harvested and measured. Nevertheless so faulty was the method employed that even his estimates were more than 100 per cent. wrong. In the seven fields he dealt with his estimates gave an average value to the crop of Rs. 22-8 per acre, whereas Rs. 9-13 per acre proved to be the actual outturn. As regards the experiments made by other officials, no steps seem to have been taken to verify the estimates. But it may be said generally that the natural tendency in such proceedings is largely to over-estimate the crop, by selecting too favourable a specimen for experiment, and by making insufficient allowance for wastage of all kinds. And this tendency to over-estimate would no doubt be exaggerated in the case of enthusiastic young revenue officers, whose professional bias inclines them to take a cheerful view of the ryot's prosperity and power to pay. But besides the indefinite over-estimate of total crop, there exists in these experiments another source of error nearly equally serious. The Secretary of State pointed out that for fiscal purposes it was necessary to know not so much the gross as the net produce; the ryot's solvency depending on the amount of produce left to him after defraying the cost of cultivation. The Settlement Department were therefore directed to calculate and deduct the cost of cultivation. And the method they have devised is most ingenious. They ascertain the cost of the labour of man and beast for a holding of an extent, say 20 acres, sufficient to occupy the whole time of a kunbi and his pair of bullocks during the nine months of the cultivating season, and from the result they determine the permanent ratio of cost to acreage. Thus, supposing they decide this cost to be Rs. 100 for 20 acres, they assume that the cost for 10 acres will be Rs. 50 and for 6 acres Rs. 30, and make a corresponding deduction from the gross produce on account of the wages of labour. But very little reflection will suffice to show that such a method is fallacious; for whether the kunbi and his pair of bullocks cultivate 20 acres or 6 acres, they must have their daily food all the same. Also it must be borne in mind that the working male kunbi cannot be kept on the land without the ordinary proportion of women and children, who must also be fed. So that, unless there exist domestic industries or other supplementary employments to occupy spare time, the subsistence of the whole family for twelve months in the year must form a charge upon the holding, however small that holding may be. The mode of calculation adopted by the Settlement Department might be correct enough in estimating the cost of a commodity where the manufacturer employs hired labour, and can take on or discharge his artizans according to the requirements of his business. But such a method is quite inapplicable to the case of the peasant cultivator in districts where agriculture is practically the sole industry, and where the ryot's spare time is of no financial value."

(*Continued from page* 191.)

would have been suicidal for the paramount power to have left such a cruel and violent man, such an avowed enemy to British authority, in power among the Manipuris. I think, therefore, that that justifies the general policy of the Government; and for my own part, in all the broad outlines of that policy, I entirely agree with it. It must be that on some of the minor details of its execution there are things which we all deplore; but those details, Mr. Speaker, I do maintain, should be left to the discretion of the Government of India. (Hear, hear.)

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT proceeded to address some remarks to the House; but,

Mr. W. H. SMITH, interposing, said: I hope the right hon. gentleman will postpone for a little what he has to say. The Secretary of State for War will reply on the whole debate. My right hon. friend will consent to the papers being granted; but the speeches of the right hon. gentleman the member for the Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell Bannerman) and the member for Aberdeen (Mr. Bryce) deserve some reply from the Government.

Mr. SWIFT MACNEILL (Donegall, S.): Mr. Speaker, I venture to intervene in this debate for a very brief time, because my views on Indian questions are different from the views of the vast majority of both sides of this House. As long as I have been in the House I have always thought it was an imperative duty on Irish members closely to investigate Indian matters, because we have more sympathy with States which, like Ireland, are under the British flag, but outside the pale of the privileges of the British constitution. Now, Mr. Speaker, the course of the debate all during the night has more than justified my action when I yesterday appealed to the First Lord of the Treasury not to throw over the Bill brought in by the Government themselves, having for its object the better administration of the Indian Government. Let us consider now with reference to that question, first of all what is admitted in the course of this debate. It is notorious that the subject States of India—Manipur is one—comprise no fewer than 60,000,000 of human beings. Now, sir, a revolution of great import has occurred in Manipur. That revolution was suppressed, or put down, or taken into consideration, not by the home Government of India, not by Lord Cross, or by my right hon. friend, or by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Stanhope) who is at present on the Treasury bench, and who has administered Indian affairs with very great success, and with his accustomed ability—it was simply taken into consideration by Lord Lansdowne and his Indian Council. The Indian Government, or those portions of the Indian Government which have a cognisance of Indian matters have no official record and no official information of anything that went on at Manipur. I think that is a very shameful and a very disgraceful state of affairs. It appears not to be within the knowledge of the British public that the India Office at home is a very elaborate office. There is an Under Secretary, my right hon. friend—(Sir J. Gorst at this moment entered, and took his seat on the Treasury bench)—I see that the right hon. gentleman has taken his seat, and I may inform him that I was simply commenting on the fact that it was a very shameful and a very disgraceful state of affairs that a revolution should take place in a State like Manipur, and that the Government at home should be without official information of it; and that further it should be simply taken into consideration by the Indian Government in Calcutta, the Government of the Viceroy and his Council. Lord Cross had nothing to say to it, and gave no advice. The matter, so far as the documents go to show, was taken into consideration by the extraordinary Council of Fifteen; the fifteen members of the Indian Council which is a kind of Cabinet for Indian administration. Having regard to the fact that no fewer than 60,000,000 millions of people are affected, and having regard to the fact that the Government at home knew nothing of this transaction, I think it will be granted that such a state of things is a scandal to our administration. I can well remember—indeed, when the right hon. gentleman was making his very able speech, I was forcibly reminded of a splendidly written article of his on Indian matters, published before he assumed the responsibility of high office—in which he said there were many facts connected with the Indian Government which had not been brought before the public. I say that the treatment of Manipur by the Home Government is one of those cases. Let us see how the right hon. gentleman stands in reference to Indian matters. The member for Southport assumed, I think, rather an ambitious office, he tried to make the Indian administration purer, and better, and more virtuous, than did the right hon gentleman who is the exponent of Indian administration in this House. The right hon. gentleman did not say that this deposed prince, this Senaputty, this Commander-in-Chief, who is now under sentence of death was, as did the hon. member for Stockport, a scoundrel. He said nothing of the kind. He admitted that he was an able man, a popular administrator who gathered round him the great enthusiasm of all his people. All this the right hon. gentleman said, yet, with a cynicism which has never been equalled, even by the Chief Secretary, he said that because the Senaputty was an able man, and because he was a vigorous administrator, he was as such an object of jealousy to the Indian Government. That, inasmuch as he was popular among his people, the Indian Government regarded him with a jealous eye. The right hon. gentleman added that the deposition of the Senaputty was not a moral but a political act, it was not done on the ground of morality. Really, I think I must commend the right hon. gentleman for that confession. He at the same time said that when a man, an Indian subject, becomes an object of danger or jealousy to the Indian Government on account of his abilities, on account of his originality of character, the first thing the English Government must do is to blacken his character, and to set a picket on him, in fact.

Mr. JOHN GORST: No.

Mr. MACNEILL: Well, I do not wish to misrepresent the right hon. gentleman. These charges and allegations date so far back as 1881, and though they should have been forgotten, they have been raked up against this man when it became convenient for the Indian Government to put him down with a view to annexing the whole province of Manipur. This was the real object of these transactions and proceedings. I do not think the right hon. gentleman was very happy in his comparison with reference to the field of poppies, in which the heads of the topmost poppies which in a degree stood above the others were knocked off, with a further suggestion that so might be managed obstreperous politicians. If it is mentioned in every bazaar, and in every gathering of English officers, and every gathering of Indian Natives that the English Government in India is not for the benefit of the people of India, that it is not to promote the welfare of the people, that it is not to advance the best men to the highest places, and that it is not to endeavour through native agency to bring home to the people of India government in its best possible form, then we shall dissolve English rule in India by dispelling the confidence which ought to exist. I never thought that an English Minister would stand up here—a responsible Minister of the English Crown, representing the English Government in the Empire of India, and avow that the subject races are held by us simply for our own benefit, and that our officials may ride rough shod over them. The right hon. gentleman drew a comparison in reference to the present dangers to the State. Reference was made to the New Zealanders who it was said constituted a danger to the colonists there, and, who therefore, ought to be destroyed. I am sorry that such cases which have been referred to have existed; but at the same time I should wish it to be known that the English democracy have never to this date been responsible for the crimes and atrocities that have from time to time been perpetrated by the governments by which they have been ruled. From the time of these remote occurrences down to the date of the Pigott conspiracy—(cries of "Oh!")—I am quite sure the Speaker will call me to order if I say anything which in his opinion may be wrong. Of course it is absolutely essential that the Government of India should be free from all blame on account of the actrocities and forgeries upon which our Indian Empire was founded. I am glad to say that the hon. baronet, the member for Evesham (Sir Richard Temple), who combines with great experience of the Indian Service high ability and high honour, has emancipated himself from the trammels of Indian officialism in that most able article in which he vigorously denounced the impropriety and dishonour of asking any one whom you intend to manacle into your garden or your house. This case, in point of fact, is the old case of the spider and the fly, and that is not the way in which English administration in India ought to be carried on. I for one shall never have the great honour and privilege of sitting on the Treasury front Bench—at any rate in this Parliament; and, therefore, I do not feel bound in my intelligence by any of the trammels of officialism; consequently, I do not hesitate to say that the person who is really responsible for all these troubles is not Mr. Quinton, who is dead, and therefore unable to speak on his own account, but Her Majesty's Viceroy of India, Lord Lansdowne. This I think I shall be able to prove to the House up to the very hilt in the Blue Book containing the correspondence which has been issued on this very painful subject. Let me ask the House to consider for a moment how things have been going on in the State of Manipur. It is a small State, and hitherto appears to have been fairly well managed. Mr. Grimwood who has lost his life would appear to have so conducted himself in the office he filled at Manipur as to be enabled to bring the natives there very much in accordance with his own views, and I am quite sure that any one who will read the despatches dealing with the action of that gentleman during the two years he was at Manipur, will agree with me in saying that he did his best to promote not only the interests of his own Government but also the peace, tranquillity and welfare of the community in the district in which he was placed. I think I shall be enabled to prove to this House from the despatches contained in this Blue Book, first of all that Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton approved of the supplanting of a feeble and incompetent Maharaja by a capable one. There was no idea of treachery or want of loyalty to the British Crown on his part, and the best proof of that is to be found in the fact that Mr. Grimwood, when the revolution occurred, was at the British Residency at Manipur, and went over and had a durbar, which was an honourable durbar, at which he conversed with the present Maharaja of Manipur, and likewise with the Senaputty, who is now under sentence of death, and who would have been a happy and independent prince administering the affairs of the State of Manipur to the welfare of the community over which he would have been ruling had it not been for the action of the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne. Mr. Grimwood says, on page 6 of the report: "The Maharaja then wrote a letter to the Senaputty to tell him his determination to leave and resign the 'Gaddi' to the Jubraj, and when I went to the palace the Senaputty and his brothers were evidently very pleased at the Maharaja's resolution, and the former promised to make all the arrangements for the journey of the Maharaja and his brothers to Cachar in a proper manner and that those who chose to stay in Manipur would not be molested. He also said he would send for the Jubraj who, it appears, was about eight miles away on the Cachar road. The Jubraj arrived two or three hours after, and at once proclaimed himself Maharaja. As soon as the Maharaja's intention of leaving the country was known numbers of Manipuris flocked to the Residency to see him, most of them bringing various sums of money to present to him. To judge from the way the people wept, one would say the Maharaja was popular, and everyone seemed sorry at his departure." On page 3 of the despatch Mr. Grimwood says: "I have no doubt that the departure of the Maharaja and three of his brothers will be, at any rate for a time, beneficial to the country. A Maharaja and seven brothers, over whom he had little real authority, were too many for a small country like this, and their reduction by half will be a relief in more ways than one. The Maharaja, personally, was popular; but he was a weak ruler, paid little attention to public business, and spent hours every day in worshipping in the temple. He was not at all the person to keep order amongst his brothers, and he is a man who will be much happier, I imagine, as an ascetic than as a ruler. The Jubraj, who, I hope, will be allowed to succeed to the 'Gaddi' has the reputation of being much more active and business-like. The Senaputty has more than once incurred the censure of the Government, but, as I have mentioned above, he is popular amongst all classes; he is the only prince who is said to be

poor owing to his generosity. He is also on good terms with the Jubraj; and if the latter is allowed to succeed to the 'Gaddi,' the Senaputty, as Jubraj, would assist in making his rule strong and popular. At the time of writing everything is profoundly quiet and going on as usual. The postal services have not been interrupted at all." In all these things we have the experience and testimony of Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton who are best able to judge as to the conduct and character of the Senaputty. I have here further testimony as to what the political agent at Manipur considers to have been the effects of the recent revolution. At the time it occurred he expressed a hope that the result would be beneficial, and after four months' experience he says, that as far as he can tell, the feeling of the bulk of the people is one of perfect contentment under the new ruler, and there is no reason why this should not be the case. And yet this ruler is the man whom the hon. member for Southport spoke of as a scoundrel in his debating society speech earlier in the evening. As I read these records, I ask you, Mr. Speaker, and I ask hon. members who are listening to me, to bring to their recollection the fact that an hon. friend stood up in his place on the eve of the Whitsuntide holidays and asked for the cause of the delay in producing these papers. Is the reason to be found that the British people quickly forget circumstances in the sequence of events, and it was deemed desirable thereupon to delay the papers until the freshness of what had occurred had passed off. I never saw State documents which so deeply convicted an administration. I come now to a despatch by Lord Lansdowne or by one of his agents in Calcutta. It is dated the 24th January, and is as follows: "The opinion which the Governor-General in Council has formed after a perusal of the papers in this case is that we should intervene with a sufficient show of strength to make it understood that we intend to be masters of the situation." Why should they, I ask, be masters of the situation? Why should not the Manipuris be masters of the situation and govern in their own country, so long as they are doing no hurt to the British Administration which after all is only there for the protection of the Manipuris? Then the despatch goes on, "The differences between the Maharaja's brothers must be settled on principles of justice." The fact is the Indian Government was simply trying to grab this State, although both Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton had both declared it to be a good Government in Manipur. Again, the despatch says, "Whatever arrangement is come to must have our full sanction." The sanction of people in Calcutta who know nothing whatever about the Manipuris. Then comes an instruction to visit Manipur, and the despatch continues: "In the opinion of the Governor-General if you find that the Maharaja would receive a reasonable amount of support from the people of Manipur he might be reinstated and promised assistance in consideration of his implicitly following our instuctions." The consideration I beg the House to mark is not in consideration of his good government or of services rendered, but of his implicitly following the instructions of people in Calcutta. Again, the despatch shows the official knowledge of the incompetence of the Maharaja, for it says, "It will probably be desirable that the Senaputty should in any case be removed, for even if the Maharaja proves hopelessly incompetent and the Jubraj is recognised it would be necessary to remove his disreputable adherents from the State, and to punish the Senaputty for his violent and lawless conduct." I must say that after this night's debate I do not think that the man now under sentence of death is likely to be executed. It appears to me from these papers that the object of the Indian Government was to disturb the tranquillity of this little State in spite of the entreaty of Mr. Grimwood and in defiance of Mr. Quinton's matured opinion. The object was to "grab" this little country; talk of Irish land grabbers why they are only miniatures of the Indian land grabbers. I am sorry that Mr. Quinton lost his life. He made an error of judgment; he ought to have put his foot down when Lord Lansdowne sent him the instructions which led up to this disaster. He began life in a humble position in an obscure Irish parish, by his own efforts he raised himself to a high post, and he ought to have told Lord Lansdowne that he valued his honour too highly to carry out such instructions. I am not particularly concerned for the honour of Lord Lansdowne or of the Indian Government, but I am concerned for the memory of my countryman, Mr. Quinton, who had a splendid career in India. An attempt has been made—no doubt a kindly one—in an admirable article by the hon. baronet to show that the plan of inviting the Senaputty to the durbar, there to arrest him, was the idea of Mr. Quinton. But the documents conclusively prove the reverse. A telegram in the Blue Book on page 27 shows that Quinton, in the earlier part of February, when this matter was brought to his notice, wrote strongly to the Viceroy objecting to it. But his Excellency the Governor and the Council were determined to destroy the little State, as Mr. Quinton was brought up to Calcutta and had an interview with the Viceroy on February 21st, of the present year. He had to be closeted with his Excellency, as Resident Magistrates in Ireland are closeted with the Chief Secretary, in order to bring them up to the scratch. Then he was despatched on the road, and on the 18th March, he telegraphed that he intends to arrest the Senaputty at the durbar. He says: "Your letter 21st ult., expect to reach Manipur on Sunday with escort described in my demi-official letter of the 22nd *idem*. Have communicated with the political agent through Lieut. Gurdon whom I sent in advance. I propose to require the Regent and durbar to meet me on arrival. Announce the decision of the Government and arrest Senaputty."

Sir W. HARCOURT: I may point out that the durbar there referred to is not the durbar called by Mr. Quinton, it was really the entourage of the Regent.

Mr. MACNEILL: I must acknowledge my error. I think the right hon. gentleman is right. But if the right hon. gentleman will look at page eight of this Blue Book, he will see a telegram dated 30th April, from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State as to the arrest of Senaputty, he will find it there stated: "Arrangement was orders of India was to be announced at durbar." That is the durbar of the British Residency and not the durbar of the Senaputty, and the Senaputty was to be told to surrender at the durbar of the Residency, the durbar which was to be surrounded by military in three or four quarters, and then came the words: "If he refused, Colonel Skene was to arrest him at durbar."

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: Those were not the orders of the Viceroy.

Mr. MACNEILL: He ratified them afterwards; and I am certain the whole of this arrangement was carried out between Mr. Quinton and his party and the Viceroy. The telegram goes on to say, "Troops were kept in readiness round Residency where durbar was held in case of resistance." A greater violation of the laws of honour and hospitality has scarcely ever been heard of even in Indian policies. Talk about straightforward English gentlemen, or about honour after this! It is a ghastly story and a shameful story. Now, sir, I think we have proved that there was an arrangement of Mr. Quinton's which at all events was sanctioned by our highest authorities, to arrest this man, and how did Quinton behave on the morning of that day? He came into Manipur on the morning of Sunday the 22nd March. The man whom he intended to arrest met him four miles out of the town. Mr. Quinton dismounted and had a conversation with him, and that afternoon the plan was arranged and he was invited to attend this durbar to be arrested. He was invited there contrary to the expressed opinion and entreaty of Mr. Grimwood, and contrary to his (Mr. Quinton's) own better judgment in fact. What I have said and always say in Indian matters, I say from a sense of great responsibility. These people have got no representative, and it is necessary that questions affecting Indian administration should be closely watched. How long is this kind of administration to last? Could you not have gone straightforwardly to these people and have said: We have come to arrest you, and have taken a proper force and carried a strong arm? That might have been an unjustifiable, but it would have been a manly, course, and why should tricks and treachery be resorted to? This Senaputty was never asked to go to the durbar with the knowledge that he would be arrested the instant he went in. I am sorry to think that Indian administration, which of all the administrations of the British Empire should be the purest to make up for its past antecedents, should still maintain the character that attached to it in the past.

Mr. E. STANHOPE (Secretary of State for War): I am very sorry the speech of the hon. gentleman who has just sat down differed in two respects from the general character of the debate; in the first place because he has drawn not from the Blue Book but from his own imagination for the facts he has laid before the House, and, secondly, because the general tone of his speech has been in direct contradiction to the general tone of the speeches that preceded it. I am glad to recognise from the speech of the right hon. gentleman who opened this debate, and from the speeches of almost all hon. members who succeeded him, that there has been a general desire to inform the country of the facts of this unfortunate incident, without endeavouring to create any party prejudice, either on the one side or the other, or to direct public attention in condemnation of any official. Among the speeches delivered on the other side of the House there has been one rather general complaint, and that complaint has been that Her Majesty's Government have not hitherto presented their final judgment upon all the facts of the case, and the right hon. gentleman asks that any despatch the Secretary of State might be ready to write towards the Government of India upon the whole of this case should be at once presented to this House. Now, sir, I am bound to say the difficulties in the way of any general view at this moment are very great. In the first place there is more than one inquiry going on. We know perfectly well from what the Viceroy has told us that he has instituted inquiries into the various aspects of this case, and he has not hitherto communicated to us, nor has he yet received, the results of these inquiries. But as regards the other aspects of the case there is a very great difference of opinion among the various authorities who have to deal with it. Unfortunately, many of those who might have contributed valuable testimony on one side or the other are dead, and in deference to that calamity which has fallen upon them there is a general reluctance on the part of the right hon. gentleman who opened the debate, and on the part of everyone who has followed, towards speaking of them or making anything like an attack upon those who are not in a position to answer for themselves. We, therefore, approach this subject under circumstances of very considerable difficulty: but we recognise fully the responsibility which rests upon the Government of the day in England to express an opinion on the action of the Government in India. The general rule we know perfectly well is this. The Government of India has to act upon its own responsibility. There have been exceptions—unfortunate exceptions, where Governments in this country have ordered the Government in India to carry out a particular policy in India without either consulting them or allowing due weight to the opinions put forward. I regret any such case, because I believe in the main it is best to throw the responsibility entirely upon the action of the Government of India, the Government of this country to remain a court of review which, when it has received all the facts and circumstances connected with any case, can write out to India and express from this country the deliberate opinion of the Secretary of State for India in Council upon the action which the Government of India has taken. The Government in this country and the Government of India in Council do not shrink from that responsibility. So soon as the facts are fully before them they are fully prepared and indeed determined to write out to India a general review of all the circumstances of the case expressing their opinion, and asking such questions as they think the circumstances of the case may demand. Now, sir, the right hon. gentleman, the member for Stirling (Mr. Campbell Bannerman), who spoke in the course of the debate, alleged that the questions that had been put by the right hon. member for Derby had not been answered by the Under Secretary of State. Well, I took a very careful note of those questions, and though, of course, I am not able to say whether the answers were altogether satisfactory to hon. gentlemen opposite, this at least I will say—that there was no question which the right hon. gentleman put forward in his speech which the Under Secretary did not attempt to approach in the course of his speech. I beg pardon, I think there was one. The right hon. gentleman in the

course of this debate spoke of this affair as one in which a British force had been cut up. I should like to say to the House one thing of which they are probably unaware. We have heard of this affair altogether in terms of the grossest exaggeration, and it may be a surprise to many hon. members to learn that after all the result of the unfortunate affair which took place in Manipur was this—that only twenty-five men of our forces in India were either killed or were missing. The total loss in the affair at Manipur—with the exception of course of the unfortunate masacre of some English officers taken prisoners afterwards—amounted to only twenty-five killed and missing. I should like, and I am sure I desire, to approach this subject from the point of view of the points which are admitted, and the points which are disputed, and it is very desirable indeed that we should all entirely appreciate what facts are admitted and what facts still remain in substantial dispute between us. First of all, it is substantially admitted that the Government of India had the right to interfere in the affairs of Manipur. That has not been disputed by any speaker who has taken part in the debate, and it is undoubtedly the right of the Government, not only in consequence of their special arrangements with the State of Manipur, but also because of their paramount power in India, to interfere, when they think it necessary, in the affairs of a State situated such as Manipur is. It is very satisfactory, therefore, to be able to stand on firm ground so far. The Government of India, whether right or wrong in what they did, had a right to interfere at any rate in the affairs of Manipur. Secondly, I think it is admitted on all hands that for the mode of carrying out their policy the Government of India cannot be held to be responsible. I do not think any speaker to-night has substantially disputed that proposition. There was one idea put toward, I rather think by the Member for Aberdeen (Mr. Bryce), that it was quite wrong on the part of the Government of India to send Mr. Quinton at all to Manipur, and that what had been done at Manipur might very well have been carried out by Mr. Grimwood, who was a man of considerable experience and might have carried out all the arrangements without the interference of Mr. Quinton. Well, I want to know how it is possible for any right hon. gentleman opposite to argue any such point as that, because on the one hand they tell us that it is an affair so small that Mr. Grimwood might very well have carried it out without Mr. Quinton's interference, and on the other hand they tell us that it was so important that it ought to have been referred to England for settlement by the Government in England. These two contentions are utterly contradictory. I believe the facts of the case really to be this:—As a rule it is very desirable if you can to deal with the matter on the spot. It is also desirable when a matter comes before the Government in India, that the Government of India should be trusted to carry out that policy. The number of instances in which reference ought to be made in matters affecting a feudatory State in India—before action is taken—through the Governments of this country is exceedingly small. That being so, with that exception, I have not heard any objection taken to the proposition I have laid down as to the mode of carrying out of a policy adopted, and which the Government of India is not responsible for. I do not think I am called upon nor am I ready to defend the military arrangements that took place. I am not dealing in particular with the number of troops, or with the question of ammunition, because I think a great deal might be said on both these subjects in very great contradiction of many of the criticisms passed in this country upon the action of the authorities in India. But upon the general disposition of the military forces, and the general action taken in that respect in the expedition to Manipur, I cannot help feeling that there is a great deal that requires explanation, and there is a great deal that with any explanation it will be exceedingly difficult to defend. (Hear, hear.) Now I come to the second point in which an attack has been made upon the mode in which the policy of the Government of India has been carried out—I allude to the arrest, or the proposed arrest, in durbar. Anybody who has read what has passed, and anybody who has listened to the debate to-night must be perfectly aware that on this subject there is a very great difference of opinion among the highest Indian authorities. We have heard very high Indian authorities passing judgment either on the one side or the other. I heard with very great interest, for instance, my hon. friend the member for Southport (Mr. G. Curzon) who had evidently studied the Indian authorities, and who spoke, not as expressing his own opinions, but as from his study of the Indian authorities which he had obtained at the time—I heard his outspoken and frank approval of the course adopted in this respect by the Indian Government. I heard also with very great respect the opinion of my hon. friend the member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple) than whom none are entitled to speak with greater authority in this House on Indian questions. He expressed the contrary opinion. Well, that only shows the very great difficulty that anybody, in this country at any rate, must have in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion on a matter so greatly disputed between one high authority and another. At the same time I cannot help thinking that everybody ought to remember that a durbar court is not necessarily a ceremonial court. I believe myself that there is a great deal in the opinion of those authorities who point out that there are various descriptions of durbars. There are durbars that are purely ceremonial, where nobody would dream for a moment of attempting anything like what is suggested in this case. There are durbars that are not ceremonial, but are practically courts, held for the purpose of announcing the orders of the Government of India. That was the kind of court to which the Senaputty and other officials were summoned—a court to hear the orders of the Government of India. Take for example the illustration of a court of justice. Suppose a man is ordered to appear and does not appear, you then issue a warrant for his arrest. In this case the men were summoned to hear the orders of the Government of India, and if they do not attend, steps must be taken to ensure their attendance.

Sir WILLIAM HARCOURT: I beg pardon, but that was not the point. The point is that they were summoned in order to be arrested.

Mr. STANHOPE: If the right hon. gentleman will forgive me, I think he will allow me to proceed with my argument in my own way. I am dealing with the point of the summons to the durbar. The summons to the durbar was for the purpose of hearing the orders of the Government of India, and so far as I am concerned, I believe the summons to the durbar for that purpose was certainly not without precedent, and might almost be described as not wholly unusual in the history of the Government of India. That being so, if any officer had attended for the purpose of hearing the orders of the Government of India the question arises, as the right hon. gentleman opposite says, whether the officers who summoned the durbar would not have the right to arrest them if they attended that durbar. That again is a point on which there is great difference of opinion.

Sir W. HARCOURT: None at all.

Mr. STANHOPE: Oh, yes; there is this difference. I think the right hon. gentleman must allow that there must be some difference of opinion if there are precedents in favour of one particular course—namely, that of arrest in such circumstances. There are precedents which the right hon. gentleman cannot dispute on this matter; and that being so, he cannot for a moment say that it is not a matter capable of argument both on the one side and the other. Now, I venture to say with the greatest respect, having no personal experience in the matter to speak upon it, I venture to say that on the whole I think the Government of this country are inclined to agree with the Government of India as to the possible legality of the course that was pursued. Precedents prove that it was a legal course in certain circumstances, but they also prove that in the particular case in which it is exercised must depend upon the particular circumstances surrounding it. There is nothing, certainly, in what has taken place that reflects the smallest stain either upon the Government of India, or upon the officer who took this course without reference to or sanction of the Government of India. What the Government of India has done is that they have approved of the case in the circumstances to which it was applicable; and in that opinion we concur. Whether that was the course that would have recommended itself to the Government of this country, if they had been applied to, is a matter which I can answer in this way: Supposing my right hon. friend the Secretary of State having, as he now has, the facts before him, had been asked whether or not it was a course it was desirable to adopt, he would have replied, it is not the course which in his opinion ought to have been adopted. (Opposition cheers.) Now, I pass to the further question, which is really in dispute between us, the question of the wisdom of the policy itself. What grounds are there for saying that the policy adopted was not a wise one? I should say it would be somewhat presumptuous on the part of any individual in this House, who could have but little knowledge indeed——

Sir W. HARCOURT: We have the Blue Book.

Mr. STANHOPE: Of the precise circumstances prevailing in Manipur, to say that the Government of India, who had at its disposal the best information on the subject, and were able to decide on the spot, with full knowledge of all the circumstances to say that that Government was wrong in adopting the particular course it did adopt. (Hear, hear.) I believe we will do wisely to place the responsibility on the Government of India, and to admit that, with very imperfect knowledge, to control the action of the Government of India in such a case as this would be wrong; but, of course, the argument is a perfectly fair one, that if the policy of the Government of India was wise, why was it not adopted at once? Why did they not at once propose to get rid of the usurpers at Manipur and replace the Maharaja. Well, of course, I think we are all agreed in this House that if it was possible for the Government of India to have proceeded at once in the matter it would have been much better. But I would point out to the House two considerations. First of all, that the approval of the Government by the Regent and the Senaputty was purely and entirely provisional. They were distinctly told that they were allowed to retain the Government which they had assumed solely until the further orders of the Government of India were received, and although the interval was a long one before the orders were given, still they had the fullest warning that they had to abide by the orders of the Government of India. The second consideration is this. Any delay that occurred at Calcutta was caused entirely by the desire of the Viceroy first of all to do justice to the ex-Maharaja. He wished to hear everything what he had to say. He gave him the fullest opportunity of making any complaint he had to make against the course the Government were taking. The Viceroy also desired to hear in the fullest manner the views of Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton as to the policy to be adopted. What the Viceroy and his Council desired in the first instance was to replace the ex-Maharaja. Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton said that was not the policy they were inclined to support and they wished that it should not be adopted. It took a considerable time to argue the question. Everybody knows very well that the complaints had to be referred to the various parties and the whole had to be fully considered at Calcutta, and after the fullest consideration the Viceroy decided to give up his own opinion and adopt the opinion thrust upon him by Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood. Then, when the Government of India is charged with not forming an opinion on the spot, I should like to know what a Government could do more than confess itself convinced upon the whole by the arguments which its agents put forward, abandoning the idea of putting up the Maharaja and accepting the course proposed by their own agents. The right hon. gentleman the member for Stirling Burghs (Mr. Campbell Bannerman) said that that was all very well, but the Government of India should have withdrawn the proposal to withdraw the Senaputty. But that meant this, that the Government of India ought to allow the revolt at Manipur to remain successful and untouched, and the authority of the Senaputty unassailed. That was an absolutely impossible course. It was absolutely essential to mark the sense of the authority of the Government of India as the paramount power. Nobody doubts that the Senaputty was the author of the revolt. I shall quote the authority of General Johnston and General Gurdon, residents at Manipur, both of whom are agreed in their views on that subject. The Government of India must have felt that there could be no peace in Manipur if they left the Jubraj reigning with the Senaputty at his side. They knew the Senaputty was a kingmaker, and that he would have afterwards made himself king. The result would have been that no native chief could have relied on the promises of the Government of India to sustain him in the position in which they placed him if the Government had allowed this revolt to pass unnoticed. I do not think, therefore, there was any alter-

native if the Government of India desired to prevent the necessity of leaving the Senaputty to be a public danger to the interests of the State in Manipur. I beg pardon—there is possibly one alternative, but that is the alternative suggested by Mr. Quinton. Mr. Quinton suggested that there should be an inquiry beforehand. Now, let anybody consider that for a moment. Here is a man in a position of paramount authority in Manipur with the power of life and death over all the people, and we are told that the agent of the Government of India is to go to Manipur and hold an inquiry into his conduct. How could you hold such an inquiry, and, if you did, how could you get witnesses to tell the truth on one side or the other? Certainly the only course that could be taken, if an inquiry was held, was the course which would be taken in any other case. If you inquire into the conduct of any officer you begin by suspending him from his duties, and that would have been the only course to adopt in the Senaputty's case. Therefore, it seems to me that although the policy under all the circumstances of the case was exceedingly difficult to decide upon, and still more difficult for us at this distance, and not understanding all the circumstances of the case, to pronounce upon, yet we are able to say with confidence that the course adopted was alike honourable to the Government and honourable to this country. It was a policy which asserted the right of the Government of India, and, as I think, the hon. member for Evesham (Sir R. Temple) said, was one likely to give confidence in the various native States in India. The general effect, therefore, of that policy was good, and we see no reason whatever to question or disapprove of it. The hon. member for Aberdeen (Mr. Bryce) in his speech raised two very important points. I am sorry to say I was not present when he made his speech; but, from what I hear, it must have been an exceedingly valuable contribution to this debate. He suggested that instead of the existing Foreign Secretary, there should be a man in a high position and a member of the Council, who should act as adviser to the Viceroy on foreign questions. I think there is a great deal to be said for that suggestion. It is not one on which any action can now be taken, but it is deserving of consideration, and the hon. member's reference to it makes it a subject which I think the Viceroy in Council ought carefully to consider. When the hon. member proposed that the policy of the Indian Government in relation to the various dependent States should be more carefully watched in this country I very much doubt the wisdom of that policy. We have in this House so little knowledge of the relations of India with the various dependent States, that I think that, except in exceptional cases, we should leave the Government of India to deal with them, and not interfere with it unnecessarily. I say, therefore, in conclusion that as far as we can understand all the circumstances of this case, whilst we are aware that we cannot defend in every respect and in all details the conduct of every actor in this matter, we do not on the other hand desire at this moment to apportion any blame. We propose at a later period to issue a general review of the opinion entertained in this country of the policy adopted by the Government of India, and we undoubtedly propose also on that general review to address certain inquiries to India as to certain points on which further light may be necessary. But, taking it as a whole, we say the policy of the Viceroy and the action founded upon that policy deserves our confidence. We are prepared to give the Viceroy that confidence, and we have every reason to believe that his answer to our inquiries based upon the further attention he will be able to give to all the facts of the case, will clear up a good many points which at present are obscured, and will prove that his policy, although unfortunate and ending in a disaster which I do not for a moment attempt to depreciate, has been devised and carried out for the best interests of the Empire over which he rules. (Cheers).

Sir W. HARCOURT: I have trespassed so long already on the indulgence of the House that I shall be very brief in what I have to say. To a great degree the object of this motion has been attained. The right hon. gentleman who has just sat down, has stated that the Government in England, represented by the Secretary of State and the Cabinet, will review the whole of these transactions and pronounce their judgment upon them. That I think is a matter of the very first importance. I am very little solicitous to go into controversial points now. I am thinking a great deal more of the effect that this discussion is to have in India than of the effect, the temporary effect perhaps, on opinion here in England. This discussion, and the principles which have been enunciated in it, will have a permanent effect in India. I have therefore looked with great anxiety to the language and to the principles asserted from the Government bench upon this subject. I was a little anxious at first when I heard the Secretary for War speaking on the subject of durbar. I regard that as a matter of enormous importance in our relations to the native princes of India. I don't know what the precedents are to which the right hon. gentleman referred, but I have had the opportunity since this question has been before the English mind of conversing with a great many persons of the highest experience. I have not met one who has not expressed his regret at, and condemnation of, these transactions or rather intended transactions. There have been mentioned to-night similar instances on the rough and rude frontier superintended by Sir Robert Sandeman. Those are the only instances of such transactions that I have ever heard of. Though I cannot agree with the Secretary for War that the Viceroy's telegram while asserting the legality generally disapproved of its application in this instance, I am perfectly satisfied with the declaration of the right hon. gentleman that if the thing had been submitted to the Secretary of State in England it would have been disapproved and discouraged, and I hope that will be a remark which will prevent a recurrence of such a transaction in India for ever hereafter. So much as to the question of the durbar which, after all, is only a subsidiary one. Though I do not agree with the right hon. gentleman as to the policy adopted in regard to the Senaputty—I confess it seems to me an erroneous policy—I can quite conceive that there should be a great difference of opinion on the subject. I quite agree that you ought not to condemn a person in the situation of the Governor-General of India on doubtful questions of policy upon which differences of opinion may be entertained; but there is a far graver matter which has taken place to-night which makes it more essential than ever that the opinion of the English Government in its most solemn form should be expressed. That is, I am sorry to say, the necessity for condemning and repudiating the grounds upon which the Under-Secretary has stated that the Senaputty should be removed. If these grounds are to be admitted, if they are to be acknowledged and adopted by the English Government, I see nothing but misfortune in the near future. The member for North Kensington said that it was not because he was an able man, but because he was a man of violent temper, that he was condemned. That was not, unfortunately, the language that was held by the Under-Secretary. Unfortunately, the words used by the Under-Secretary for India are already in print and to-morrow they will be known in every part of India. I could have understood the ground taken up, and I suppose was intended to be taken up, by the Government of India, although I call it an unfortunate ground, that the Senaputty's former character was bad. That was a ground on which I was sorry to hear my hon. friend the member for Southport speaking in the heated language which he used. That the Senaputty, tried according to the standard of English opinion, was not a man of admirable character I am ready to admit; but the Government of India had for years permitted that man to occupy the highest position in the government of Manipur. It was not the unauthorised act of Mr. Grimwood or of Mr. Quinton to acknowledge the Senaputty. The Government of India had deliberately acknowledged him as Senaputty, that is as Commander-in-Chief of the army in Manipur, for years under the late Maharaja; and it is all too late in order to justify a policy of this kind to produce acts of former years which they have condoned. But I pass to the reason given by the Under Secretary for India, in a tone which I confess I regret, for these imputations which fill up the latter part of the Blue Book, viz., that they had only been advanced by the Government of India because it was only language like that used in political conflicts. The Government of India ought not to regard itself as entering upon a political conflict with a man in the position of the Senaputty, and still less to launch at him in these circumstances charges founded in such a spirit. But a far graver thing was the language in which the Under Secretary justified the removal of the Senaputty. It was not because he was a violent man, it was not because he was a cruel man; it was because he was an able and an independent man.

Sir JOHN GORST: I do not think the right hon. gentleman would wish to misrepresent me. I have already interrupted a speaker on this point to say that the ground for the Senaputty's removal was, as I stated, that he was a man of a character dangerous to the peace of the Manipur State.

Sir W. HARCOURT: Yes, I agree; but what was the nature of the danger? The nature of the danger was the evidence of his ability and the independence of his character. What was that reference to the only safe principle which can be adopted in the Government of India? I do not know that he would want it to be applied to the Government of England also. But what was this panegyric upon mediocrity if it was not a censure, if it was not a satire, if it was not a sarcasm, yes, a sarcasm, against ability and against independence. If the statement enunciated by the right hon. gentleman is to go forth as the views of the English Government with reference to the administration of India, I think it is capable of and will result in most disastrous consequences. I spoke of the public opinion which is growing in India. It is growing under your civilisation, it is growing under that education which you have given to the native races; and when you state in the seat of authority in England that a disability for that administration in India is to be found in the ability of the native races, is to be found in their independence, and that the Government of India is to be likened to the policy of Tarquinius Superbus, it is high time that the Cabinet should consider their review of the transactions that they are about to make. The Government of India have found three defenders to-night. First of all was the Under Secretary, and he compares them to Tarquinius Superbus. He was followed by the member for Southport; and he likened the English durbar to the policy of the Court of Louis XI. of France; and, then, as if these illustrations were not complete there rises the member for North Kensington and says that the policy of Lord Lansdowne in India was that of Nebuchadnezzar towards Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego. Well may the Viceroy of India say "Defend me from my friends." If you should have a joint defence offered from these benches——

Sir ROPER LETHBRIDGE: I am very unwilling to interrupt the right hon. gentleman, but I should like to say that I never really compared Lord Lansdowne's policy to that of Nebuchadnezzar. I simply used it as an illustration of the kind of durbar which I understood had been held by Nebuchadnezzar, who called together his captains and generals, and bands of music, and arrested Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego.

Sir W. HARCOURT: Precisely what I understood. In order to defend the policy of the durbar the hon. member for North Kensington, with his profound acquaintance with Indian customs, said that these were the Eastern habits and practices, and were exemplified in the conduct of Nebuchadnezzar in summoning Shadrach, Meshach and Abednego to his durbar, and without notice seizing them. Now that is the sort of line which was taken up. I think it unfortunate; and I desire that in this debate there should go very different language to India. It is not by raking up precedents of ancient times, which no man approves, that we wish to see the British rule defended and sustained in Indian opinion. I hope that these views will not be adopted. I hope, on the contrary, we shall lead the Indian races to believe that we value ability, that we value independence, in them. I do not myself see why, if the Senaputty was an able and an independent man when these revolutions took place, he should not have properly succeeded himself to the throne. It has been explained by the Secretary for War that the Senaputty was removed as a danger and a cause of disturbance in Manipur, and he has said that you ought to rely upon the opinion of the people on the spot in judging of these matters. I am entirely in favour of relying upon the judgment of the people on the spot, but Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton upon the spot said most distinctly that the Senaputty was a great security for peace. It is said in the most express terms, in a

passage which I have already quoted, but to which I will again refer: "The Senaputty is his youngest brother. The present Government has now been in existence for nearly six months, and is conducted with tranquillity. It has shown itself in various ways amenable to the advice of the Political Agent, and has, as already reported, met the views of the Government of India with regard to the Manipur levy." That does not bear out the assertion of the member for North Kensington that the Senaputty was an enemy of the British Government. He was nothing of the kind. He was ready to act in the most perfect accord in support of the English power, and you have the testimony of men of experience on the spot that his rule and influence in Manipur had contributed to the strength of English authority and to the peace of the state of Manipur. Therefore, if it is to be put upon the ground that this man was a danger, except perhaps as Pretender to the Throne—which I do not deny—to the peace of the State in respect of his being adverse to English authority or creating disturbances in Manipur, that is absolutely contrary to all the evidence upon the face of it. Of course if that danger is to be accepted, you will have in the native States no man of any ability, no man of independence. If their heads according to the illustration of the Under-Secretary are to be cut off like the poppies of Tarquinius, then I say that that is a policy unworthy of the English nation and will be ultimately fatal to the British rule. In my opinion you ought to take a policy exactly the opposite. If you find men of ability and independence who are ready to act with you, who are ready to support your power, you should gladly welcome and embrace them, instead of laying down what I will call a cowardly principle, a principle which has no reliance and no support in that which is best and most worthy in the peoples you govern. If you accept a principle of that kind you never can govern these great populations growing every day in intelligence and power, and you will weaken your policy in your Indian Empire. It is in my own opinion in embracing principles entirely the opposite that you must look forward to the strengthening and continuing of that Empire which is the chief glory of the British rule.

Sir J. GORST: I hope the House will allow me a few words by way of personal explanation in consequence of what I consider the very unfair interpretation put by the right hon. gentleman the Member for Derby upon some general observations in the course of my speech. If the matter concerned only myself individually I would be content to leave it to the judgment of those who may read what I said, to see whether the words I used could fairly bear the construction put upon them by the right hon. gentleman, but inasmuch as I have been speaking here as the Under-Secretary of State for the Indian Department, and inasmuch as the interpretation the right hon. gentleman thought fit to put upon my words might do mischief in India, and I think the right hon. gentleman himself said he thought it would do so, I should like expressly to deny that I ever asserted such a doctrine as that the Government of India in the Native States should be conducted on the principle of suppressing ability or independence. What I said was that the reason which justified the Government of India in removing the Senaputty, and what would justify the Government of India in removing any native prince, magnate, or official from any of the protected native States was not only that the Senaputty was able and independent, but also that he was a man who was prepared to act and who did act in defiance of the paramount Power. I particularly called attention to the fact that he effected a revolution without the leave of the paramount Power, that he put a Maharaja on the throne without consultation with the paramount Power, and, I said, using almost the language of the despatch from the Government that such a state of things could not be endured, that it was necessary to show we were masters, and it was for that reason and that reason only that the expulsion of the Senaputty from Manipur was justified.

Mr. CREMER (Shoreditch, Haggerston): I have not the slightest desire to prolong a debate which on the whole I think will be productive of excellent results. The impression of the speech of the right hon. gentleman the Under Secretary produced upon I must say was exactly of the character described by the right hon. gentleman the member for Derby, but as to the difference between the right hon. gentlemen I will not attempt to decide. I have only risen to make an appeal to the Government to ask them whether they are willing to exercise the power and authority with which they are clothed to act in a spirit of clemency towards the Senaputty. He has been condemned to death by a tribunal concerning the composition of which I will not venture to express an opinion, but there are very grave doubts in the minds of his countrymen as to his guilt or complicity in guilt. It is quite clear from the debate, and the admission has been made by those who have defended the Government of India, that a series of grave blunders were committed by somebody, and I think it is clear from a perusal of these despatches that the Senaputty had always been anxious to act in a spirit of harmony with the British Government, and it is open to doubt whether actual hostilities commenced from the attack of the troops under his command or of the British force. It is quite clear that the Senaputty had word of the intention to capture and punish him, and he resisted, and I think though I am not well acquainted with the rules of warfare and have no desire for the knowledge, I think the Senaputty was perfectly justified in offering resistance to the attempt to capture him. I have not the slightest doubt in my own mind that there was an intention to capture him treacherously, though I know that is not the view entertained by hon. members opposite and seeing that there is no proof that the Senaputty is a villain of the character depicted by the hon. member for Southport, and acted practically in self-defence in evading capture, I put it to the right hon. gentleman and the Government to exercise that clemency they have the power to exercise, and to spare the life of the Senaputty until a full enquiry has been completed into all the errors of the case.

Question put.

Resolved: "That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty praying that she will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid [illegible] this House, further correspondence relating to Manipur."

June 18.

THE ENGLISH FACTORY BILL.

In the course of his speech, Mr. MACLEAN said: The hon. member for Poplar (Mr. Sydney Buxton) taunted him with having proposed in the House that the age of factory children in India should be raised in accordance with the resolutions of the Berlin Conference. But the inclusion of the half time system was the essence of the whole thing. The Indian Government refused at that time to raise the age to ten years: they would only raise it to nine and that was an example of the impracticability of governing the hours of labour or wages in this country by any international obligations whatever. These conferences were practically of no use. When we could not carry out in our own dependencies against the remonstrances of the people there, a resolution that we wished to carry out in order to raise the level of industrial employment in that country to the English, what hope had we that any resolution of the kind would ever be effectually carried out in foreign countries?

THE OPIUM TRADE.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH (Flintshire): I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for India, whether his attention has been drawn to the following paragraph in the 25th statement exhibiting the moral and material progress and condition of India, pp. 78, 79: "The principal change in the Punjab excise system during the year was the enactment of new opium rules under which the acreage fee was raised from half a rupee to two rupees per acre in order to check the production of small quantities of unexcised opium for home consumption. It is proposed also to close the Chundoo shops where prepared opium is smoked upon the premises, as the existence of these houses tends to spread the vice of smoking opium which is of recent origin in most parts of the Punjab:"

Whether the Government will draw the attention of the authorities in other parts of India to the desirability of closing the shops where prepared opium is smoked on the premises, as has already been proposed in the Punjab:

Whether he will lay upon the table of the House the new opium rules of the Punjab:

And, whether he can state the extent of acreage in poppy cultivation in the Punjab during the last ten years?

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): The passage contained in the first paragraph of the hon. member's question is accurately quoted from a paper presented to Parliament last year. The local Government has reduced the opium smoking licenses, and is considering further reductions. The attention of the Government of India will be invited to the hon. member's question. I shall be happy to show the hon. member the new opium rules, and he can then consider whether it is necessary to lay them on the table. I will also show the hon. member a ten years' statement of poppy cultivation.

June 19.

CASE OF BULWUNT RAO.

Mr. KEAY (Elgin and Nairn): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether his attention has been called to the case of Bulwunt Rao, formerly an official of the Indore State, for whose arrest a warrant was recently obtained from the Residency Magistrate at Indore, at the instance of the Maharaja Holkar, the Ruler of Indore, or one of his officials, on a charge of having written a letter in a local newspaper commenting on certain proceedings of the Maharaja, the said Bulwunt Rao living at the time at Ujain, a town in the Gwalior State, in which the warrant could not be legally executed. The warrant was nevertheless entrusted to a body of police in the service of the Ruler of Indore, who seized and barbarously murdered Bulwunt Rao on the 19th ultimo in the streets of Ujain;

And, whether he can inform the House what steps the Government of India are taking in the matter?

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): No, sir; the Secretary of State has no such information.

Mr. KEAY: Will the right hon. gentleman make inquiries?

Sir J. GORST: Yes, if the hon. member will give me any data to go upon, or the authority upon which he makes the statement. I do not think that the Secretary of State ought to be asked to make inquiries upon his own authority into a matter of this kind.

COST OF INDIAN COLLEGES.

Mr. KING (Hull, Central): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether he will lay upon the Table a Return showing the capital cost of the four Indian Colleges at Roorki, Seepoor, Poona, and Madras, their annual expenditure and amount of their return in the shape of fees, and the number of annual Government appointments.

Sir J. GORST: The Secretary of State will be glad to give the information asked for by the hon. gentleman, but it has to be obtained from India, and some time may elapse before it can be laid on the Table.

HOUSE OF LORDS. June 22.

MANIPUR.

The MARQUIS OF RIPON rose to call attention to recent occurrences in Manipur, and to move for further papers. His Lordship said: My lords, in accordance with the notice that I have placed upon your lordships' Table, I rise to call attention to the papers which have lately been laid before us with relation to the affairs of Manipur. I believe your lordships will not think that I am wrong in taking this course in a case in which such sad occurrences have taken place as those which have happened in the State of which I am about to speak. Several valuable lives of civil and military servants of the Government have been sacrificed, and a force of our Indian troops has received a repulse. Under those circumstances, it is, I think, only right that in this, as in the other House of Parliament, the questions connected with these affairs should be discussed and considered. And

indeed, my lords, in this House, apart from the fact that we have here many noble lords especially qualified to speak upon Indian questions, we have an advantage which is not possessed by the other House of Parliament at the present moment, for we have amongst us the noble lord the Secretary of State for India, who can give, with an authority to which none else can pretend, an explanation of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this question. And, my lords, if this was the view which I took of the matter when I first placed this notice on the paper, I am more convinced than ever now, after some strange declarations that have been made in another place, of the necessity of entering upon the consideration of these questions in the House of Lords. I am perfectly aware how very easy it is to be wise after the event, and it is with a constant recollection of that fact that I hope to address myself to the consideration of these proceedings; and of course, having filled the office that I have filled in India, I know well many difficulties which beset questions of this kind, and the complications in which they are involved. The State, the affairs of which we have to discuss to night, is one of those which are called in the common Indian parlance, though the term is not perhaps historically accurate, feudatory States. It is a small State, probably until these events took place very little known to your lordships, unless indeed some of you may have heard of it as the birthplace of the game of polo; but it is a protected State, which has been under our protection for a considerable time, and where we have had for long a Political Agent to represent us. In the year 1851 the Government of India took a step, in guaranteeing the then Maharaja—or the Raja, as I think he was called—in the possession of his State, which made somewhat closer the connection with that State than it had been before. There is little remarkable in the condition of Manipur except in one respect, that succession to the gaddi, as it is called in India, or the throne, is based upon a peculiar system. When there are a series of brothers they succeed one after the other—not the son of the Maharaja, but his brother succeeds him, and so the succession goes on until the last of the brothers is exhausted, and then it is his son and not the son of the elder brother who succeeds to the throne. I need not point out to your lordships what a complicated succession this is, and how very likely it is to raise difficulties and complications; and so it has done on many occasions in Manipur. Difficulties have arisen, domestic quarrels have taken place, palace revolutions have occurred, and it is out of one of these palace revolutions that the present difficulty has arisen. As those who have read the papers are well aware, on the night of the 22nd September last an attack was made upon the then Maharaja by some of his brothers; shots were fired at the palace; he was seized with a great alarm and fled to the protection of the British political agent, Mr. Grimwood. His alarm was such that it appears his first thought was to quit the country. Mr. Grimwood supposed that he intended to abdicate, and that he had actually abdicated. The Maharaja now contests that matter; but there seems, at all events, to be no doubt that he did intend to retire from Manipur, and he immediately took steps to do so; and, with the consent of those who had overthrown his authority and rebelled against him, he upon the following day left the city of Manipur and proceeded to British territory. This occurrence was at once reported by telegraph to the Chief Commissioner of Assam. Your lordships will understand that the political agent of Manipur is under the orders of the Chief Commissioner of Assam. He is generally one of the officers of the Assam Commission, and he serves under that Chief Commissioner, whose authority is, to a certain extent, as it were, interposed between him and the Government of India. Mr. Grimwood immediately reported these occurrences to his chief, who forwarded information of them by telegraph to the Government of India. Upon the 25th of September—that is to say, three days after the events of which I have been speaking—Mr. Grimwood forwarded a full account of what had taken place, together with his views upon the subject, to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, who did not, however, transmit that paper in full, so far as we officially know, to the Government of India until after the lapse of a considerable period. There is nothing in the papers to show what was the cause of that delay. Mr. Quinton's letter is dated the 31st of December, and the delay of course was considerable. There is nothing to show whether the Government of India communicated by telegraph or otherwise with Mr. Quinton during that period, except one single telegram at the commencement. We have therefore to conjecture as best we can what may have been the cause of this very considerable delay. But Mr. Quinton did take one step during that period, as I understand, which was a step of very considerable importance, as bearing upon the ultimate decisionto be arrived at. Mr. Quinton reports to the Government of India (and the words are important): "The Jubraj"—that is, the Regent as he became afterwards, the elder brother of the Maharaja—"whose nomination by the Maharaja as his successor on his demise had been sanctioned by the Government of India, has since carried on the government of the country, having been recognized as Regent by the Political Agent under the orders of the Chief Commissioner." Now, my lords, here is clear proof that the person whom we have since been in the habit of calling the Regent was acknowledged as Regent by order of the Chief Commissioner shortly after the palace revolution took place. There is nothing in Mr. Quinton's words about a preliminary acknowledgment, pending the decision of the Government of India. That is stated in a subsequent letter, but it appears to me to be a gloss which was put upon Mr. Quinton's statement. That statement is broad and unmistakeable. The Regent was "recognized as Regent by the Political Agent under the orders of the Chief Commissioner." These matters came under the consideration of the Government of India, and they took no doubt a considerable time—a very long time, I think—to come to a decision about them. I am not at all inclined to say that matters of this kind should be decided hastily. No doubt the Government of India were quite right to seek the views of their local officers and not to come to a hasty decision upon a question of importance. But, on the other hand, a delay of four months is a very considerable delay, and it had in this case, as I think I shall be able to show your lordships, one effect of importance, namely, that it rendered it extremely difficult to adopt one of the attitudes which might have been adopted by the Government of India if they had determined to act upon it immediately or shortly after the receipt of the intelligence of the revolution. They wrote upon the 24th January, and then proposed an inquiry by Mr. Quinton upon the spot, and appeared to point towards the restoration of the old Maharaja. Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood had both previously expressed their opinion against the restoration of the old Maharaja. They held him to be a weak man, incompetent to rule the country, and they had also said that he could not be put back except by force. Their conclusion was distinctly and clearly that the true course to take was to recognise the palace revolution, to acknowledge the *status quo*, and to leave things in the condition in which they were after that revolution was carried out. In accordance with that view, the Government of India hesitated to restore the old Maharaja; but they ultimately determined to take a different course, upon which I shall have more to say in a few moments. Mr. Quinton in the meantime had got to Calcutta. He entered no doubt into communications of which there is, naturally, no record, with the Government of India and the Foreign Office, and although he acquiesced in the course which the Government ultimately determined to take, there is nothing in these Papers to show that either Mr. Grimwood or Mr. Quinton did change their opinions or did really give their approval (and I venture to say that I distinctly believe that neither of them did give his approval) to a portion at all events of the policy which the Government of India ultimately adopted. Now, my lords, with respect to one question I think there can be no doubt. I have no doubt whatever that the Government of India had a right to interfere in this matter. The State of Manipur was, as I have said, a protected State. We had been in the habit for a considerable time of acknowledging the successors, the heirs to the government of the country, and the right of the government to deal with a question of this kind is to my mind complete. I go beyond that. I say it was their duty to deal with this question, because they were appealed to by both parties. They were appealed to by the old Maharaja and by the Regent who had taken his place, and they were therefore bound to give a decision upon the matter. But, my lords, it seems to me that they might have taken one of two courses. They might either have determined to restore the old Maharaja, or they might have determined to acknowledge the Regent and acquiesce in the palace revolution. There is a good deal to be said for both these courses. For the restoration of the old Maharaja there is the strong and powerful argument that it would have been a step tending to maintain the authority of a native chief whom we had ourselves acknowledged as ruler of the country. But it was objected to, and strongly objected to by the local officers, both by Mr. Quinton and by Mr. Grimwood, and it would, as it appears, undoubtedly have involved a resort to force in order to carry it out. For the other step, in a case of this kind, in which the interests of the British Government were very little directly concerned, there were all the arguments which may be adduced for an acknowledgment of accomplished facts; and there was the great advantage, that, according to the view of the local officers, that policy could have been pursued quietly, and would have involved no use of force at all. Therefore, my Lords, although strong arguments might have been adduced in favour of restoring the old Maharaja, nevertheless I am not at all inclined, to blame, or even to criticise, the Government of India, for having, upon the recommendation of their local officers, determined against that course. But I do think it is much to be regretted that they did not take one or other of these two courses—that instead of that they adopted a third course, which was neither one nor the other. I quite admit that after a delay of five months it would have been quite impossible to restore the old Maharaja, and to upset the state of things which had grown up there with the acquiescence and acknowledgment of Mr. Grimwood, who remained our political agent there. But, if that is true, then the proper course was to acknowledge that state of things. Instead of doing that the Government of India, as it seems to me, tried to adopt a compromise between these two policies, they acknowledged the revolution, and they endeavoured to punish its authors. Well, I cannot say that that course seems to me to have been a very logical one, and I certainly think, as I said before, it is easy enough to judge after the event no doubt, but still I certainly think that it has proved not to have been a wise one. It involved really all the objections to both the courses. It involved the refusal to maintain the right of the old Maharaja, and it also involved the necessity for employing force. It had the objections to both courses, and I think it had the advantages of neither. Therefore, I cannot but express regret that that course should have been adopted. But this also I will say: If it was going to be adopted, if the intention was only partially to accept the change which had taken place in Manipur, to proceed against the Senaputty as a person who had been guilty of offences that deserved punishment in regard to that revolution, then the action ought to have been speedy. There ought not to have been this delay of five months during which the government was being carried on at Manipur by the Regent and the Senaputty, but steps ought to have been taken without delay. However, my lords, assuming that this was the course to be taken, I cannot but think that it is to be regretted that the policy thus adopted was carried out in the manner which was pursued. It seems to me that it would have been far better—I think it is always better in dealing with Indian questions with native chiefs and rulers in India—for the Government to state at once, distinctly and plainly, what was the policy intended to be pursued. As soon as they had made up their minds they should have authorized our representative at Manipur to declare to the Regent what was the policy of the Government, and to call upon him to conform to it. If that had been done the Regent would have been informed that the Government were prepared to acknowledge him as Maharajah upon certain conditions; they did not think it necessary to restore the old Maharaja; they would acknowledge the new one if he conformed to the conditions which they thought fit to lay down. Then those conditions might have been communicated to him, and he would have been told: "It is for you to remove the Senaputty. It is for you to call upon him to retire, and if he refuses to retire to take steps to remove him. If you are not strong enough to carry out our wishes in that respect we will help you." But the first responsibility of

acting upon that policy ought to have been cast, in my opinion, upon the new Maharaja openly and clearly by a declaration from Mr. Grimwood. That might have avoided—I am not at all sure that it would not have avoided—the necessity for employing force at all; but if force had been necessary ultimately you would then have employed it in defence of a policy that had been fairly declared to the parties, and about which they would have had their option whether to accede to it or to resist it. Whereas it is quite evident from these purposes that the main purpose—at all events the main purpose as Mr. Quinton understood it—was the purpose of deporting or getting rid of the Senaputty. If you look at these papers your lordships will see at once that Mr. Quinton set out evidently understanding that that was his main business, and that accounts for the secrecy of his proceedings of which we have heard a good deal. That accounts for his not having communicated the orders of the Government of India earlier than he did to our representative at Manipur. That accounts for the mode in which he conducted himself up to the last day or two of these proceedings. His main object evidently, as he understood it, was to lay his hand upon the Senaputty, and I myself, I confess, trace to that mistake, as I regard it, a good many of the difficulties and evils that have arisen since. Mr. Quinton arrived at Manipur on the 22nd of March last, and then occurred that series of acts which culminated as we all know, in the unhappy massacre by which Mr. Quinton's life, as well as the lives of Mr. Grimwood, Col. Skene and others were sacrificed. I do not propose to review this part of the proceedings in detail, for this very good reason that we have no accurate information about it. The men who were concerned in them are dead; their lives have been sacrificed; they have fallen in the service of their country, and it would be unjust and ungenerous to criticise upon imperfect information the acts in which they have been engaged. But there is one point connected with this matter which I cannot help alluding to, because it has been so much brought before the public, and that is the question which has been raised in regard to Mr. Quinton's intention, as it is supposed, of arresting the Senaputty at a durbar. Now I quite admit, as I think everybody connected with India will admit, that there are durbars of different kinds. There are ceremonial durbars, and there are durbars at which the policy of the Government or intentions of the Government are declared to those who are present at them, and I see it has been stated that my friend Sir Robert Sandeman says that he has often arrested native chiefs at durbars. I have not the least doubt that that is so. Sir Robert Sandeman had to deal with a turbulent set of chiefs in Beloochistan, and I have no doubt, as he says so particularly, that he has often taken that step in the manner described. There is a great difference of opinion upon this point. I have sought counsel about it of many of those whom I knew in India, and who are now in England, and I have found great differences of opinion exist about it. But on the whole I am bound to say that I think the attempt to arrest any person at a durbar, except under some very exceptional circumstances, is an attempt to be regretted and a thing to be avoided, and I hope that the noble viscount opposite will be able to tell us to-day what are his views upon that subject, and whether he will give any general directions in respect of it when he communicates those views to the Government of India. Of one thing, my lords, I am perfectly convinced, and that is that Mr. Quinton was absolutely incapable of treacherous or unworthy conduct. I knew Mr. Quinton very well. I have a very great respect for him. He was a most upright and high-minded man and I am quite sure that any idea unworthy of a high-minded servant of the British Government never once crossed his mind. But he had got hold, as I say, of that idea, so unfortunate as I think in the conduct of this business, that his main object was to secure the Senaputty, and it was because of that that he took the course which he did, practising so much secrecy with regard to his intentions and bringing himself into a position so liable to be misrepresented, as that in which he appears to have stood. Your lordships know very well what were the results of this attempt. The Senaputty did not come to the durbar. The durbar did not take place, and then an attempt was made on the 24th of March to arrest the Senaputty by force in his palace. You know what happened; you know the fatal results; you know how our officers were seized, and how they died. As I have said I will not enter into any discussion of the details in this matter, either in their civil aspect still less in their military aspect, because perhaps I am not the best person to speak upon those matters from a military point of view. But I must say this, all that I have ever learnt of the late Colonel Skene leads me to believe that he was a very able officer, that he was a man whom the Government of India were right to trust, and who deserved their confidence. I will not touch upon the question of ammunition because the facts about it appear to be very obscure. We were distinctly told that the force which went out with Mr. Quinton had only forty rounds per man. If that was so, and if they had nothing else to rely upon, sending them out with such a small amount of ammunition was a great mistake. I think there can be no doubt about that matter. Forty rounds a man is about what is carried, I believe, by the troops who go out to guard and protect the Viceroy's carriage in a quiet district, and it would be quite inadequate for a purpose like that of Manipur; but there seems to be doubt as to whether there was a larger supply at Manipur or supposed to be there, and I will not press that matter further. I hope the noble viscount will give us any further information that he may possess on the point. But, my lords, I cannot help saying, if it is not wrong in a civilian to say it, that I greatly regret that the force was not accompanied by any guns. There are mountain guns in Assam; I believe at present each of these Goorkha regiments has two mountain guns; a mountain gun can go wherever a mule can go. It was known that the Manipuris had at least four guns; some of the accounts represent them as having had more. I do think it is to be regretted that with the force that accompanied Mr. Quinton a few of these very useful mountain guns were not sent. I believe if they had been sent, evils would have been greatly avoided. My lords, put very briefly, and compressed as much as it has been in my power to compress it, that is the view which a perusal of these papers has led me to take of the course pursued in regard to these transactions. Your lordships will see that the points upon which I have made some criticism are undoubtedly points upon which opinions may differ, and I shall wait with very great interest, as I am sure all your lordships will, to hear from the noble viscount opposite an explanation of his views upon the matter, and anything that he may have to say on behalf of the Government of India. But, my lords, I am quite sure that whatever else the noble viscount may say there is one line of defence, if defence it could be called, which he will not adopt, and against which I feel bound to enter my strongest protest. We have been told that the true explanation of the conduct of the Government of India, the real reason why they made it the principal point of their policy as they seem to have done to remove the Senaputty from Manipur, was because the Senaputty was a man of great ability and force of character: he was considered by them dangerous because he was able. It has been said also that when the Government of India spoke of the offences which the Senaputty had committed, and of criminal acts which they attributed to him, they did not mean anything by those charges; they were only said in the sort of way in which politicians in this country are perhaps too often apt to bring charges against their political opponents. It is said that they meant nothing of the sort, but that what they really did mean was that the Senaputty was able, therefore he was dangerous, and that resulted from the fact that governments have always discouraged independent and original talent, and have always promoted mediocrity. It is said that that is the true construction of the course pursued towards the Senaputty. Now, with respect to that very extraordinary statement, I have some observations to make. In the first place I must say that I think it is a great exaggeration to describe the Senaputty as a man of great ability and force of character. He was a man of more force and character than some of his brothers, who seem to have been singularly weak, but there is nothing in these papers that I can see to show that he was a man of extraordinary ability. He had a certain amount of vigour and he had a certain amount of popularity, the result apparently of lavish expenditure, but that he was a man of whom the Government of India would ever dream of being afraid appears to me to be an exaggeration of the grossest kind. Then, my lords, to say that the Government of India in their official communications brought forward charges against a native of India, a member of a native princely family in which there was no reality, which were in fact sham charges, is to my mind, I confess, an insult to my noble friend Lord Lansdowne and to his colleagues, and I should think they would resent it and repudiate it as strongly as possible. And lastly, my lords, I assert at once that the notion that the Government of India in former days or now have systematically discouraged talent and countenances only mediocrity, is altogether a libel upon the Government of India, and is altogether unsupported by facts. Events have occurred in the course of our Indian rule of which we cannot approve. Acts may have been done which we are bound to condemn, but to my mind it is untrue, and it is unfounded, to say that the great fabric of our Indian Empire, the most wonderful perhaps in some respects of any of which we read in the history of the world, has been founded upon or has been built up by the adoption of a mean and trivial policy like this. Against this, my lords, I distinctly protest. It is easy enough to produce proofs of the injustice of this accusation, I will not trouble your lordships with more than two, and two of a somewhat recent date. When my noble friend the Earl of Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and at the time when a Gaekwar of Baroda had been removed from his government for misrule, my noble friend had to provide for a new native Administration of the State of Baroda. What did he do? Did he try to find out some wretched mediocrity who would be nothing but a tool in the hands of the British Resident? Not at all. He sought for the ablest statesman possible to be found in India itself; he selected the late Madhava Rao, and selected him to be Dewan to the new ruler. Again, take the case of the late Sir Salar Jung. The Government of India had differences of opinion with Sir Salar Jung, and they expressed their opinion very frankly, but when Sir Salar Jung died (I was in India at the time myself), what was the feeling of the Government of India? Was it a feeling that an able man had been taken away who was dangerous to us, and that it was a very good thing that we had got rid of him? Exactly the reverse. We felt and we knew that Sir Salar Jung had rendered great services to the people of the Hyderabad State, and to the Nizam of the country, and we felt that we had lost in him a man of whom India might be proud, and that we should find it exceedingly difficult, as we did find it exceedingly difficult—nay, my lords, we found it impossible—to get anybody who was really fit to take his place. And then, my lords, we are to be told forsooth that this policy, this love of mediocrity, this attempt to cast down everything in the nature of intelligence or talent, is the policy of the Government of India. But, my lords, there are some persons who have been giving a very startling explanation of the utterances to which I am alluding. They have said that the speaker was not thinking at all of governments in India either past or present, but was thinking of governments nearer home. Now there have been men who have had the audacity to say that the true Tarquinius Superbus sits on the bench before me. My lords, I will not attempt to pronounce upon these delicate questions; but, and this I am sure, that the princes and the people of India will not give credence to that explanation. They do not understand the ways of public life in this country and the queer things that are sometimes done in it. They will never be persuaded to look for the Roman tyrant on the Treasury Bench. They will be sure to expect to find him enthroned on the heights of Simla. That is the mischief of these rash and cynical declarations, and a very grievous mischief it is. They will be repeated in every native newspaper in India; they will be discussed in every bazaar; they will be commented upon with pain and anxiety by our friends, and with secret triumph by our enemies; they will alarm every native prince in India, and will fill with disgust, aye, and indignation, the minds of many able men, fired with a just and natural ambition, who reside now in large numbers in that country. I am afraid, my lords, that it will be impossible altogether to get rid of the mischief effected in India of declarations of this kind made, if not with the authority, at least on behalf of Her Majesty's Government; but there is only one way in which the mischief can be stopped, that is by a clear and distinct declaration from the noble viscount opposite, which I am sure, he will give us to-night in repudiation of these doctrines. It will not be a very pleasant thing for my noble friend to have to do.

and I am very sorry to invite him to do it, but in the interests of our rule in India, aye, and I will go further, I will say for the vindication of our fair fame, it is essential that the noble lord should repudiate these doctrines, and that they should be repudiated by him to-night in clear, decisive, and unmistakable terms. Now, my lords, before I pass on to some questions connected with the future administration of Manipur, I wish to say one word upon a matter which does not arise directly out of these papers, but which has been alluded to in another place, and upon which I should like with your lordships' permission to express my opinion. It has been suggested that it would be an improvement in our system of Indian administration if a new member were added to the Council of the Governor-General, who should be specially charged with the management of foreign affairs. I deprecate any such change in the present system. The Viceroy is now and has been for a very long time at all events in direct and personal charge of the Foreign Office Department, and according to my view of the matter it is right that he should continue to be so, because I hold it to be very necessary indeed that the head of the Government should have a distinct hold and a clear knowledge of all the details of our dealings with native States. In questions of this kind (and this Manipur story seems almost to show it) it is very easy for mistakes to arise from small beginnings. What is done in one State is closely watched by all the other States, and you may give a great deal of offence to the native chiefs generally, without perhaps even thinking of it, unless you have them constantly before your minds. The Viceroy is a man who is sent out from English public life, acquainted with English feelings. He is, or at all events he ought to be, in the closest and most confidential communication with Her Majesty's Government. He knows their views not only upon Indian foreign matters but upon other foreign matters which are connected with Indian questions. He is in possession of matters of a most secret and confidential character, and I venture to say that he, and he alone, is really fit to deal with the management of native States. If he is only to deal with questions when they have been got into a difficulty or when matters of particular importance arise he will not have—he cannot have—that close and daily knowledge and interest in those questions which he ought to have, and I am quite certain that the arrangement will not work better, but rather that it will work considerably worse than the present arrangement. And another thing. I am very certain that this change, if it were made, would be highly distasteful to the native princes of India. They set great store by dealing directly with the Viceroy. They are very sensitive, and would be highly offended if anybody else was to be interposed between them and the head of the Indian Government. I would not, my lords, have perhaps touched upon this matter if it had not been that some words fell from the Secretary of State for War in another place which seemed to give some encouragement to this idea. They did not pledge the Government at all, and I hope we shall hear from my noble friend opposite that having had some few days to consider it, he is not inclined to make this change. If there was anything wrong, any mismanagement in the Foreign Office in regard to these affairs at Manipur, I venture to say that it arose from this single fact, that the Foreign Secretary, a very able Foreign Secretary he is, my friend Sir Mortimer Durand, was absent from India on sick leave during the whole of this time. But that may happen under any system, and it is no reason for changing your system, that it may have led in this particular case (I do not say it was so) to results which were lamentable. Now, I hope your lordships, will allow me a very few moments to say a few words about the future course to be pursued in regard to the State of Manipur. In the first place I would say one word about the trials that have been going on in that country. It is right, nay, it is necessary, that condign punishment should be awarded to those who have had any hand in the massacre of our officers. Upon that point I entertain no doubt whatever, but I see today stated in the newspapers—and the only information available to us upon the point is from the newspapers—that the Regent has been acquitted of any complicity in the murder of Mr. Quinton and his companions, but that he has been found guilty of what is in reality the crime of high treason, and that he has been condemned to death. Well, my lords, I fully hope and believe that the noble viscount will tell us to-night, or if he cannot do that, that he will come speedily to the conclusion, that it will not be right to carry out that death sentence in this case. The circumstances are very different indeed from those of the men who were engaged in any way in the massacre. I think to carry out that death sentence in this case would weaken the effect of the example of the punishment of the men who were concerned in the murders, and I venture to express the hope that the noble viscount will be able to draw a distinction between this case and the others and to admit the plea of mercy to a certain extent in regard to those who were not in fact engaged in the massacre. My lords, the point that I am most particularly anxious about in respect to the whole of this question is to obtain, if possible, from the noble viscount opposite a declaration as to the principle upon which he proposes to deal with Manipur in the future. I do not ask him—of course, it would be quite unreasonable—to give us any details. I do not ask him to say what member of the family he is going to put upon the gaddi. There is the old Maharaja, who never sinned against us at all events, and who never was accused of cruelty or oppression towards his people. There is his son—there may be others for aught I know—who may be available for the purpose. I ask for no information, and I express no opinion as to the detailed manner in which the principle is to be carried out. But I do most earnestly hope that Her Majesty's Government will be able to say that they do not favour the idea of annexation. There is a party in India who are always anxious for annexation, who are ready to cry out for annexation whenever opportunity offers, and they are following their usual course upon this occasion. There is nothing whatever, I am happy to say, to show that that policy is favoured either by the Government in India or by the Government at home. I do, therefore, very earnestly hope that we shall have it disavowed to-night. The native princes of India watch with the most singular closeness—perhaps it is not singular, but with the most minute closeness—every step which is taken with regard to every native State in India whatsoever. I could give you, if I had the time, many curious instances of that kind. The Princes are always on the watch. They study what is said in Parliament: they get our Blue Books read and described to them, and they know exactly the principles which we have professed and the acts which we have done, and I can assure you that the annexation of Manipur would give a great shake to the confidence of the native princes of India. They rely upon the proclamation of the Queen, in which Her Majesty's Government was advised, most wisely and justly, distinctly to disavow any desire for an increase of territory. They rely upon that, and any deviation from that policy would shake their confidence and would be very mischievous. Therefore, I do earnestly beg the noble viscount opposite to give us a statement upon that matter to-day, and I hope that he will be able to tell us that, in spite of all the complications and difficulties with which this question of Manipur is surrounded—and I do not at all desire to underrate them—Her Majesty's Government will do nothing to impair the confidence or excite the fears of the Native princes and chiefs of India, who believe that their rights now rest firmly on the gracious pledges of the royal proclamation, and that they may dwell in peace and in security under the protection of the British Crown. I beg, my lords, to move that further papers be laid before the House.

Moved,—That a humble address be presented to Her Majesty for further correspondence relating to Manipur.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Viscount Cross): My lords, I am quite sure I have nothing whatever to complain of in the way in which the noble marquis has brought forward his case upon this matter. It was undoubtedly quite right that the question should be submitted to your lordships for inquiry, and no one is more glad than myself to be able to state from my place in this House to your lordships my views of the conduct of the Government of India in this question. I think it is only right for the Government of India itself that those views should be stated, and I am one of those who regret very much that I have not had an earlier opportunity of making a statement on behalf of the Viceroy than I have to-night. Probably before I enter into the whole question of Manipur, I might be allowed to deal with those one or two points which the noble marquis raised just before he sat down. First of all as to the question of annexation, I think your lordships will agree with me when I state that before I could make any definite statement to your lordships upon that point I must wait till I hear the opinion of the Government of India, and the views which they may have to present to me for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but I have no hesitation in stating as a broad principle that I individually have not, and I am sure the Viceroy has not, the smallest wish to add to those territories in British India which we already possess, and it would only be under the most absolute necessity of annexation that we would adopt that course. For think, my lords, what it really means. It would mean in the first place probably the punishment of a great number of people who had committed no offence against us at all. It would probably throw upon us the direct responsibility for the behaviour of the savage tribes in the neighbourhood of that country. It would involve the application of the cumbrous machinery of our British law to that State, at, I think, considerable expense and considerable trouble. It would involve a very large expenditure in any case, and it would probably give rise to discontent amongst the inhabitants of that country where the collections of revenue have been very carelessly carried out, and where if they were properly carried out discontent would be quite certain to arise. And it might give rise to a feeling among the other chiefs of a mistaken idea of the policy we want to adopt towards them. But supposing that the state of facts were such as to make it an absolute necessity that we should annex Manipur, I think that even those native princes would see that the circumstances of the case were very peculiar, and could not be of general application. All I can say at the present moment, as at present advised, is, that I am decidedly against annexation—against any annexation, but I can give no opinion at all upon the annexation of this particular province until I hear the opinion of the Viceroy, and the reasons he may have to give. And I will say the same with regard to the trials. I quite admit that there is a great distinction between those persons who are found guilty of murder, or even of abetting murder, and those who are found guilty of waging war, although the latter by the Indian Code as the noble marquis knows perfectly well, is liable to be punished by death. I am quite certain that your lordships may trust to the mercy as well as to the justice of Lord Lansdowne in any recommendations that he makes in matters of this kind. His views are not likely to reach me for some little time. I understand that the Senaputty who has been condemned to death, has made an appeal to the Viceroy to be allowed to petition in his favour, and that some three weeks have been granted to him to draw up his petition. I presume the same course will be adopted in the case of the Jubraj. Therefore, some time must necessarily elapse before we know the result of his deliberations. There is only one other point that the noble marquis has mentioned which I should like to deal with before treating with the general subject, and that is the suggestion that was made in the other House the other night about a Foreign Member of the Council. That suggestion, I think, was made by someone who sat on the Opposition side of the House—Mr. Bryce. There is no doubt that the Secretary of State for War—very naturally—said that the suggestion was one that required consideration. I have considered that question in the short time that has elapsed since that debate, and the more I look upon it I must say the more I dislike it. I think that what the noble marquis has said is perfectly true, and that great evils might arise. At the same time I am very happy to state that we have taken steps already to strengthen the Foreign Department by the appointment of an Assistant Secretary at an increased salary, so that that department may practically be stronger for the future than it hitherto has been. Now, my lords, I have answered the main points of the noble marquis outside the case itself. With regard to the case of Manipur, I

should like to put my views as shortly as I can before your lordships, and also the views of the Viceroy himself. I would make this first proposition to your lordships, which I do not think anyone will dispute—namely, that it is the right and the duty of the British Government to settle the successions in all the dependent States; that every succession may be recogised by the British Government; and that no succession is valid until it has been so recognised. I believe that is a principle thoroughly understood throughout the whole of India, and one of universal application. It is a principle which is of very vital importance when we come to discuss the case a little later on. But if the principle is true in general it is more especially applicable to the State of Manipur. The State of Manipur is one practically of our own creation. Your lordships are perfectly aware of the quarrels that took place between them. In 1826 we first recognised as a ruling sovereign the Raja of Manipur. We have always interfered with the internal affairs of Manipur from that day to this. In 1833 we made a treaty with them, and by that treaty we were to have very great advantages, and to be enabled to call upon them for support and assistance in many ways; not only for making roads, but also in case of war, and in cases of disturbance and other matters. In 1834 we went so far in interfering with the State of Manipur that we ordered them to give up one of the valleys which they had taken, and hand it back to the Burmese on receiving from them a payment of something like 500 rupees a month. In 1835, when that Raja died, we recognised the infant son, and we said that he should be the Raja under his uncle, who was the Regent. Some little time afterwards the Queen-mother attempted to murder this uncle, and fled away with the infant prince. We then stepped in, and we recognised the uncle as Raja. We set aside the succession altogether and recognised the uncle. He lived and ruled till the year 1850. We then brought back the infant who had grown up and who had been guilty of no offence in former times, and we placed him upon the throne; so that we have interfered continually. In 1888 when the Raja was ill we recognised his next successor as the next in order; and during the lifetime of the last Raja, who has just run away, we again recognised the Jubraj as his successor. Nothing can be clearer than the letters themselves, both of the Maharaja who has gone and of the man who is sitting there temporarily whom we have just acknowledged. In the letters of both of them they acknowledge as absolutely as men can the actual supremacy of our ower, and request its assistance and public recognition by it. That, my lords, is the second point which I wanted to place before you. I wanted to show that when the Raja had been recognised by us, especially in Manipur, we had always found it our duty to support him against all comers. We did that especially in 1847 when the refugee prince, after the queen mother had run away, attempted to invade that country. We told them that if they stirred towards the borders of Manipur and made any distubance in that territory they must be immediately removed to Bengal. We interfered again in 1850, in 1851, and in 1852, and then it was that took place that occurrence to which the noble marquis has already alluded. We formally undertook to support the Raja against all comers, and not to allow him to be attacked in his seat or to allow any attempt to disturb him from his throne. We did so again in 1862, in 1864, and in 1866. So that, historically speaking, from the very first, especially in this State of Manipur, we have felt that it was thrown upon us to interfere whenever it was necessary with the internal affairs of that State, and the State has always acknowledged our suzerainty and our sovereignty, and the Government have interfered always to protect the ruler of that State against those who rose up against him, I feel that those propositions which I have just placed before your lordships are of great importance when we come to consider the rest of this case. Now, my lords, I come to the rising which took place in September of last year. That rising against the Maharaja in September I venture to say was an unlawful revolt if ever there was one. It was an unlawful revolt against the man who was reigning there who was recognised by us, and it was a revolt which the paramount power could not allow to succeed. We should have been perfectly justified then in marching straight into Manipur to the assistance of the Maharaja if there had been time and opportunity to do so. What was the first thing that Mr. Quinton did? Mr. Grimwood telegraphed to Mr. Quinton the moment this disturbance had taken place. That was on the 22nd September. He telegraphed to him on the 22nd September and told him what had taken place, and the answer of Mr. Quinton at once was: "You can apply for troops at Kohima. You can employ your troops in support of the Maharaja"—that is the policy we have always pursued in this State of Manipur—"and if the Maharaja of Manipur is threatened by his subjects and this revolt there are the troops for you to support him just as we supported the former Maharaja." And there can be little doubt that if that Maharaja had remained where he was those troops would have gone, and he would have been replaced on the throne; and there can be no doubt, at the same time, if that had taken place the Senaputty would have been punished as a man who was dangerous to the peace of the State. I do not think your lordships can imagine for a moment that there would be the smallest doubt that that would have been the result if it had not been for one particular circumstance, and that was that the Maharaja was so frightened with what had gone on in the palace and by the fear of the Senaputty, his brother, that he ran away. What was the origin of this revolt? As Mr. Grimwood tells us, it was the quarrel between two of these brothers, Pucca Sena and the Senaputty. They seem to have been the most powerful brothers. It was no doubt a great misfortune in a State like Manipur that there should have been seven brothers living together in such a small country. Quarrels naturally occurred, and of the seven brothers some took one side and some the other. Pucca Sena had a certain following and the Senaputty had another, and the Maharaja was not strong enough to keep the peace between them. That was the primary cause of the outrage that took place. The immediate cause was a very trifling matter. It arose from a slight which had been supposed to be given to two of the younger brothers. They were the people who first started the firing in the palace, but the moment it began the Senaputty came to the front, and there was no doubt whatever that he was the leader of the revolt. That is admitted on all sides, and, as I have told your lordships, if the old Maharaja had remained in Manipur, undoubtedly our troops would have gone from Kohima and replaced him, and undoubtedly at that time the Senaputty would have been removed from the State—not because he was an able man, not because he was an independent man, but because, whether he was able or independent, he used such powers as he had to the mischief of the State, and to the disturbance of the happiness and peace of the country. The notion that a man is to be removed from the State simply because he is an able man or an independent man, is a notion to my mind so utterly repugnant to all common sense, to all practice either in India or elsewhere, that I really cannot imagine that such a statement could have been made. I am quite sure that if any words of mine have any weight with the princes of India, they need have no fear whatever so far as the Viceroy and the British Government are concerned as to their removing any man because he is able or independent. They would thankfully welcome him and wish there were more such men. The difficulty is not to remove them. The difficulty is to find them. We can find work for all the able men and all the independent men from one end of India to the other. My lords, the Maharaja runs away and then what is to be done? The Jubraj had taken no part whatever in the revolt. The moment it had begun he went some eight miles away from Manipur, not wishing to take part either on one side or of the other. But when the old Maharaja left, then the Jubraj came back and took possession of the gaddi. He wrote to the Viceroy and told him that he had done so, and asked specially that he might be recognised. Mr. Grimwood knew that at all events; and Mr. Grimwood also knew that the Jubraj was perfectly aware of the fact that until his being there had been recognised by the British Government, his reign practically was illegal. When the Maharaja had got away and had once got across the borders, and felt that he was safe, he changed his mind, and denied in fact that he had ever tendered his abdication. I think, if your lordships will look at the papers, you will see that Mr. Grimwood's account is quite substantiated that this man was so frightened that undoubtedly he did tender his abdication. I think there cannot be a doubt about that. However, his own story is that when he got to the border and opened his passport, or whatever it was, and found he was stated in that to have abdicated, he immediately denied that any such abdication had taken place. What he did was at once to telegraph to Mr. Quinton to say that he was going to submit a representation to the Government of India in order to be restored, and he hoped that this would receive a favourable consideration at the hands of the Government. Mr. Quinton very properly said that any representation that he made should have the proper attention of the Government of India. So it would have had—so it had. Then there is a matter which has a very important bearing upon one point which the noble marquis raised and which Mr. Quinton distinctly stated to Mr. Grimwood in the first instance and in the first telegram which I think the noble marquis had overlooked. It seems to me one of the most important questions in the whole matter. It appears quite in the early part of the book and I think the noble marquis must have turned over the page without seeing it. What are Mr. Quinton's instructions to Mr. Grimwood? On the 23rd September he says: "Yours of yesterday. The Jubraj may be acknowledged as Regent"—now mark the words that come afterwards—"till sanction of Government has been obtained." That is the whole starting-point of the thing. To say that this man has been reigning therefor six months, believing that he was acknowledged by the Government of India, in face of these words which were used by Mr. Grimwood on the 23rd September is, it seems to me an impossible suggestion. When Mr. Quinton writes to the Government of India on the 9th October, almost immediately after the telegram that he has received from the new Maharaja, what does he say? The officiating secretary says: "It will be observed that the Chief Commissioner has expressed his readiness to give his best consideration to any representation which the Maharaja may submit and pending its receipt" (the noble marquis seemed to have missed this too) "Mr. Quinton would suggest that it might be well to defer passing any orders in regard to this succession of the Jubraj." So that Mr. Quinton tells the Government of India at once that this representation is coming and he says, "Please hold your hands till you have got it and do not pass any orders about the succession of the Jubraj until you have received this representation which the Maharaja is going to send." Surely nothing can be clearer than that this man should not for a moment fancy that he was there with the sanction of the Government after the communication I have just read from Mr. Quinton and the letter which was telegraphed to Mr. Grimwood. Now the noble marquis refers to the delay, and there is no doubt that a considerable time was taken up before the final orders of the Government of India were made. But a great part of that delay is due to the consideration that had to be given. I do not like to trouble your lordships with dates, but the matter is so important that with your lordships' permission I will just mention a few of them. It is necessary that you should follow what happened. On the 14th November the representation was sent in by the Maharaja. That is the beginning. On the 9th October he said he would send in. The representation was sent by the Maharaja on the 14th November. It reached Mr. Quinton on the 19th. On the 22nd November Mr. Quinton very properly forwarded that representation to Mr. Grimwood for his observations. It takes some ten or eleven days to get from Assam to Manipur, and that letter from Mr. Quinton only reached Mr. Grimwood about eleven days after it was sent. On the 4th December Mr. Grimwood writes to Mr. Quinton and makes a report on the case. That report is received by Mr. Quinton on the 15th December. On the 31st December Mr. Quinton writes to the Viceroy a letter which the Viceroy receives on the 8th January. Therefore if there has been delay up to that time it has not been any delay on the part of the Government of India. It has been because the Maharaja took some little time in drawing up his report: then that had first of all to go to Mr. Quinton and then to Mr. Grimwood and then back again to the Government of India afterwards. On the 24th the Government of India reply as follows: "The Government of India wishes and desires to support the late Maharaja." There is no wonder that they should do so. The Maharaja, as the noble marquis has said, had never offended the Government of India in any way. He may not have been a very strong ruler, he may not have been able to keep his brothers in order, but still so far as we are concerned we had no cause of complaint against him. Quite the contrary. He had on

more than one occasion rendered us very valuable assistance. He had offered to send troops to Kohima. He had also rendered considerable assistance in the Burma expedition and also in another war, and had shown that he was our sincere friend. Therefore there was every reason why the Viceroy should wish not to let this man go. And it is clear that the Viceroy was so strongly impressed with that that although he had got Mr. Quinton's and Mr. Grimwood's views to the contrary he thought it wise to write a strong remonstrance to Mr. Quinton about it, which he did on the 24th of January. On the 9th February comes a direct appeal from the Maharaja to the Viceroy, and Mr. Quinton's answer to the Viceroy's objections to his former letter arrives on the same day. Now, Mr. Quinton was going to Calcutta on the 11th or 12th. Therefore he thought it quite necessary to stay till he came, and had communications with him personally. After that Mr. Quinton had evidently been asked to consider the effect of all those conversations, and to put down in writing his final views. This he does on returning to Assam on the 19th February, and on the 21st February the Viceroy gives his final orders. Now your lordships will see, I think, that the whole desire and wish of the Viceroy had been up to that moment to support the old Maharaja, if it had been possible for him to do so. I am quite sure that that is a desire which would commend itself to all the Native Chiefs from one end of India to the other. Here had been a terrible revolt, and in consequence of the revolt the Maharaja had had to run away from his throne. It must be a matter of satisfaction to all the other Indian Chiefs to know that under these circumstances, if there is a revolt of this kind, the Government of India will stand by the ruler and will go against those who revolt against him; but I should like to read to your lordships one sentence —I won't trouble you with many of these quotations—one sentence in which the Viceroy communicates his reasons for, at all events, yielding. It will be found on the 26th page of the Blue Book, paragraphs 5 and 6: "It was not, however, so clear whether the Jubraj should be placed in the gaddi, or whether the Maharaja should be restored. You do not hesitate to recommend the former. The Maharaja is described as a miserably weak man, and you recall his vacillation in 1888, when he disregarded the advice which was given to him and failed to punish the Senaputty, thereby, as his Highness acknowledges in his letter of the 9th February, bringing upon himself his present misfortunes. You anticipate that the Maharaja's restoration would involve the necessity of strengthening the garrison at Manipur, and give rise to frequent occasions for interference in support of the ruler as well as in the internal affairs of the State. It has already been intimated to you that in the opinion of the Governor-General in Council whatever arrangement is come to in the affairs of the Manipur State must be brought about with the full sanction of the British Government. His Excellency in Council accepts your opinion that it will be to the advantage of Manipur and to the furtherance of the British interests to recognise the Jubraj rather than restore the Maharaja." That is the close of the chapter so far as that part of the case is concerned. But now let us go on. The noble marquis says there were two courses open. There was the course either to support the old Maharaja, and there was the course to support the person who was in authority at the moment. Those were the only two practicable courses. But the noble marquis goes on to say that the Viceroy made a compromise. I think anything further from a compromise than that he made could not possibly be imagined. What compromise was there? What remained really for the Viceroy to consider was this. There had been a revolt, by which the Maharaja had been dismissed from his throne. There had been a revolt against the wishes of the paramount power. That revolt was not to go unpunished. What would have been thought of the case of Manipur by the other Indian Native Princes if it had been said that we put this man on the throne, and that the man who has caused the revolt and who is driving away the old Maharaja is to remain in power unpunished, and no notice is to be taken of his conduct? I think there was no other course for the Viceroy to take than to say that this man had to go. He had to go, not because he was able, not because he was independent, but he had to go for the reasons which the Viceroy himself urged, and which your lordships will find on the 20th page of the Blue Book, and for those reasons alone. In the seventh paragraph, it says, "The Senaputty has more than once incurred the displeasure of the Government of India on account of the violence of his conduct, and if the Maharaja in 1888 had not been afraid of his turbulent brother he would have been banished from the State. The Maharaja whom we have recognised as the ruler of Manipur, has now been ousted by a cabal in his own family led by this man, and if the British Government acquiesce in the present state of affairs, and recognise the Jubraj as ruler of Manipur, the Senaputty will wield the real power in the State. The Government of India cannot regard occurrences of this kind with indifference. Now, my lords, of course they cannot. Mention has been made of two instances in which this man's character had shown itself before, one in 1881 and one in 1888. In another place those were treated rather as slight matters. One took place; by the bye, when the noble marquis opposite was Viceroy. The Raja had punished his brother: the political agent asked the noble marquis to say that that punishment was not enough, and to interfere, and to have a Court of Inquiry. The noble marquis very properly said, "He has been punished by the proper authority. I am not going to interfere." That is all quite right. But when it came before the Government of India, in 1888, it was a very different story. The Government of India wrote in this sense to the Maharaja about the punishment of his brother. This is the deliberate judgment of the Government of India at that time. "This is not the first instance in which the inhuman conduct of the Senaputty has been brought to the notice of the Government of India, and although ordinarily the Governor General in Council would not interfere if the brother of a native chief illtreated a subject of the State, the circumstances of the present occurrence are such as to justify a departure from our usual policy. I am, therefore, to state that the Governor-General in Council approves of your addressing a letter to the Maharaja and advising the banishment of this man from the Manipur State for a year. You may tell the Maharaja that his Excellency the Viceroy" (that is Lord Dufferin) "has seen the correspondence: that he much regrets to hear of such cruelty having been practised by the Maharaja's brother, and that as this is not the first offence of the kind which has been brought home to him, his Excellency thinks that he should be severely punished." Now, there are grounds for thinking this was a bad man: there are grounds for thinking that this was a turbulent character, and that his presence in the State was undoubtedly mischievous. The last word of the Government of India, when they finally say that he is to be removed, is to this effect. It is to be found on pp. 25 and 26. "It is evident that the Jubraj owes his present position rather to the successful issue of his brother's insurrection than to the authority of the British Government, and that, while the Senaputty remains in Manipur unpunished for his treachery against his eldest brother, the Maharaja, the real power in the State, will be in the Senaputty's hands. This is not a state of affairs which the Government of India can view with indifference, nor would it be to the credit of the British power any more than to the interests of the people of Manipur itself that the Governor-General in Council should acquiesce in such a settlement of the case. As I have already, in my letter above cited, informed you, the Governor General in Council considers that it will be desirable that the Senaputty should be removed from Manipur and punished for his lawless conduct." My lords, I think I have shown this, that in the opinion of the Government of India, and as I think rightly, this man was a dangerous man to the peace of the State of Manipur. This man had been the leader of the revolt. He had practically made himself a sort of chief of the Prætorian Guard, and there was no sense of security, and there could not be while that man was in Manipur. He was the leader of the revolt, and as the leader of the revolt the Governor General came, in my opinion, to the wise determination that he ought to be removed from the State. Then the Viceroy writes to Mr. Quinton: "In the opinion of the Government of India it is advisable that you should visit Manipur, and make known on the spot the decision which the Governor General in Council desires you to enforce. You should take with you a sufficient force, even though opposition may not be expected, and you should report for the orders of the Government of India the conditions which you propose to attach to the recognition as Maharaja of Manipur of the present Jubraj." Upon that Mr. Quinton makes his preparations, and he sends that telegram which has been already alluded to, in which he tells the Viceroy what he proposes to do. Those propositions which Mr. Quinton has telegraphed to the Viceroy received the Viceroy's approval. Now there is an end of the Viceroy's action in this matter. There is nothing in the subsequent proceedings which touches the Viceroy himself or the Government of India. And I ask your lordships whether the Viceroy was not right in the course he adopted? It was his duty to settle the disputed succession in this State of Manipur. He had striven hard to continue if he could have done, so had the old Maharaja in Manipur. He yielded at last, and with great difficulty, to the opinions of Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton; but he stipulated that this man who had been the leader of the revolt should not go unpunished, and I venture to say that the judgment to which the Viceroy came would commend itself to the chief of every native State in India, because he had done his best to maintain the man in power, and he had done his best to show that anyone who revolted against his own chief, and against the paramount power, should not be allowed to remain in the State. Now, my lords, having dealt with everything that I have to deal with, I think, so far as the Viceroy of India is concerned, I must say one word about what took place afterwards. I, no more than the noble marquis opposite, want to say no more than I can possibly help with regard to any of those unfortunate officers who lost their lives upon this occasion. There is a strict inquiry going on at the present moment by the Viceroy to find out everything he can with regard to what actually did take place. Until the report of that inquiry comes no words of mine shall throw blame either on one person or on another. The noble marquis asked me one question about the ammunition. I would only say that the orders of the Viceroy were to take a sufficient force. It was not for him to say what force was sufficient and what was not. Colonel Johnson, who wrote to the *Times* some time ago, said that 200 or 300 men would have been quite sufficient. With regard to the ammunition, they did take 40 rounds. I understand that General Collett first told them that they were to take a considerable quantity more; but, no doubt, the roads were very bad and transport was very difficult, although I think that might have been overcome if it had been necessary, and they left with only forty rounds. But after they had left, General Collett had some doubts about it (and I do not wonder), and he telegraphed to Mr. Quinton to say that they would find at Kohima some more ammunition if they chose to take it—that it was entirely at their service. Unfortunately, they did not take that ammunition, and they apparently had been relying upon some 13,500 rounds of ammunition which were at Manipur, and which they found there and which were actually used. Still, in my opinion, I am disposed to think that the quantity taken was not enough; but that will be investigated when the time comes. No doubt there was a series of blunders, it may be of civil, it may be of military people; there are a great many things it is impossible to understand. It is impossible to understand how the troops got placed as they were; it is impossible to understand how it came to pass that after the Indians had been victorious, these men should have attempted to treat with the victors; it is quite impossible to understand these things. I confess I cannot do so. But there are one or two things in respect to Mr. Quinton about which I want to say a word or two—in his favour. I think I am only bound to do so. The noble marquis has talked about the secrecy with which he moved. There is no doubt that Mr. Quinton did mean to keep this secret. The misfortune was (and it is a misfortune which I hope will never happen again, because it has been remedied) that there was no cipher in Manipur with which Mr. Quinton could communicate to the Resident. He dare not telegraph up there, and there was no cipher that he could use. Therefore, until he got somehow into communication with Mr. Grimwood he could not tell him what really was going to happen. His Assistant Commissioner, Mr. Gurdon, went to Manipur, and there he explained what Mr. Quinton was going to do. Oddly enough, Mr. Grimwood thought, and so I understand it was given out in Manipur, that when the troops were coming they were to bring back the old Maharaja. That was the view that Mr. Quinton himself had, and that was the view we are told that was popularly put about in Manipur itself. There is no doubt Mr. Grimwood objected altogether to the proposal and he objected altogether to the Senaputty being deported; but he eventually came to this compromise

with Mr. Gurdon, that if in the orders given it was said that the Senaputty after being removed, if he behaved well might be allowed to go back again in the course of a year or something of that kind—entirely depending on how he behaved—then Mr. Grimwood gave a reluctant assent. Therefore you will find, in that telegram which was sent by Mr. Quinton to the Viceroy, those words, that it was to be seen how he behaved, and if he behaved well he was to be allowed to come back. I only want to defend Mr. Quinton from any undue secrecy, which I think the noble marquis rather cast in his teeth. Now, my lords, there is one other matter and that is about the treachery. I agree with the noble marquis that Mr. Quinton was a man incapable of treachery; and I also agree that no treachery was ever contemplated anybody in this case. Of that I feel absolutely certain. There is no doubt that there are durbars and durbars. You may have a durbar which is a mere court ceremony, and if you were to ask a man to come there and then put him in prison, that would be a breach of faith, undoubtedly, of the grossest character. But this was a durbar which was held as a court, and everybody knew it was a court, and everybody knew that the decision of the Government was going to be pronounced in that court: nobody had any other notion than that. I mean the Senaputty was not allured into this place; he was not induced to come there under false pretences, and in fact, he never came at all, because if any treachery was ever intended it was carried out in such a clumsy way that the bird was effectually frightened from coming into the net. But I am only now concerned to defend Mr. Quinton against the notion that there was ever any treachery thought of in this case. Now, as to the durbar itself. Was it right or was it not right under such circumstances to arrest a man in the durbar? Well, I have made every inquiry which I can from those who are most conversant with Indian affairs in this country, and, with the exception of those precedents which were quoted in the other House and have been alluded to-night, of Sir Robert Sandeman. I can hear of no precedent where a man was summoned to durbar even as a court where he was arrested. And the Secretary of State for War the other night, with my full assent, after a conversation with him, stated in the other House what I state in this House, frankly and fairly, that it is a practice which I individually should entirely discourage. I do not think it is a proper thing to do, and I should be very sorry to see this case taken as a precedent. It was stated I think in the other House that the Viceroy was responsible for this. Nothing could possibly be further from the fact. This arrest in durbar was never thought of until the 21st of March. On the 21st of March Mr. Quinton, Colonel Skene, Mr. Grimwood, and one or two others, met at Sengmai, four miles from Manipur, and there the matter was fully discussed. I have the whole paper here, and everything that was said about it; it is a paper which will be laid before Parliament as soon as it can be printed. There you will see that the whole question was discussed for the very first time, and the Viceroy had no more notion that the Senaputty was going to be arrested in the durbar than I had myself. If your lordships will look at the papers, you will see that it was not until the 7th of June that the Viceroy heard, practically, that this attempt at arrest in the durbar had been made. Therefore, I think you will see that not a word can be said against the Viceroy so far as the durbar is concerned. I know it was stated elsewhere that after it had been done the Viceroy, in a long telegram which you will find in the Blue Book, gave a qualified sanction to it. Granted: but it is one thing to order a thing, it is another to excuse an act which is done by your subordinate. They seem to me to stand on totally different grounds: and I maintain most strongly and stoutly that that was never contemplated by the Viceroy from the first, and that he never knew anything at all about it until a long time after it had taken place. My lords, I have I am afraid detained you a considerable time. I hope I have put the case of the Viceroy at all events before your lordships in a plain and intelligible way. I cannot sit down without bearing my testimony, if it is wanted, to the gallant conduct of Major Grant. He has shewn what a few troops can do. I should also like to bear my testimony to the courage and the physical endurance and patience of Mrs. Grimwood. The gravest responsibilities rest upon our Viceroys and upon our Governor Generals in the Dependencies and Colonies of all the distant parts of this great Empire. If they fail in their duty, it is no doubt within the competence of Parliament, and it is one of the highest and at the same time one of the most painful duties of the Government of the day either to censure or to recall them. But if you have no fault to find—and I would say that the actions of persons placed in those difficult positions are to be discussed in no carping or critical spirit—they are entitled to that which I am quite sure they ought to and will receive always in this country—to an ungrudging and a generous support. In the case of the present Viceroy of India, I should like to bear my humble testimony to the zeal and efficiency and ability with which he has discharged the high duties of his office. He has maintained untarnished the honour of the British name. He has cultivated the most cordial relations with all the native States of India. He has greatly added to the strength of the defences of the Empire. And above all he has done much to improve both the social and the moral condition of all the various races and peoples committed to his charge. I trust your lordships will agree with me and with Her Majesty's Government in thinking that Lord Lansdowne is deserving of the unabated confidence of his Sovereign, of Parliament, and of his country.

The DUKE OF ARGYLL: My lords, I hope that the able, clear, and most judicial speech which we have just heard from my noble friend opposite, will set at rest in the public mind any doubts which may have arisen either as to the policy or the moral straightforwardness of the conduct of the Government of India. When I saw upon the paper a notice by my noble friend the noble marquis behind me, I felt quite sure that from his own personal character, and from the recent date at which he had filled the highest office in India, he would present this subject to the House with judgment and in the most temperate language. But I am bound to say that although that expectation was entirely fulfilled, he did present to this House a narrative of affairs which materially differed in its impressions from that which I have derived from a perusal of these papers. My noble friend opposite, the noble marquis, has pointed out two or three mistakes which the noble marquis made in the few adverse observations which he made bearing upon the policy of the Government of India. In the first place, my noble friend distinctly misunderstood the facts, as I think, when he said that there was an immediate recognition of the present Regent, and that any subsequent conduct in derogation of that recognition was a second thought on the part of the Government of India. The noble marquis, as far as I can see, was entirely wrong in that supposition, because on page 5 of the Blue Book to which the noble viscount has referred, I see that the Government of India say "Jubraj may be acknowledged as Regent till sanction of the Government is received," and that was immediately after the outbreak in September, and upon that footing it remained during the whole of the six months before the Government of India came to its final decision. I have no doubt that my noble friend the noble marquis had not observed that telegram, because he went on for many weeks and months, and quoted a few words which seem to imply that there had been a full recognition from the very beginning, and that the Government of India had retracted its policy in consequence of the advice of its local officers. Now, again, the noble viscount opposite has, I think, effectually answered an opinion which has been shadowed forth by the noble marquis, and that is that the Government of India may never consider the proverbial three courses in a policy. I do not understand what my noble friend means. A great statesman in this country was accused of always saying that there were three courses in everything, but there are in human affairs almost always at least three courses to be taken, and I am sure my noble friend would not issue an order to the Government of India that they are always to say yes or no to two extreme propositions, and never to consider the circumstances which may recommend a middle course. I hold, on the contrary, that in the peculiar circumstances of this case a middle course was clearly the best that could be taken. What were the two courses? The first was to recognise the Jubraj as Regent as the result of an atrocious conspiracy on the part of his own brother, in defiance of the recognition of the Government of India and its refusal to sanction his right to the throne. My noble friend will hardly say that that was an alternative the Government of India ought to have said yes to. What was the other alternative? It was that the Maharaja, who had distinctly fled from the gaddi, should be restored to the throne of Manipur. Well, have your lordships read the evidence that this Blue Book contains as to the character of that prince? Why, he seems to have been one of the poorest creatures that ever sat even upon an Indian throne. The account that is given by Mr. Grimwood of his conduct on the night on which his place was invaded represents a man who had no nerve at all, who was utterly shattered by a few shots being fired in his palace, and who was utterly incapable of withstanding the more powerful character of his brother. Is that the other alternative that my noble friend would have had the Government to adopt? Surely not. Then what was the middle course? The middle course was recommended by Mr. Quinton, and I think also by Mr. Grimwood, that the Jubraj, the existing Regent, should be acknowledged, but that the author of the revolution should be deported from the State. Now, my lords, was there really any other proposition before the Government of India which could be taken with equal advantage? It is quite clear that if the Regent had been continued without the Senaputty, the Senaputty would have been considered, and would have been the real governor of the State. My noble friend has stated that the Senaputty's talent and ability had been much exaggerated. I do not know much about his character for ability, but I do know a good deal from these papers of his moral character and of his fitness to rule and be the real and virtual ruler of any State. The Government of India do not hesitate to say that he was a man of infamous character: he was a man who was personally cruel; he was convicted of the most atrocious cruelty, carrying us back to the most savage times of the most savage governors of India. Would my noble friend have admitted that the Government of India should be recognised a sovereign—a nominal sovereign—who was a mere catspaw of a man of this character? I contend that the Government of India had no other course to adopt but that which they did adopt—that what my noble friend calls the middle course was the right course, and under the circumstances almost the only course which they could adopt. My noble friend has used more than once, I think, the expression "this unhappy massacre." He used no other expression about it. For a long time I could not quite understand what the object of my noble friend was in using those words, because after all, his blame of the Government of India was very mild, and all that it amounts to really is, that if he had been a Member of the Council of India he might possibly have given other advice. Well, that is not much to the purpose. We do not govern India from the House of Lords or from this country in these matters of detail. We leave them to the Government of India. But then came the part of his speech which it was evident excited my noble friend most, and that was an answer to a speech by Sir John Gorst in the House of Commons. I am under the unhappy disadvantage of not having read Sir John Gorst's speech, and I can quite understand that anything said by a man in his position, however, almost of the character of a joke, may have a bad effect in India, and so far my noble friend may have been justified in the severe comments which he passed upon it. Certainly, if my noble friend thinks that the Government of India or the Government opposite, as representing the superior government of the Empire, adopts the policy of removing from all native States every able man they can find, out of mere spite or jealousy, he is well entitled to bring the subject before this House; but I do not think my noble friend can really believe that any such policy is in the mind of anybody. But I must remind my noble friend of this that if we are to consider the effect in India of speeches made in either Houses of Parliament, the defects of speech may be as serious as exercises of speech, such certainly as those that are attributed to Sir John Gorst. Now, I must say I do regret that my noble friend has not said one word of severity against the conduct of the Government of Manipur. Of course I do not mean to say that my noble friend meant to speak lightly or to think lightly of the transactions that took place there, but remember,

my lords, this is a transaction almost unprecedented in the history of India. We are not dealing with mere savages in the native states of India. They are not so civilised as we are, of course; they stand on a lower plane of civilisation, but they are very far from being mere savages. Many of them are represented and governed by enlightened men. They knew the usages of civilised life, and I do think that if a speech is to be made in this House on the whole of the Manipur business, some expression should be given of our horror at the atrocious treachery and the abominable cruelty of that massacre of our officers in Manipur. I am not at all sure that the total abstinence of any such censure in my noble friend's speech, and in other speeches which have been made in Parliament, may not almost have a worse effect in fact than any of the absurd sentiments ascribed rightly or wrongly to Sir John Gorst. Now I come to the point which is of real importance in this matter. As far as I can understand, nobody really blames the Government of India as respects its policy in this case. What is thought is that there was some trickery or treachery in the mode in which the orders of the Government of India were executed by its officers. My noble friend has entirely acquitted the Government of India and especially Mr. Quinton from any suspicion of treachery. When that is said, all is said that can be said upon the subject. The question becomes one of the mere mode in which the Senaputty was to be deported and the sentences of the Government of India to be recorded against him. The noble viscount opposite has said that he has consulted many authorities in England, as many as he could, upon the meaning of the word durbar, of course my noble friend has access to authorities to which most of us have not access in the India Office. He is surrounded by very able and very competent men, no man more able or competent than the Chairman of the Foreign Committee, my distinguished friend, Sir Henry Rawlinson, he must have means of knowing what the word durbar means. But we have no need to go further than this Blue Book to see the variety of the senses in which the word "durbar" is used. It is used at least in three senses in these very papers. It is used in the sense of a place—a place where an assembly is held. Again it is used for a company of men—for the prince and his cabinet. My noble friends opposite are the durbar in that sense. The noble marquis and his colleagues would be called a durbar in India, and they are so called in this Blue Book. Then it means also a ceremonial, assembly, and that is the meaning most familiar in this country. The people of England think of the amounts which they have had of splendid durbars given by my noble friend the noble marquis or the noble earl behind me (Lord Northbrook) in which the princes of India have been received with splendid ceremonial by the Viceroy, and the idea of arresting a native prince when he comes to a ceremonial of that sort, probably at the invitation of the Indian Government, is abhorrent to the moral sentiments of the people of England. Very naturally, and that is what they think has happened in this case. My lords, it has nothing to do with it. There is a note at the foot of page 27 which will explain exactly how this matter stands as to the meaning of the word "durbar." I think it is quite clear from this note that the Government of India did know that Mr. Quinton intended to summon the Regent with his ministers and his brothers to meet him at a certain place, and at that meeting announce the decision of the Government, and if necessary enforce it. But that was not what the English people understood as a durbar. These are the words of Mr. Quinton on the 18th of March: "I propose to require the Regent and durbar"—that is to say, I propose to require the Regent and his Ministers "to meet me on arrival." The word "durbar" is used as the people who are to come. It is not used of the place or of the assembly or of the nature of the occasion. Mr. Quinton says, "I propose to require the Regent and durbar to meet me on arrival: announce the decision of Government, arrest Senaputty and inform him that the length of his exile and return depends on his conduct and the tranquillity of the country." To that the Government of India answer, "Your telegram 18th, subject to re-consideration if necessary of the amount of the Maharaja's allowance proposals are approved." That shows clearly that the Government of India did approve of the proposals of Mr. Quinton to summon a durbar, that is to say, to summon an assembly or a Court, as the the noble viscount opposite called it, at which Court he was to announce the decision of the Government, and to enforce it. But it was not a durbar in the ceremonial sense, or in any of those mixed senses of the word, in which men are invited to come for ceremonial purposes, and at which an arrest on the part of the superior power would savour undoubtedly of treachery or something of an unusual kind. My lords, this being so, I see nothing that remains to be discussed except the unfortunate military miscalculation which the local authorities made, and into which inquiries are now being conducted, as to the sufficiency of the force which might under certain circumstances be required. But I do not think it is very difficult to understand how that miscalculation arose. The Manipuris are essentially a feeble foe. They have a very small military power and almost no military prowess. Look at the flight and rout to which they were put by a mere handful of men under that gallant fellow Lieutenant Grant. My lords, an accident will happen even with the tamest animals. In India it is not infrequent that many men are injured from the sudden going wild of a tame elephant. Here you had to deal with a violent and treacherous man—a man whom the Government of India knew to be violent and treacherous, but they had no idea of the extent of the atrocity of his character. That is the whole explanation of the case. I confess that I see no difficulty in understanding it, although some of the details, as my noble friend says, are very difficult to understand. The disposal of the force, the method of attack, the small amount of ammunition carried by the men—all these are points of detail upon which we cannot form any judgment until we have heard the evidence which may be brought before the Government of India. Now, the noble marquis behind me went on to speak of other matters as regards the future, upon which I desire to express no opinion. I should be very unwilling to balance my opinion against that of my noble friend. He knows better than I do the working of the Council in India. I think the objections which he has stated to certain proposals which were lately made, and which objection seems to be, I think, approved by the noble marquis opposite, are probably sound objections. At all events, I should say that this is a very trivial case indeed to found upon for any great, or considerable, or organic change in the Government of India. It is a mere accident—a deplorable accident—an accident owing mainly to the villainy of one man, and I do not see that it throws any doubt upon the ordinary transactions of business between the central Government and its feudatories. Before I pass from this question of the mode in which the orders of the Government were issued, I cannot help saying that I have heard—I do not know whether it is on good authority—that even at durbars of a more serious and ceremonial character it is not without precedent that the Government of India should make very grave intimations as to its intentions with regard to those who attend them. I have been informed by a friend of mine that on a celebrated occasion—a great occasion—in a no less important city than Cabul, at a great ceremonial meeting there, certain chiefs of Afghanistan were touched on the shoulder as they went out of the durbar, and were told that their loyalty to the Government of England was doubted, and that their detention had been determined upon by the military authorities. So that after all whatever may be the general rule of the Government of India, and I cannot doubt that the general rule is very much what has been stated by the noble viscount opposite, with the assent I think of my noble friend beside me (Lord Northbrook), who cheered what he said, there is a certain pliability in the practice of the Government of India depending on the circumstances of each particular case. Now the noble marquis behind me went on to speak of the sentence on the Regent, and he expressed a hope virtually that the punishment of death would not be inflicted upon him. Well, my lords, individually we are always rightly in favour of mercy, and I certainly should be so myself on this particular occasion. But I think much depends upon the evidence which has been brought forward, not as to the Regent having made war against the Government of India, because I entirely agree with my noble friend that under the circumstances of the case the infliction of capital punishment for that offence would be an extreme course, and as I understand, the sentence has been passed upon that ground; but if the Regent has been found guilty of taking part in the abominable treachery of inveigling our officers within his palace, then having them decapitated by the public executioner one by one, that would entirely alter the case. My noble friend went on to refer to the question of annexation. I should be very reluctant to give any opinion upon that point at all, but there is one thing that I should like to say, and that is that these general assurances against what is called the policy of annexation are assurances against a policy which as a deliberate policy has never been pursued by the Government of India. We have never set before ourselves annexation as a policy. Sometimes we have suffered severely through not having annexed. You remember the two Sikh wars. You remember the conquest that was achieved over the Sikhs in the first war. You will remember the determination of the Government of India at that time not to annex. You will remember the deplorable results which followed—the second Sikh war, during which for a time England held her breath lest the Empire of India should slip from out her hands. My lords, these questions of annexation come upon us by the force of circumstances, by the necessities of the case and not by a deliberate policy on the part of the central Government, and assurances of this kind in truth of very little value. Before I sit down I cannot help saying this, that discussion on details about the Government of India and the administration of her affairs ought to be very rare indeed in the two Houses of Parliament. We ought to remember how that Empire has been acquired and how it is still governed. It has not been acquired by the House of Commons nor by the House of Lords, nor by the Crown in its Imperial capacity in this country. It has not been acquired by great Englishmen, great Scotsmen, and great Irishmen sent out to India, and acting largely on their own discretion and their own responsibility. That is the way in which the British Empire in India has been acquired beyond all question and all doubt, and if that Empire had been under the daily government or the yearly government of the English Parliament, it never would have been acquired or it would have been lost long ago. Under those circumstances I say I am not at all sure that the electric telegraph has not made a serious and injurious inroad upon the discretion of the authorities in India. We attempt to interfere where we ought not to interfere. For, after all, when we come to balance nice considerations one course with another course, and a middle course, as my noble friend did to-night, what means have we of judging here compared with those who are charged with the great responsibility of the Government of India? My lords, we have none. And if there is one Department of the Government of India more than another in which we should trust that Government to the utmost extent, and be most chary of interfering with it, it is its relations with the native States. They know the Imperial traditions under which we act. They know the duty of good faith. They know the general desire of the English people that mere passion for dominion should not lead to unprincipled annexation. They know all that, and yet in spite of their knowing that, look what has happened. From the days of Clive and Warren Hastings to the days of Canning, of Dalhousie, of Hardinge, and last, not least, Lord Dufferin, immense provinces have been added to the Indian Empire. It seems to me that at present we have arrived pretty nearly at the geographical limits which Nature has imposed upon that vast dominion. But there is another thing that I think we ought to remember—not merely how that Empire has been acquired but how it has been governed—how smoothly that immense machine is working. Why, my lords, from month to month and from year to year, except from an occasional war on the frontier, we hear little or nothing of the Government of India. It is like a vast mechanism which moves automatically. And yet it is a Government over various tribes and races animated with fierce fanatical passions and opposite religions, and we govern it more easily, more peacefully, more successfully, than we do the neighbouring country of Ireland. Surely, my lords, that is a ground for placing confidence in the Government of India. I cannot understand any one being disposed to make carping objections even to details in regard to accidents which may now and then happen in the working of the great machine. I rejoice on the whole that my noble friend has brought forward this motion to-night. It has enabled the noble viscount to defend with most complete success the Government of India, and I trust the people of this country will now clearly understand not only that the policy was right, but that it was carried out in a mat perfectl consistent with the traditional maxims of honour upon which the Government of India stands.

The EARL OF KIMBERLEY: My lords, I entirely agree with the noble Duke in what he has said as to the statement of the noble viscount opposite. Though I may not agree in every point of detail, yet I recognise with the greatest pleasure the fairness and the calmness with which he spoke, and also that he, on more than one point, responding to the appeal made to him by my noble friend, repudiated doctrines which I think were unsound and accepted others which we all desire to see observed. My noble friend who has just sat down has made what I may call a somewhat militant speech. He found fault with my noble friend behind me for his observations upon a speech which my noble friend had not read, I mean the speech of Sir John Gorst, and concerning which, therefore, I must say that I think his judgment is worth nothing. But he was not satisfied with that. To my great astonishment he discovered a gap in my noble friend's speech, one which I hardly think any one would have sought for, and to which I think it was perhaps rather ungenerous to allude. He imagined that my noble friend the noble marquis actually did not feel the greatest abhorrence at the cruel massacre at Manipur.

The DUKE OF ARGYLL: Oh, no!

The EARL OF KIMBERLEY: I beg the noble lord's pardon. I really would appeal to my noble friend whether he could, for one moment, have supposed that the noble marquis had any less feeling of abhorrence of that abominable massacre than the noble duke himself, or any other member of this House.

The DUKE OF ARGYLL: Certainly not.

The EARL OF KIMBERLEY: Then why make that attack upon him? I regret it. I think it might have been very well omitted. I do not wish to allude further to Sir John Gorst's speech, except to say that I was extremely glad to hear what the noble viscount said upon that subject. I do not want at all to attribute any extraordinary weight to that speech. The noble duke seemed to think that it was of very little consequence indeed, but I would point out to your lordships that Sir John Gorst did not speak as a private member of Parliament: it is only because he spoke on behalf of the Department charged with Indian affairs that importance attaches naturally to what he said, and I think the noble marquis was perfectly right in pointing out that in India probably more importance would be attached to that declaration than we should attach to it here, not on account of any want of ability on the part of Sir John Gorst, but because he is not a member of the Cabinet, and therefore did not speak with all the authority with which the noble viscount speaks. I will not allude to that any further. With regard to what the noble duke said at the conclusion of his speech, I entirely concur in his general principle, namely, that it is most undesirable as a rule that the details of Indian government should be discussed in Parliament. No one who has had any connection with Indian affairs will not feel that the continued successes of our government in India depend essentially upon our appointing able men whom we trust, to govern that country, and trusting them and supporting them here. At the same time there are occasions when it is necessary, I think, that Parliament should take notice of what takes place in India; and although I do not wish to exaggerate the importance of this event as a political event—except as regards the murders, which were very horrible—still, I think that when such events have taken place in India as these unfortunate and unhappy events at Manipur, it is proper that Parliament should take some notice of them—should take notice of them, as I think notice has been taken of them, in a judicial and temperate spirit. We may not entirely agree with the noble viscount opposite in the complete approval which he bestowed upon the Government of India. I do not think that serious blame can be attached to the Government of India in the matter, though we may differ in some matters as to whether it acted in the wisest manner. Above all—I think my noble friend justly said it is extremely easy to be wise after the event; but I still think that some observations, which were made by my noble friend behind me had a little more weight than perhaps the noble duke who has just spoken attached to them. My friend's criticism of the Government of India depended I think, principally on two points, namely, that there had been an unnecessary and unfortunate delay in coming to a decision, and that there was in the decision itself something in the nature of a compromise which was unfortunate, and had unpleasant effects. With regard to the delay, looking to the usual course of the Government of India, the delay certainly does not surprise me, but I think that we have a right to observe that the peculiar circumstances of the case ought to have led the Government of India to see that it was necessary to deal with unusual promptitude with this particular matter. The reason I say that is this. The noble viscount found fault with my noble friend for having supposed that the Jubraj had been recognised as Regent. That he was actually recognised as Regent I think was shown by the noble viscount not to be the fact, but he was recognised undoubtedly as the temporary governor of Manipur, and dealt with by our officers as that temporary governor for no less than five or six months. Now, during the whole of that time you will observe that the Senaputty was as much virtually governor as he would have been supposing the Jubraj had been permanently recognised. He was there upon the spot, and all the objections which existed to his wielding power existed at that time. I think that the Government of India ought to have seen that if the Senaputty was to be removed—they knew the character of the Senaputty from the first, and they knew also that the Senaputty was the author of the revolt from the first—then it was very unfortunate and likely to lead to much misconstruction, to leave the Jubraj supported by his brother, whom they knew to be paramount, for about five months in peaceful relations with our Resident and with the Chief Commissioner. I observe that in one of the Chief Commissioner's letters which the noble viscount did not refer to, the letter of February 9th, he says, speaking of the Government of the Jubraj, "The present Government has now been in existence for nearly six months, and is conducted with tranquillity." Now, although the Jubraj was not formally recognised as Maharaja it is in vain to say that his Government was not recognised when it is spoken of in that way. It was recognised subject to the decision as to whether it should be permanently recognised. Then my noble friend pointed out that there were two courses which might have been taken, or indeed three—to restore the Maharaja, to adopt the state of things which existed in Manipur, or, to take the course which the Government of India finally did determine upon. Notwithstanding the observations that have been made, I think the course taken by the Government of India is open to very obvious criticism. I daresay they were quite right in not restoring the Maharaja, upon that I am not competent to express an opinion, except upon what I see in the papers. They say he was a very weak man, and I daresay they were quite right in not restoring him. But the course pursued seems to me to have been, as my noble friend pointed out, exactly the course which involved all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the other two courses. If they had taken the advice of Mr. Grimwood, and observed Mr. Quinton's first advice also—though he modified it afterwards when he had been to Calcutta—they would have acknowledged the Jubraj, and left the Senaputty untouched. That would have been a course which at all events had something to recommend it. But to set up the Jubraj and get rid of the Senaputty, who himself had set up the Jubraj, seems to me to have been taking the most singular course that could be conceived. Here is a man obviously, and it is admitted on all hands, the mere tool of the younger brother. The younger brother makes a revolt and sets up this man on the throne. Then what is to happen? You are to confirm on the throne the man who has been set up by a revolt, and in defiance of your authority, and you are to punish the man who set him up. I must say that that is a policy which seems to me to have very little to recommend it. The impression left upon my mind is that it arose from this. Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood had one opinion, the Government of India had another opinion. They each had good reasons no doubt, but the Government of India, evidently wished to send back the Maharaja. Mr. Grimwood and Mr. Quinton were equally strong the other way. As very often happens unfortunately when there are two opinions expressed, a middle course was determined and I believe in this case that the middle course was most injudicious. The event has certainly proved it to be so. But more than that I do not think you can say in criticising the judgment of the Government of India. It is undoubtedly a matter upon which judgments might differ, and as to any severe blame being attached to the Marquis of Lansdowne in the matter I entirely repudiate that suggestion. No doubt we are entitled to express our opinion and to criticise what was done, but to say that is was a very serious error of judgment I think would be to assume on our part a greater knowledge of all the difficulties and a greater power of determining them here than really belongs to us. I have only one or two other observations to make—because a great deal has been already said on the subject, and really the matter lies very much in a nutshell. One word with regard to the durbar. I do not profess myself, naturally, to have any opinion worth stating upon the question of the durbar derived from any peculiar knowledge of my own, and I entirely agree with those who do not ascribe any notion of deliberate treachery to Mr. Quinton. That I believe to be perfectly out of the question. But I look upon the matter as a mere plain ordinary question of how an Englishman would naturally proceed in these matters, and ought ordinarily to proceed. I confess I think that arresting this man at a durbar to which he was summoned without any notice of what was going to be done—I mean without any notice that there was going to be a judgment passed upon him at this durbur—was not that plain ordinary straightforward course which is better in all these matters. The more straightforward we are in dealing with Asiatics I am quite certain the better it will be for our rule. The one great mistake we could fall into would be to adopt anything like oriental methods, and the only criticism I have to make is that I think that this idea of arresting the man at a durbar, after having received him in a friendly manner when he came out to meet Mr. Quinton, and after he had been for five or six months no doubt virtually governing the State, savoured a little too much of oriental *finesse*, and I am very glad to hear that the noble viscount opposite does not think that this course, however often it has been pursued before, will probably ever be pursued again in the future. Now I have only one word more to say, and that is one to which, in common with the noble marquis, I attach certainly the greatest importance, I mean as to the policy which is to be pursued in regard to Manipur in the future. My noble friend behind me (the Duke of Argyll) I confess stated some doctrines with which I am quite unable to agree. He said that our policy in India had not been a policy of annexation. I quite agree with him that we never professed a policy of annexation, but facts are stronger than theories, and we have annexed State after State in India until, as we all know, we have this immense Empire. Neither do I agree with the noble duke in saying that assurances given upon this subject are of no value, and should be lightly spoken of. The assurance to which my noble friend referred was the assurance of the Sovereign herself—the assurance after the Mutiny, given in the most solemn manner, and although I do not pretend to say that such an assurance as that would prevent the Government of India from an annexation which might be absolutely unavoidable and necessary, yet I do say that after that assurance no annexation should be sanctioned without the gravest and most paramount necessity. I myself had an opportunity of proving that at the time of the annexation of Burma. That is not a parallel case because Burma is not an Indian State, it was annexed after a war, and for reasons which could in no way arise as regards any native Indian State properly so called; but I must say I was exceedingly struck with the widespread jealousy in India on the part of the native princes in that Empire at the annexation of Burma, and at the strong opinion which was expressed to me by all those who had the greatest experience of Indian affairs that there was no portion of our policy in which we ought to be more cautious, and nothing in which we ought to be more firm and consistent than in adhering in all circumstances, except those, as I have said, of paramount necessity, to the declarations made by the Queen, and which I believe have had the most important and admirable effects in pacifying and reconciling the native princes of that country, and making them truly loyal subjects of Her Majesty. I therefore welcome what the noble viscount said upon this subject. Of course he very properly, not having the opinion of the Government of India, would not pledge himself absolutely to the particular policy, which is to be pursued, but I gathered from him—I think I am not

going too far in saying—that he shares the opinion of myself and my noble friend, and of many others who have more experience than I have upon this subject, which is against annexation unless as I have said, it be from some paramount and overbearing necessity. My lords, I will not detain you any further. I think it is on every account a matter which must give satisfaction to this House that the subject has been brought before us, and especially because I am most happy to say who have had the opportunity of hearing so plain and complete and satisfactory a statement from the noble viscount opposite.

The EARL OF NORTHBROOK: My lords, I was very glad to hear the speech of the noble viscount the Secretary of State for India, because he appeared to me to have given a fair and accurate account of the whole of the circumstances connected with this unfortunate catastrophe at Manipur, and because I entirely agree with the conclusion at which he has arrived, namely, giving the approval of Her Majesty's Government to the course taken by the Viceroy in respect of these events. The speech of the noble marquis who brought forward this motion, was, like all his speeches, both temperate and fair in respect to the manner in which he treated the question, but I think my noble friend must have been convinced by the noble viscount opposite that he had not given that careful attention to the papers in the case which he would have done, supposing he had been either in India or at the India Office. I myself have felt it to be my duty to pay the most careful attention to all the papers that have been laid before Parliament, and I am quite satisfied that the answer given by the Secretary of State to the criticism of my noble friend, in respect to the alleged delay on the part of the Viceroy in dealing with this matter, was a complete and a substantial and an accurate answer. I am quite surprised at my noble friend the Earl of Kimberley trying to defend the noble marquis in respect to that matter. Just let us put the other case. My noble friend says that it ought to have been dealt with with unusual promptitude. Now, if the Viceroy had dealt in this case with unusual promptitude what would have happened? The Maharaja of Manipur, a good friend of the English Government, who when Mr. Dement and forty men were killed on the frontier and Kohima was assailed by the Mahrattas, led 2,000 of the troops of Manipur with Col. Johnson to the defence of Kohima, and who has supported the Government on many subsequent occasions—this Maharaja petitions the Viceroy to have his case inquired into, and the unusual promptitude which my noble friend the Earl of Kimberley recommends would have been the unusual promptitude (I admit it would have been unusual) of neglecting the appeal to the Viceroy of an old friend and supporter of the Government simply because there was a gentleman called the Senaputty, who appears to have got on the brain of both my noble friend the Earl of Kimberley and my noble friend who brought forward this motion. I should like to know what native opinion would have been if this unusual promptitude had been shown. I should like to know what native princes would have thought if the claims of an old friend had been set aside because the Government of India was rather afraid of a man who is described by one who was seven years resident there, as a man of infamous character, who had committed infamous murders, and who was altogether a turbulent character.

The EARL OF KIMBERLEY: If the noble lord will excuse me, I never said that the claim of the old Maharaja should be put aside. What I said was that it was not necessary to take five months to consider it.

The EARL OF NORTHBROOK: I must ask my noble friend to follow me a little further. Would my noble friend have accepted the representations of the ex-Maharaja without any inquiry from Mr. Grimwood? Would he have taken the ex-Maharaja at his word without obtaining the advice of Mr. Grimwood? Would he have said, "Oh! yes, you shall go back." Would he not have thought it necessary to ask Mr. Grimwood to report upon the matter? If my noble friend concedes that, his whole case is gone. It would be necessary to consult Mr. Quinton and to consult Mr. Grimwood, and to have Mr. Grimwood's reply, and I say that the unusual promptitude recommended by my noble friend, and rather, by implication, by the noble marquis, would have been neglect of the fair consideration to be given to the claims of an old friend, and would have been considered as an injustice by all the native princes in India. Therefore, I think that the attack made upon my noble friend the Marquis of Lansdowne for the delay in the matter, entirely fails to have the very slightest foundation in the mind of any one who has carefully gone into the circumstances of the case and who knows the duty which devolves upon the Viceroy in India, of considering fairly and dispassionately the claims which are brought before him, and especially the claims of native princes deserving of consideration from this country. That is my answer to the main criticism made by my noble friend in answer to the reply given by the Secretary of State to the same criticisms made by the noble marquis who brought forward the motion. Now, my lords, no doubt the case that was presented to the Government of India was a difficult one. Undoubtedly in ordinary cases the Government of India are quite right to accept this kind of revolution happening in native States, and so long as the person who assumes power is loyal to the British Government and likely to govern his State decently well, to accept the circumstances and to deal with the person who takes up the succession. But this State of Manipur is a very exceptional State. I must confess that I myself on reading the papers thought that upon the whole it would have been better to let the matter go and to deal with the Government *de facto* after the revolution. I must admit that I never, until these difficulties arose, gave the same attention to this small State of Manipur that I have done since. In fact I never heard when I was in India of the State of Manipur except in connection with a team of polo players who came down and beat the Calcutta polo club in Calcutta. But I took every pains I could to read the history of this State and the whole history of it is contained in an elaborate Memorandum written by Sir Alexander Mackenzie, who is now the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, and who was at one time Secretary to the Governor of Bengal. We had set up this small State of Manipur entirely ourselves. We were obliged, because of the quarrels among the different members of the Raja's family, to give our sanction and authority to the reigning Raja and to interfere to prevent any conspiracy against him. I saw that this very Raja against whom the conspiracy took place had been twice supported and kept on the throne by British arms, and I saw at once that the revolt against him, organised as it was by this Senaputty, must have been made with the full knowledge by the Senaputty that he was acting against the authority of the Government of India. Under those circumstances I saw that the case was very different to an ordinary case, and in my opinion the Government of India were justified in interfering. And having to interfere, I believe that in the circumstances of the case, and even with what we know upon the papers, the Government of India took the right course. I should like to ask my noble friends who have criticised the Government of India upon this matter just to think for a moment in what position the State of Manipur would have been if their advice had been followed. They proposed that this Senaputty was to be made, in point of fact, practically the ruler of Manipur. Does it not occur to my noble friends that the very catastrophe which has happened shows how absolutely dangerous it was to leave that man as the ruler of Manipur? Just conceive a man the *de facto* ruler of a petty State like that who had so absurd a notion of his position as to think that he could set himself up against the Government of of India. That is what this man has done. I think the very facts have shown that the Government of India were right in not conceding to the Senaputty the full control of Manipur. That is the conclusion I have arrived at after very careful consideration of the papers, and I hope the considerations I have suggested may induce my noble friends to reconsider their position, to read the papers very carefully along with Sir Alexander Mackenzie's Memorandum, and I hope that having done that they will be satisfied that the Government of India has acted in the circumstances of the case in the manner most for the interests of the people of Manipur and of the Government. Because your lordships must recollect that in recognizing this Raja of Manipur, and defending him against all comers, as we have done, we, the Government of India, assumed a considerable responsibility. We assumed the responsibility of taking care that no great oppression was committed in the State of Manipur. My noble friends would have put a man as principal ruler of that State who on two occasions was guilty of such oppression that on one he was banished by his own Sovereign, and on the other the Government of India required him to go away from the State for a year to expiate his offence. I think that this part of the question has been threshed out sufficiently, and that that is the conclusion that any impartial person would come to, namely, that on the whole the Government did what was right under very difficult circumstances. Your lordships must remember that in discussing the conduct of the Government of India everything does not appear on the papers that are laid before Parliament. It is impossible to lay before Parliament, or even to send home the mass of documents which come to the Indian Foreign Office and which are no doubt consulted by the Viceroy before he forms an opinion, and moreover the Viceroy had an opportunity of conferring personally with Mr. Quinton before he decided this matter. I do not think, my lords, there has been any other point made at all adverse to the conduct of the Viceroy in this case. I wish, however, to allude to two other matters. One is the question which has been raised as to the nature of a durbar and whether the idea of arresting the Senaputty at a durbar is one which is altogether to be commended or the reverse. There is no doubt, as the noble duke observed, that in the telegram from Mr. Quinton to the Viceroy the word "durbar" was used for "persons" and not for "ceremony" or "place." Mr. Quinton said that he proposed to summon the Regent and the durbar to meet him: that meant the Regent and all his *entourage*—his brothers and everybody connected with the State. Then when those people met him it was at a durbar, and in the further telegram towards the end of the book your lordships will see that it was proposed to arrest the Senaputty "at a durbar," because the Government say in a late telegram that they were not aware of that communication till the 7th of May. Therefore, it is clear that it was intended to arrest the Senaputty at a durbar. Well, I agree with what has fallen from the Secretary of State for India upon this matter. It seems to me even if there should be found any precedent for taking that course it is not a desirable course to take. It might possibly occasion disturbances, collision and bloodshed at these solemn assemblies which should be carried on in all the State which ceremonies in the East require. I think it would be very undesirable that this should be considered a precedent for any such course to be taken in the future. I entirely agree with all the noble lords who have spoken that Mr. Quinton was perfectly incapable of any idea of treachery in this matter: all those concerned were perfectly incapable of such a thing; but nevertheless the durbar was not the proper place to make the arrest. If I were to say the manner in which I think the decision of the Government of India should be communicated, I agree with what fell from the noble duke that it would be quite right that an intimation should be given in the most solemn manner possible of the decision at which the Governor-General in Council had arrived in respect to the matters of a native State, and having given that intimation I should say that the right course would be to place it upon the ruler of that State to carry out the decision of the Government of India. In this particular case if the Regent had been told at that Assembly that he would not be recognised unless he himself removed the Senaputty for a limited time under such conditions as might have been right for the State of Manipur, in all probability the difficulty would not have arisen. The only other point, at this late hour of the evening, upon which I would venture to make a very few remarks, is the question of annexation, and whether it would be desirable or not that this little State should be annexed to the territories of Her Majesty in India. I agree with all that has fallen from those who have addressed your lordships in deprecation of the annexation of native States. In regard to this particular case, I would say that the offence, grave as it has been—and none can be greater than the treacherous murder of English officers—has been committed, not by the ruler of the State, but by those who revolted against the ruler of the State. The ruler of the State now will be the ex-Maharaja who is at Calcutta, because

the Jubraj, as they call him, had not been recognised by the Government of India as the ruler of the State. I would say also, to come to questions of expediency, that it would be very undesirable to take over the government of a small hill State like Manipur. The State is in a very limited stage of civilization, totally unfit for our laws and regulations. It has been very fairly managed under the influence of British residents, and it is a State the annexation of which might bring us into collision with some of the neighbouring tribes, and, as any of your lordships who have paid attention to the matter know, these tribes on the north-east frontier of India have given very considerable trouble at different times. That was my own impression, and it has been confirmed by the opinion expressed by Sir James Johnson, who was for seven years resident in Manipur. Sir James Johnson's opinion upon a matter of this sort is one of great value. He is one of those excellent Indian officers who have devoted themselves towards the civilization of the hill tribes in India. He was employed for many years among some of the hill tribes in different parts of Bengal, and he was for seven years, I think, resident at Manipur. His opinion is that if we were to annex this little State we should be brought into collision with other tribes; we should probably be involved in several small expeditions and we should be also losing a source of strength which we now possess in this native State. He says, and I think quite rightly, that if this State had been annexed, we might very likely have lost the frontier station of Kohima because there would not have been any force of 2,000 men ready to defend Kohima from Manipur which really saved the place in 1879, and similar incidents might well take place. I do not know that I can add anything to what has fallen from other noble lords with regard to the feelings of the rulers of different native States in respect to annexation. One third part of the whole of British India consists of these native States. Their armies now number something like 300,000 men, and there is no doubt that they do watch most carefully any case in which they think the assurances given in 1858 are not carried out by the Government of India. Fortunately, I do not think that since 1858 there is any case in which they have a right to say that those assurances have not been strictly followed by the British Government. I was very glad to hear from the noble viscount, the Secretary of State for India, with all the due reservation with which he naturally spoke, previously to having realised the opinion of the Government of India upon the subject, that his own individual opinion was very much in accordance with the views which I have ventured to put before your lordships upon this matter. I was glad to hear what fell from the noble Duke [of Argyle] in regard to the manner in which the officers who are serving their queen and country in India should be treated both in Parliament and by the Government, and I will add that when I had the honour of serving under the noble Duke his dealings with me were entirely in accordance with the opinions which he has expressed in your lordships' House.

LORD REAY: At this late hour of the evening, I do not intend to detain your lordships very long; but as I have only recently returned from India, I am very anxious to corroborate what has been said with regard to the principles which at present dictate the ideas of the Government of India with regard to their relations with Indian States. A great deal of misconception seems to exist on that head, and if possible I should like to remove it. The motive of our interference in native States is as a rule for the benefit of the people of those Indian States and also of the dynasties of those Indian States. It is often overlooked that we do not interfere to weaken an Indian dynasty, but that we interfere to strengthen the hold of a native dynasty over its people. One of the best instances that can be given of this process is that which the noble Earl Lord Northbrook gave when he interfered in Baroda. What did we do in Baroda? We did not look for an incapable man, but we looked for a young Raja to whom we gave the best tutor we could find, and we made of him one of the best rulers who at present rule India. The result, therefore, of our interference was to strengthen the Government of Baroda, to establish better relations between it and the people, and the result has been that Baroda is now governed more on British principles than any other State in India. Now this is only one instance, and many others could be given. Perhaps, my lords, the best illustration that I could give is what happened to me personally when the brother of a native Chief came to me and asked me to interfere with his brother on this ground: he said, "You have taken away from us the means which we had when our States were governed in a less civilized manner, therefore it becomes your duty to interfere so that we may have our rights." Therefore, the interference in the affairs of a native State is for the general security of the State—for the general security of our own Empire, and for the benefit of the people in those States. Now the only question, my lords, which seems to me to be of importance is whether the interference of the Government of India in the affairs of Manipur was conducted in accordance with those principles which have hitherto prevailed in regard to our interference, and I think the question cannot be answered otherwise than in the affirmative. You could not restore the ex-Maharaja without, as we have seen, causing bloodshed in the State of Manipur. You could not, it seems to me, allow the Jubraj and the Senaputty to wield a kind of dual power; and when you therefore put the Jubraj on his gaddi, it became almost necessary and imperative to remove the cause of disturbance which then existed in the State. It is impossible to agree with what the Political Agent seems to have thought that the Senaputty would be a source of strength, and that his influence would be exercised in favour of his brother Jubraj. It seems to me, undoubtedly that after a certain time the Senaputty would have dealt with the second brother as he dealt with the senior one. Now, it is unfortunate, undoubtedly, that the Senaputty was not removed immediately after he had shewn his revolutionary tendencies; and I am sorry to say that the slowness of the Indian administration might undoubtedly in times of real trial become a source of danger, but anyone who has been connected with the Indian Administration knows that in this case the letters were not only answered with extraordinary promptitude but that I should be unable to quote out of the Archives of Bombay, at all events any instance in which letters had been answered so quickly as were those of the Chief Commissioner of Assam answered by the Government of India. On the other hand, the Chief Commissioner, when he read the original orders of the Government of India ought, it seems to me, undoubtedly to have seen the importance of putting a stop to the provisional Government. In India provisional Government ought undoubtedly not to last longer than is absolutely necessary. In the mutiny there was a case of the Senaputty of the Mahrattas. The news reached Poona as the Senaputty of the Mahrattas was collecting troops. A squadron of cavalry was sent at night to disperse the Senaputty, and the Senaputty was there and then taken, and in that way they nipped the revolution in the bud. I wish that something of that kind might have been done upon this occasion; but I admit for the slowness of the mechanism of the administration of the Government of India there is a great deal of excuse, and I am sure that no one will regret more that the action was not taken more promptly than the Viceroy when he reads the report of this debate. I must say that I think that is a mere question of delay and procedure; it is not a question which touches his policy, which, I think, originally was rightly conceived. Now, my lords, I was very glad to hear what was stated by the noble viscount that the Secretariat at the Foreign Office had been strengthened, and I was also very glad to hear that there was no idea of depriving the Viceroy of complete control of political affairs which I think it extremely important that he should have. One other point I wish to allude to—namely, the organisation of the political service. I think it extremely important that the organisation of the political service should be passed under review, and that if it is found that at present causes operate which do not induce the ablest men—either military men or civilians—to enter that service, those causes should be removed. I think it will be also found that very often after men have entered the service they find the promotion slow, at any rate as compared to promotion in other departments of the public service. I hope that will be corrected if possible. Then, my lords, I wish to say a few words upon the durbar question. I believe that a friendly durbar in the circumstances under which this durbar was held was a perfect impossibility; therefore the whole notion of treachery seems to me to be absolutely out of the question. The durbar would have been held as a Court, and all I can say is that so far from there being treachery, my impression from these papers is the reverse. My impression is that it was very much as if a police officer were to invite a man whom he was going to arrest to meet him in a police court. Certainly such action would not be treacherous, but it would probably deserve another name. At all events anyone who has known Mr. Quinton knows that he was quite incapable of doing anything which would be a dishonour to the English name. At the same time I agree with the remarks which have been made that arrests should not if possible be made in durbar. With regard to the question whether Manipur should be annexed or not, I think that such a step should only be taken in the last resort. At present when we find chiefs in any way defaulting, when we find it necessary to depose two—and, unfortunately, I found it necessary to depose two chiefs—our strength lies in this that the people and the members of those families know that we only undertake to rule for a short time and that the dynasty is restored to its legitimate rights whenever a member is found again who could rule according to those principles which we desire to see established in our great Indian Empire. Therefore, I hope that if annexation can be avoided it will be avoided. Before I sit down I wish only to say this, that I was very glad to hear the tribute which was given by the Government to the merits of the noble marquis who presides over the destinies of that great Empire. I am the only one of your lordships who has had the honour of being associated with him in the task which he performs so well and I wish upon this occasion to bear witness to the great ability, to the great conscientiousness with which he fulfils the duties which have devolved upon him and which have earned him the respect not only of his countrymen here but also of the natives in India. With regard to the horror of the massacre, not to incur the censure of the noble duke, I shall only say that I fully share in what must be the prevailing feeling in your lordships' House with regard to that.

The EARL OF DERBY: My lords, this question has been so thoroughly threshed out, it has been spoken too by so many noble lords who have had practical experience of Indian administration, and I will add that notwithstanding differences upon specific points there has been so general an agreement among us on the main principles involved that I almost hesitate to trouble you at all, and I shall only do so to the extent of a few words. In this business of Manipur there are three distinct and separate questions. There is the question of the policy pursued by the Government of India towards the State of Manipur. There is the question of the execution of that policy and the disaster to which it led. And, lastly, there is the far more important question what are we to do with that State in the future. One of those questions may be very easily disposed of. The misfortune which led to the loss of valuable lives is one as to which it can serve no useful purpose here to endeavour to apportion whatever blame there may be. To say nothing of the natural feeling towards those who cannot defend themselves, we cannot do it in justice, because those who are mainly concerned have their mouths closed: if they made mistakes they have far more than expiated them, and if there was on their part no error they are doubly unfortunate in being unable to repudiate unjust attacks. There are only I think one or two remarks which need be made upon that part of the case. In the first place popular information and report has enormously exaggerated the extent of the disaster. We heard at first of the sacrifice of 400 lives. Now it turns out, as I understand (I hope I am right), that the total loss does not exceed some 25 dead or missing. Well, everything goes by comparison and however we may regret such a misadventure it is not one on a great scale relatively to the armies of India and to the work which those armies have to do. Scarcely a year passes in which much larger

losses are not incurred in frontier expeditions which excite very little interest here and sometimes in accidents of which nobody ever hears. In the next place the military honour of the troops is safe. Acts of signal courage were performed and alleged causes of failure do not in any way touch the courage or the discipline of the soldiers engaged. And, lastly, let me suggest that we ought to be very slow to blame Indian officials when in the Civil or Military Service for acts which may seem to us rash and imprudent. If our officers in either service had been always prudent, if they had not often run risks which might have been avoided, without dishonour, we might have escaped a few mishaps, but our position in India would not be what it is. I have no doubt that such inquiry as is now possible is being made by the competent authorities, and in their hands I think we had better leave it, probably altogether, at any rate for the present. The question of policy is far more difficult and naturally leads to more difference of opinion. What I gather from all that has been written upon the subject, and from the speeches that I have heard here, points to the conclusion that in general there has been no desire to interfere unduly in the internal affairs of Manipur. That is the view of other noble lords whose authority goes far to decide the question, and the best proof that they are right, is that we were at one moment—I speak on the authority of the then Governor-General—about to withdraw our Resident altogether from the State of Manipur, when the late Raja desired that he should be allowed to remain. That does not look like a policy of undue interference on our part. My lords, I will not waste time in proving what is not disputed, but, looking at the position which we have assumed in India I do not think that our right to interfere when the revolution broke out can be denied. We had recognised the deposed Raja; we were bound not in any way to acquiesce in his deposition. No native would have thought that in using our discretion to give or to withhold the sanction of the paramount power we were going beyond our proper and legitimate sphere of action. And there is in such a case as this no question of ignoring or resisting the wish of the people because the revolution was one of an entirely oriental kind; it was a revolution of the Palace made simply by force. The Governor-General might accept the results of that revolution or he might reject them, but he could not reasonably say, and no one could say for him, or of him, that it was a matter with which he had nothing to do. He is responsible for the peace of India, and peace may always be endangered by a change of rulers in a native state. But the question of right is one thing, the question of policy is another; and if I ventured to express or even to form an opinion of my own upon a matter so doubtful, and about which we really know so little, I should have doubted whether it would not have been wiser to disregard at once the ruler who, though we might have no cause for quarrel with him, had run away from his country in a flight with very little cause, and who was evidently unfit for his position, and, in that case, to have accepted, unconditionally, the ruler who had replaced him and his advisers, and to influence and control the country through him. No doubt the new ruler would not have been a nominee of ours, he would not have owed his throne to us; but I do not know that that makes very much difference in the long run. There is a very memorable instance in Indian history. We all remember what happened in Afghanistan fifty years ago. We tried to put Shah Subjah on the throne, and we failed. He was replaced by the very man whom we had unsuccessfully tried to dethrone and whom we were compelled to recognise again, Dost Mahomed. Dost Mahomed was an able man, and saw that it was not his interest to bear malice, and he reigned for many years in perfectly good understanding with us. I do not say that the cases are precisely parallel, because of course Manipur is a dependent State, but I do not see why on a smaller scale the same results should not have followed. And I will own frankly, though with no wish to criticise, that I do not quite understand the policy recommended by my noble friend the Secretary of State. As I understand the speech of my noble friend he puts it in this way that it was quite right and judicious to recognise a new ruler, but that he had been placed on the throne by an unlawful revolt, and that therefore though he was to remain the people who had put him there ought to be punished. That is a new doctrine in politics. I do not understand accepting the results of a revolution and then proceeding to imprison or banish the people by whom it has been made.

VISCOUNT CROSS: I would like to say that it was specially stated that the Jubraj took no part whatever in the revolution; he had disappeared from Manipur for eight miles: it was only after his brother had gone away that he came back.

The EARL OF DERBY: The revolution was made to his advantage if not made by him. However, I do not want to argue that point because what I was going to say, and I say it quite unaffectedly, is that I shall entirely distrust my own judgment in a matter of this kind. It is a question which depends so much upon details, upon the character of the men, upon the feeling of the people, and upon the circumstances of the country that I do not believe any one here, and I hardly believe even my noble friend the Secretary of State is capable of pronouncing dogmatically. It is essentially a question for the Government of India. We give our Viceroy immense powers, we surround him with able assistants, and it is not wise I think to take such decisions out of his hands, he is better able to judge in such matters than we are, and what is perhaps still more important he is not exposed to those disturbing and distracting influences which prevail at home. As a matter of fact questions of this kind are I imagine commonly left to him, and it must be remembered that but for the military mishap which has caused all this discussion nothing would have been heard of the affair here, and it would have passed absolutely unnoticed. There is one point with regard to which I listened to the explanation of the Secretary of State with much satisfaction. I confess that in reading the papers I did not understand the long delay of the Government of India in coming to a decision. I think even now that the delay was unfortunate, because silence and forbearance give a sort of consent, and we might have been supposed to acquiesce in what we did not immediately resent; but I am bound to say that I think the Secretary of State has given sufficient reasons. Information had to be waited for. There was no distinct agreement among the authorities concerned, and no doubt other important business intervened. I still think the delay that occurred was a misfortune, but I do not think after what we have heard that it can be treated as a cause of censure. My lords, I do not think that it is worth while after all that has been said to go into the story of the durbar and the charge which has been made outside this House, but which has not been made here, of treachery and foul play against the Viceroy or his subordinates. The Governor General, I apprehend, is entirely out of the question. He could not have taken it upon himself to have arranged a detail of this kind, and as to the others a durbar, I take it, is merely a public audience of a formal kind. It may be held for all sorts of purposes; it has no sacred character about it. The real question is: Was anybody invited there called upon to attend there, under an implied promise of safety, and was that promise violated? For my own part I do not believe that to be likely or even to be possible. On that point, which is really the important part of the question, the officers concerned have been completely exculpated not only by the Government but by others who speak independently. If it is only a question of etiquette, especially if it is determined that to avoid misunderstanding no such proceeding shall take place in the future, I do not think that matter is worth discussing. But, my lords, the question still remains, and it is really that upon which I rose to speak—what is to be done with Manipur? Upon that question I wish to join my humble and earnest representations to those of my noble friends, and to say whatever we do, do not annex it. I do not think we could possibly ask from the Secretary of State a more formal and binding pledge than that which he has given. He could not speak in a definite manner without reference to the Government of India, but though I agree with the noble duke, who has left the House, that Parliament had better not interfere habitually in Indian affairs, I think there are exceptions to the rule, and that this is one of them. As we all know, there exists in India, always has existed, and probably always will, both among soldiers and civilians, and for reasons which we can very easily understand, a strong feeling in favour of annexation, and what I wish is, not that we should interfere with the discretion of Lord Lansdowne, but that we should give him such support as is in our power to help him to resist that feeling. It is not merely that annexation of a very poor State surrounded by wild tribes would be a source of increased military expense—though it certainly would be, and that is rather serious, because as we all know finance is the one weak point of our Indian Administration—but we have to look, as several noble lords have said before me, to the effect produced over the whole of India. Everybody who remembers the year 1857, and the events which followed, knows how widespread was the feeling of insecurity and distrust prevailing at that time among the native princes. They had seen many of their kingdoms swept away, and no one knew whether his turn might not come next. When the Company's power ceased, in 1858, opportunity was taken to give solemn assurances that the policy of annexation (for so I must call it) was at an end. Those assurances produced a complete change of feeling. For the last thirty-three years, the native princes have been our best friends, and they would stand by us in case of need, because their interests are ours. We protect them, we respect their position, and a good many of them know that if the day of our expulsion from India were ever to arrive, their thrones would be, to say the least, very insecure. But though they trust us, and though they act cordially with us, it is not possible that they should entirely forget the past, and I believe that one native State annexed within the limits of India, whatever might be the justification, would create a feeling of alarm from Cashmere and Cape Comorin. I do not know that any benefit could be conferred upon us or upon Manipur itself by annexing that State, but certainly no such benefit could be worth the risk of mischief done elsewhere, and I am quite sure from what he has said that the Secretary of State for India, and the Government know the recent history of India as well as I do, if they think it necessary to practise a certain amount of reticence agree with me in what I have said. That is really the one important and the one practical part of this whole discussion. The rest relates to the past—to matters which are disposed of and cannot be altered. But we must have no more of the Dalhousie policy. We must have no more annexation. The native Princes trust us now. This is an occasion to show that we deserve their confidence, and I hope and believe that we shall avail ourselves of it.

The MARQUIS of RIPON: I do not propose to detain your lordships more than a moment or two. I am very well content to rest myself upon what has fallen from my noble friend the Earl of Kimberley and from the noble earl who has just sat down, and who has expressed his views with so much force and power. But one matter fell from the noble viscount upon which I want to say a single word. He spoke of me as having complained of the secrecy of some of Mr. Quinton's proceedings. I beg the noble viscount to understand that when I spoke of the secrecy of those proceedings I did not use the expression in a disparaging sense to Mr. Quinton. I regretted that the intentions of the Government were not earlier and more openly declared, but I never had it in my mind for a moment to think that Mr. Quinton pursued a secret course in any dishonourable or unworthy manner. I am anxious to make that statement because Mr. Quinton has been, as I think, so unjustly attacked that I should be exceedingly sorry if I could be supposed to have said anything disparaging to him in any way.

VISCOUNT CROSS: I am sure the noble marquis will not think that I have said one word in disparagement of Mr. Quinton.

The MARQUIS of RIPON: Quite so.

The motion for papers was agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS. JUNE 22.

THE CEYLON PADDY TAX.

Mr. SCHWANN (Manchester, N.): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether the Secretary of State for the Colonies has now come to a decision as to the abolition of the paddy tax in Ceylon, and the substitution for it, of taxation which does not press upon the most impoverished class of cultivators in that island.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Baron H. de Worms, Liverpool, Toxteth): Her Majesty's Government have not yet come to a decision upon this question.

MADRAS.

Mr. HENNIKER HEATON (Canterbury) deferred his question to the Under Secretary of India as to whether the Government will print and lay upon the table the reports of the ex-Governor of the Madras Presidency on the progress, resources, and capabilities of that portion of Her Majesty's dominions.

JUNE 23.

LOTTERIES IN INDIA.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL (Kirkcaldy): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, what was the result of the reference to India promised by him, regarding the practice of drawing lotteries in India with many large prizes on the result of races, and the extensive system of public gambling resulting from the practice of carrying on such transactions nominally by clubs and associations, but really open to the public.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir John Gorst, Chatham): The subject of the hon. member's question has been inquired into in India, and the result is that it did not appear that any infringement of the law has taken place except in Burma, and that steps have there been taken to prevent the law from being disregarded in future.

Sir G. CAMPBELL: I understand from the right hon. gentleman's answer that the practice will be put a stop to in the future?

Sir J. GORST: Yes, sir.

BLACK MOUNTAIN AND MIRANZIE MILITARY EXPEDITIONS.

Sir GEORGE CAMPBELL: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether, now that the Black Mountain and Miranzie military expeditions have been brought to a conclusion, Her Majesty's Government will lay upon the table papers showing the circumstances under and the orders by which they were undertaken.

Sir J. GORST: Yes, sir; Her Majesty's Government will very shortly lay papers on the table relating to these expeditions.

BRITISH MANUFACTURES IN INDIA.

Mr. PARKER SMITH (Lanark, Partick): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether it is the fact that there is a regulation of the Indian Government under which all British manufactures required for Government works, such as the State Railways, require to be purchased through Indian firms only; and, if so, what are the terms of that regulation, and on what grounds officers in charge of public works in India are hindered from purchasing goods direct from the manufacturers in this country, without the necessity of paying commissions to intermediate agents in India.

Sir J. GORST: Articles required for Government works, such as the State Railways, if manufactured in the United Kingdom, must not be purchased from Indian firms, but obtained by indent from the stores department of the India Office. Supplies of materials, tools and plant, made of iron and steel, if manufactured locally, may be obtained from India.

THE MANIPUR DISASTER.

Mr. CREMER (Shoreditch, Haggerston): I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for India, if he can state whether the Government of India have arrived at any decision in regard to the sentences recently pronounced upon the Jubraj and the Senaputty;

And, whether, as the Government have requested further information from the Government of India concerning the occurrences at Manipur, Her Majesty's Government will urge the Government of India to spare the lives of the Jubraj and the Senaputty until complete information is received and Her Majesty's Government are in a position to review fully all the circumstances of the case?

Sir. J. GORST: The answer to the first paragraph of the hon. member's question is in the negative. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed for the evidence in these cases to have reached the Government of India, and the Government of India has given the Senaputty three weeks for the presentation of a petition. In reply to the second paragraph of the question I may say that the Secretary of State does not see any necessity for sending further instructions or fettering the discretion of the Government of India in the proper exercise of which he has full confidence.

Mr. CREMER: May I ask the right hon. gentleman if the sentences which have been pronounced on the Jubraj and the Senaputty are likely under any circumstances to come under the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, and whether Her Majesty's Government are likely to exercise any control over the carrying out of the sentences?

Sir J. GORST: I am sure the hon. member will see that I cannot be expected to say what is likely to happen. I can only state what is happening. The evidence is on its way to the Government of India, and the Governor-General has given three weeks to the Jubraj and the Senaputty to present a petition. They will no doubt most carefully consider the evidence. The Secretary of State has full confidence that the Government of India will carry out their duty properly.

PENSIONS TO MRS. GRIMWOOD AND MRS. QUINTON.

Mr. SCHWANN (Manchester, N.): I wish to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether it is true that an extra pension of £300 a year each has been granted to Mrs. Grimwood and Mrs. Quinton;

Whether they will be furnished out of Imperial or Indian resources;

And, if out of Indian resources, on what ground such a charge will be thrown on the Indian exchequer?

Sir J. GORST: The hypothesis on which the hon. member has founded his question is inaccurate.

INDAIN GRIEVANCES.

Mr. S. SMITH (Flintshire) gave notice that on an early day he will call attention to the proceedings of the National Indian Congress, and to the first resolution passed by that body representing that the people of India suffer serious grievances under British rule, consequent upon the absence of all elective representation of the people of India on the legislative councils of the Empire, or will move "that it is expedient to appoint a Royal Commission composed partly of representative Indians and partly of Europeans unconnected with the Indian services to inquire into the justice and expedience of those demands; such Commission to sit in India during the winter for the purpose of taking evidence."

JUNE 25.

REPORTS RESPECTING MADRAS.

Mr. HENNIKER HEATON (Canterbury): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether the Secretary of State for India will print and lay upon the table of the House the valuable Reports of the Governor of the Madras Presidency on the progress, resources, and capabilities of that portion of Her Majesty's dominions.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): The reports in question have been published in the Madras Government press, and can be procured through the ordinary channels. It is, therefore, hardly necessary to republish them in the form of a return.

FAMINE IN SOUTH INDIA.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH (Flintshire): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, whether his attention has been drawn to the Report of Mr. Tremenheere, the highest revenue official in the district in South India where the famine prevails, describing the condition of the poor people at Senneri, of whom he says that "their state is not appreciably lower than usual; a large proportion of them are always badly nourished, clad (if at all) in the vilest rags;" and also states that they are suffering from disease, and are living in wretched huts:

And whether the Government of India are taking any steps in the matter?

Sir J. GORST: The Secretary of State has not received the particular report cited, nor can he identify the name of the place given in the question. Perhaps Pouneri is meant, which is the relief centre for one of the poorest parts of the Chingleput district. Owing to uncertainties of season, parts of Chingleput are decidedly poor. The fortnightly telegrams received from Madras show that over 7,000 people were receiving Government relief a fortnight ago. The Chingleput district is served by two railways from Madras, and food can easily be brought thither. We must look to the progress of the country; the growth of other industries, and emigration to Burma for the gradual amelioration of the condition of the people in Chingleput.

SALE OF OPIUM IN BOMBAY.

Mr. SAMUEL SMITH: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether it is the case that while at Thana, a few miles out of Bombay, there are only two persons reported as holding the Government licence to sell opium, these two licenses carry with them the power to open branch establishments, and these two licences have in all no less than twenty-eight servants who are keeping opium dens all over the district;

And, whether any mention is made in the Government Returns of these sub-agents, and other similar cases throughout India?

Sir J. GORST: The Secretary of State has seen in a London newspaper a statement to the effect suggested in the question, but he thinks the statement erroneous. The latest Bombay return shows twenty-two licensed shops in the Thana district instead of two, as stated in the question. There is nothing in the reports or papers received from Bombay, or from any other province, to show that licensed opium vendors are permitted to establish branch shops for which they hold no licence.

SALE OF OPIUM IN BURMA.

Mr. HENRY J. WILSON (York, W.R., Holmforth): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, what is the total number of places licensed for the sale of opium in Burma;

What is the total number in other parts of India;

Whether the licence-holders are required to sell a specified quantity of opium.

What is the quantity or, if variable, what is the average quantity so specified;

Whether the same form of licence is used in all parts of India;

And, whether he will lay upon the table a copy of the licence, or of each kind of licence, if more than one is used?

Sir J. GORST: The total number of places licensed for the sale of opium in Burma is 36; in other parts of India 8,798. Licensed holders are required to sell a specified quantity in Bombay; but, so far as the Secretary of State is aware, not in any other province. The average minimum scale specified for the seventeen districts of Bombay is 9,412 pounds per district. The average actual sale is somewhat less. If the hon. member will move for a return of the forms of licence the Secretary of State will procure them from India.

JUNE 26.

MRS. QUINTON AND MRS. GRIMWOOD.

Mr. SCHWANN (Manchester, N.): I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for India what is the total amount of the yearly pensions accorded to Mrs. Quinton and to Mrs. Grimwood from the Bengal Civil Fund and from the special pensions just awarded to them, respectively;

Will the amount of these pensions, and also the £1,000 granted to Mrs. Grimwood for exceptional services, be wholly borne by the Indian or partly by the Imperial Exchequer;

And, if by the former, on what grounds?

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): Both Mrs. Quinton and Mrs. Grimwood are entitled to pensions of £330 a year from the Bengal Civil Service Fund—a fund to which their husbands contributed, Mrs. Quinton will receive in addition a special pension of £300, and Mrs. Grimwood a special pension of £140. These pensions, except so far as they come out of the contributions of Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood to the Bengal Civil Fund, will be paid out of Indian Revenues because Mr. Quinton and Mr. Grimwood were officers in the service of the Indian Government.

THE MANIPUR PRINCES.

Mr. SCHWANN: I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India, with reference to the sentences of death lately passed on the two Manipur Princes, whether he is aware that an appeal lies to the Viceroy of India, and that the Viceroy exercises appellate functions similar to those of the High Court, and is therefore bound to hear counsel on the case;

Whether he is aware that the Manipur Princes have appointed counsel to appear for them, and that the Viceroy declines to hear counsel on their behalf, though the trial is professedly judicial;

And, whether the Secretary of State for India will make representations to the Viceroy on the subject?

Sir J. GORST: The Secretary of State is informed that the Viceroy does not exercise in this matter appellate functions similar to those of the High Court. The Government of India as the paramount power, have appointed a tribunal for the trial of the accused at Manipur, and have reserved to themselves the power to deal with the sentences passed by such tribunal according as they may consider advisable after perusal of the papers in the case. Under these circumstances it would be unusual for the Viceroy to hear counsel.

JUNE 29.

THE RESIDENCY MAGISTRATE AT BOMBAY.

Mr. DONALD CRAWFORD (Lanark, N.E.): I beg to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the Bombay Government have asked the Secretary of State to sanction the appointment of Mr. W. C. Webb, barrister-at-law, as third Presidency magistrate at Bombay;

Whether Mr. Webb fulfils the conditions laid down by the orders of the Secretary of State and the rules of the Government of India, viz., that such appointments should be treated as "very special cases;" that the barrister so appointed should be a person of exceptional merit, and distinguished ability in the exercise of his profession for at least ten years, and should possess a thorough knowledge of the vernacular language of the province;

Whether he is aware that, although the Secretary of State has laid it down that the judicial branch of the provincial service should be essentially a native service, if Mr. Webb is appointed, the Presidency magistrates will be exclusively European;

Whether there is no competent and qualified native barrister, advocate, or pleader of the High Court now available for the appointment;

Whether a protest against Mr. Webb's appointment has been received from the Bombay Presidency Association;

And, whether the Secretary of State is aware that the native public and press are strongly opposed to Mr. Webb's appointment?

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (Sir J. Gorst, Chatham): The answer to the first paragraph of the hon. member's question is, in the affirmative, but as the matter of the appointment of the third Presidency magistrate at Bombay is now under the consideration of the Secretary of State in Council, I trust that the hon. member will defer his other questions until a decision has been arrived at.

Mr. D. CRAWFORD: Will the right hon. gentleman give an assurance that the appointment will not be confirmed until an opportunity shall have been afforded for considering it?

Sir JOHN GORST: I have no authority to give any such assurance. The hon. member must put a question on the paper, and I must take the opinion of the Secretary of State with regard to it.

THE MANIPUR PRINCES.

Mr. SCHWANN (Manchester, N.) deferred his question to ask the Under Secretary of State for India whether the action of the Viceroy of India in refusing to hear the counsel appointed by the Manipur Princes (now under sentence of death) to appear before him is based on precedent, *i.e.*, by what is usual or unusual or by some act or ordinance: and, in the latter case, under what act or ordinance.

THE POPULATION OF INDIA AS COMPARED WITH EUROPE.

MR. BAINES' INTERESTING AND VALUABLE COMPARISONS.

IN his preliminary report on the recent census taken in India Mr. J. A. Baines, the Census Commissioner, makes some most interesting comparisons. Before quoting a few paragraphs from his report we may indicate the comparisons to which we refer.

BENGAL, with a population nine millions larger than that of the UNITED STATES, spreads over *an area less than* ONE-TWENTY-THIRD of the latter country.

NORTH-WEST PROVINCES and OUDH, with the population of the GERMAN EMPIRE, *has less than half its area.*

MADRAS corresponds with ITALY and BELGIUM.

THE PANJAB corresponds with SPAIN and PORTUGAL.

BOMBAY (omitting Sind), with a population between HUNGARY and SPAIN, *is considerably less in area than* HUNGARY.

CENTRAL PROVINCES, with the population of HOLLAND and BELGIUM, has an area three-and-a-half times greater than those countries.

ASSAM, in area and population, corresponds with ROUMANIA.

On the census as a whole, the Commissioner says:—"The population dealt with will amount, when the full returns for the Feudatory States are in, to just under 286 millions, of which 220½ live in British territory and 65½ under feudatory rule. During the decade that has passed since the last enumeration, the gross increase has been 29 millions, the population of Italy or Prussia at their last census. Deducting 3 millions of population not brought under the census of 1881, the balance of 26 millions exceeds the whole population of cis-Leithian Austria added in ten years to the soil of India. Taking only British territory and excluding Upper Burma as a new acquisition, it appears that the population has risen from 198,655,160 to 217,487,370, which is about 1·6 per cent. above what I estimated in 1889 would be the probable number for whom schedules and enumerators would have to be provided. This indicates an annual rate of increase very nearly 14 per ten thousand higher than I thought would be the case. The actual growth is just under 9½ per cent., and the slight relatively greater increase amongst females is no doubt attributable to greater confidence in the intentions of the Government in taking a census rather than to an irregular advance of the sexes. We may account, I think, for the comparatively more rapid increase in Feudatory territory in the same way; and in certain instances, as, for example, in the case of the Central Province Feudatories, there seems no doubt that the abnormal increase is mainly due to the fact that many of these small States happen to be just now more directly under British control or administration than they were ten years ago, as the difference between the rates of increase in the two sexes seems to indicate that immigration is not to be credited with the variation. On the other hand, there are instances where the female rate falls below that of males, and this is apparently more markedly a characteristic of the tracts most severely afflicted by the great famine of 1876-78 than of places which have enjoyed normal circumstances since 1881. The point is one that will receive due attention when dealing with the full returns as without the age-tables it is futile to attempt explanation."

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Printed by A. BONNER, 34, Bouverie Street, Fleet Street, London, E.C. and Published by WM. DIGBY, 25, Craven Street, Charing Cross, W.C.